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1. Introduction 
 
“Development is about transforming the lives of 
people, not just transforming economies.”  
Joseph E. Stiglitz (2007) 
 
1.1 Alternative concepts of well-being and development and the aim of 
this thesis 
What is development and well-being all about? Can we define it in terms of 
monetary wealth and economic growth or is there more behind it? Many economists 
have tried to tackle these questions in the past. One of the most famous non-monetary 
approaches to development is Amartya Sen’s capability approach that focuses upon 
individuals’ capability to achieve the kind of life they want to achieve (Sen 1985). Or as 
Sen puts it: “Development can be seen (…) as a process of expanding the real freedoms 
that people enjoy” (Sen 1999, p.3). The capability to lead a good life is determined by a 
set of abilities, for example the ability to live to old age, to be in good health, or to 
participate in political discussions. These factors, in turn, are often closely linked to 
income, given that individuals with a higher income are, for example, more likely to be 
better nourished and educated (Sen 1999, p. 19). Sen’s capability approach was also 
embodied in the Human Development Index (HDI) that was introduced in 1990 by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The idea was to provide country-
level data for a broad range of aspects related to human life and to allow for better 
comparability and measurement of well-being across countries, with a concept of 
welfare that goes beyond the traditional indicators such as gross national income per 
capita (Stanton 2007).
1
 The idea that well-being is not exclusively connected with 
monetary wealth has become the overwhelmingly broad consensus nowadays. The 
OECD (2006, p. 130), for example, states that “(…) well-being is a more fundamental 
goal than GDP. It would be perverse to strive for faster growth of output if this entailed 
reducing the well-being of the current and future generations.”  
                                                 
1
 The Human Development Index is a composite index of indicators of educational attainment, income 
and life expectancy and therefore includes both the monetary aspects and non-monetary aspects of well-
being in a single indicator. 
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A broader development perspective has also been taken for the definition of the 
Millennium Development Goals that were established at the Millennium summit in 
2000 and aimed at achieving a set of development goals until the year 2015 (which 
should thus, at best, be successfully reached shortly after the delivery of this thesis). The 
goals include the eradication of poverty and hunger, the achievement of universal 
primary education, the reduction of child mortality and the improvement of maternal 
health as well as well as the combat against HIV, malaria and other diseases. The 
improvement of the above-mentioned factors is viewed as crucial for increased well-
being in developing countries. Some of these development goals or factors closely 
related to them will be principal discussion points in the subsequent chapters.  
The central motivation for this thesis is to illuminate various aspects of well-
being and development for a global set of countries taking a long-term perspective. The 
calculation of a historic HDI would be a straightforward approach. However, the 
necessary data is only available for certain – mostly rich – countries from the late 19th 
century onwards (Crafts 2002). Instead, alternative non-monetary indicators for the 
measurement of development-related issues – for example anthropometric indicators as 
a proxy for the biological standard of living and ABCC indices
2
 as a proxy for 
educational achievements – are used to offer alternative and additional insights into 
development-related topics. Unlike conventional indicators of well-being, the 
measurement approaches applied here have the advantage that data is available for a 
larger range of countries and historical time periods.  
As the thesis is not written as a scientific monograph but consists of five 
separate papers that are intended for individual publication, the subject range is quite 
broad. There are nevertheless some connections among the individual papers that run 
like a red thread through the thesis: firstly, all papers address the issue of well-being and 
development on a global scale. Secondly, as stated above, all of them take a rather non-
monetary approach to development, thus covering a broader range of factors (e.g. 
health, nutrition, hygiene, etc.). Thirdly, a long-term view is taken where possible. Last 
but not least, anthropology plays a major role in the individual papers and therefore the 
                                                 
2
 The name resulted from the initials of the authors’ last names (A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen) plus 
Gregory Clark’s, who suggested this transformation of the Whipple index in a comment on their paper. 
The index and measurement issues are described in detail in Appendix A. 
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thesis also serves as an example of how versatile anthropometric indicators can be used 
as an alternative to conventional ways of measuring well-being: they do not only serve 
as a proxy for the biological standard of living itself, but can also be a tool for 
differentiating between dissimilar social strata, as shown in chapter 2, or applied as an 
indicator of inequality, as will be done in chapter 3. While the first two papers rather 
focus on the determinants and development of certain development-related topics, 
namely educational inequality and civil war onset, the subsequent three sections focus 
on measures to improve development and well-being as well as their actual outcomes. 
As anthropometric indicators play an important role in four of the five papers, an 
introduction into this alternative indicator of well-being is provided below. 
 
1.2 Measuring well-being with anthropometric indicators 
The biological standard of living – a term that was introduced by Komlos (1985) 
to describe the measurement of well-being based on biological factors – is by now a 
well-established concept for the evaluation of welfare and poverty (Fogel 2012). 
Anthropometric indicators, that is, measures of human stature
3
, are not only used in 
academic research, but also in International Organisations as these have recognised “the 
relevance of anthropometry throughout life, not only for individual assessments but also 
for reflecting the health status and social and economic circumstances of population 
groups” (WHO 1995). Indeed, several studies were able to show that anthropometrics 
can provide valuable information on important aspects of well-being and development, 
also for periods and countries where data on these issues is scarce (Baten 2000a; 2000b; 
Baten and Blum 2012; Floud et al. 2011; Koepke and Baten 2005; Komlos and Baten 
1998, among others). 
People who get in touch with anthropometrics for the first time often argue that 
height cannot be an appropriate measure of welfare since it is not only affected by 
environmental conditions, e.g. nutrition and health, but is mainly determined by 
genetics. This is partly true for individual height, although genetics only determine how 
tall a person could become under optimal environmental circumstances while the actual 
                                                 
3
 Anthropometry in general refers to the measurement of human individuals. Therefore anthropometric 
indicators do not only include height, but also weight for height or weight for age as well as the body 
mass index or mid-upper arm circumference. 
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prevailing conditions determine whether a human being reaches its full genetic height 
potential (Eveleth and Tanner 1976, p. 222). The average height of a population group, 
however, is an indicator for the degree of this group’s well-being during early 
childhood. More specifically, while the variation in height between individuals might be 
determined by genetic factors, the variation between means of population groups is 
determined by the childhood environment of each population group, including 
nutritional, hygienic, disease and stress factors, among others (Deaton 2013, p.156; 
Tanner 1994). Komlos and Kriwny (2003) make this picture very clear in their essay on 
average height and height variation in Eastern and Western Germany before and after 
unification. The authors show that – although the genetic potential in both parts of 
Germany was uniform – West Germans became increasingly taller than East Germans 
over the period under study due to worsening socioeconomic, environmental and 
medical circumstances in the German Democratic Republic. After unification, East 
German males were able to catch up in terms of height with their Western counterparts. 
A similar finding has been reported for North and South Korea (Pak 2004). This clearly 
shows that anthropometric indicators are a powerful tool for the evaluation of the 
environmental conditions of population groups. While height measures are often used to 
examine differences in well-being between countries, the indicators can also shed light 
on different social groups within a certain region (see, for example, Baten and Böhm 
2009).   
The final height of an individual is determined mainly during the first years of 
life (Baten 2000; Eveleth and Tanner 1990; Schmidt et al. 1995). Consequently, the 
average adult height, which will repeatedly be used as a measure for well-being in this 
thesis, reflects the environmental conditions of a certain birth cohort at early childhood, 
not at the time of measurement. Moreover, as mentioned above, height is a reflection of 
several factors, such as the nutritional intake, health and physical activity; in short, 
factors that determine the net nutrition (Steckel 2008; Deaton 2013). It is therefore 
closely linked to income, as people who are deprived in terms of material well-being are 
also less likely to have access to highly nutritious food and medical care. But if there is 
a clear relationship between anthropometric indicators and traditional welfare-indicators 
such as GDP per capita, why don’t we use these conventional measures of well-being 
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anyway? Firstly, anthropometric data is often available for periods and regions, for 
which income data is scarce, lacking, or unreliable. Moreover, it also covers income 
groups that are not included in income or wage data, such as slaves, clandestine workers 
or children, and may even reflect resource allocation at the household level (Steckel 
1995, 2009). Finally, traditional purchasing-power based indicators of well-being have 
been criticised for not sufficiently measuring basic human needs, such as health. 
Despite these criticisms, it would be misleading to claim that anthropometric indicators 
are superior to traditional welfare measures. Particularly in rich countries with good 
data availability and low levels of malnutrition, monetary measures such as GDP per 
capita and Gini coefficients provide a good overview of levels of welfare and 
inequality. Anthropometric indicators should therefore be seen as a complementary tool 
that provides important additional insights and helps to get a comprehensive picture of 
historical and current developments of well-being. 
 
1.3 Outline 
The thesis comprises five sections that are intended for separate publication and 
are therefore referred to as papers. Three out of five papers are co-authored with Joerg 
Baten (chapters 2, 3, and 4). At the time of submission of this thesis, the papers of 
chapter two and three have been published. The other working papers are to be 
submitted in the near future.  
The thesis is structured as follows: in chapter two, the educational inequality 
between rich and poor, as well as tall and short individuals is examined, putting a 
special focus on globalisation’s role in increasing or reducing educational inequality. 
Furthermore, a modified Kuznets inverted U hypothesis, that is, increasing educational 
inequality with rising GDP p.c., is tested. While the paper focuses on Latin America for 
the 18
th
 to early 20
th
 century using a large body of new evidence on educational 
inequality, a broader range of countries is examined for the mid-20
th
 century. The 
results show that educational inequality in Latin America increased in the “First Era of 
Globalisation” (1850-1913) while the contrary is true for 20th century globalisation for a 
broader sample of developing countries. Moreover, it is of note that large educational 
differences have not always existed in developing countries: the evidence shows that in 
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Mexico, for example, differences in educational achievement between the richer and the 
poorer strata of the population was modest in the 18
th
 century but gradually increased 
over time. Strong evidence is found for Kuznets’ inverted U hypothesis, which was on 
the rise during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries in Latin America and tended to fall in the 
second half of the 20
th
 century in the developing world.  
In chapter three, the influence of absolute and relative deprivation – proxied by 
anthropometric measures – on civil war risk is examined. The study takes a long-term 
view, analysing civil wars from 1816 to 1999 for a global sample. Studies that assessed 
the relationship between average income or income inequality and civil war onset have 
often been limited by severe data problems for the conflict-struck and poor world 
regions; in particular, inequality indicators are rarely available for countries of interest 
(Miguel et al. 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The problem of data scarcity is overcome 
here by using an extensive data base for inequality in well-being. The results indicate 
that inequality was a major trigger of civil war for the period and countries under 
research. The evidence for the correlation between absolute welfare levels and the 
probability of civil war outbreak turns out to be less clear.  
Chapter two and three show that inequality is one of the main obstacles to poor 
countries’ social and economic development. The second half of this thesis therefore 
focuses on certain efforts that have been undertaken by the international community to 
reduce inequality so far. One possibility to fight inequality and poverty in general is to 
provide foreign aid to developing countries. Chapter four, five and six seek to give an 
answer to the question whether attempts to reduce poverty and thereby inequality by 
providing foreign aid had positive impacts on recipients’ well-being or rather produced 
adverse effects for the recipient country and its inhabitants.  
In chapter four, the focus is put on the impacts of overall official development 
assistance (ODA) on recipients’ well-being. Previous studies mostly used GDP per 
capita growth to assess whether aid has welfare-enhancing effects. However, as was 
already pointed out by the opening quote of this thesis, development is not only about 
transforming economies, but rather about transforming the lives of people. Therefore, 
anthropometric indicators are once again used as outcome variables. It can be shown 
that foreign aid had a significantly negative short-term effect on well-being in the 1960s 
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to late-1970s. The negative effect becomes insignificant for later periods of time. 
Slightly more favourable results are found when a long-term perspective is taken, 
indicating that it might take some time until investments in development pay off. 
Moreover, the results suggest that foreign aid has become more efficient over time, 
although positive outcomes are still counter-balanced by adverse effects. 
In the two subsequent chapters, I take a more specific look at food aid. Food aid 
may improve the nutritional intake of the poorer strata of the population, thereby 
reducing inequality. This special form of foreign assistance has triggered heated debates 
for decades but very few empirical studies have been produced to confirm or refute the 
– mostly negative – presumptions about food aid’s effects (Awokouse 2010; Barrett 
2001; Lavy 1990; Schultz 1960). The specific impacts of food aid on malnutrition and 
stunting of children in recipient countries are assessed in chapter five. The results show 
that food aid is positively and significantly correlated with the percentage of children 
that are not stunted for the post-1995 period. Children’s weight, which is reacting more 
promptly than height, is not found to be significantly affected by foreign food 
provisions. As a substantial literature has commented on the fact that nutritional support 
by different donors might have substantially different outcomes, this discussion point is 
also examined by taking a closer look at the two most important food aid donors: the 
United States and multilateral organisations. However, the impact of nutritional support 
on recipients’ well-being does not differ significantly among donors, according to the 
results. To cut a long story short, while this thesis cannot give the final answer 
regarding the impacts of food aid on well-being, it contributes to the discussion by 
providing empirical results for the relationship between nutritional support and 
anthropometric indicators. 
In chapter six, I look at the effects of food aid from a different angle: the 
question whether food aid has adverse effects on the recipient countries’ agriculture is 
empirically examined. More specifically, the chapter takes a closer look at the persistent 
concern that food aid creates producer disincentives in recipient countries by increasing 
food supply and thereby lowering local food prices. Another major concern that has 
frequently been raised is that nutritional support might shift recipient governments’ 
investments away from the local agriculture, thus reducing agricultural productivity. I 
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therefore provide an empirical assessment of whether food aid actually decreased food 
production in general and wheat production in particular (as wheat plays a major role 
with regard to in-kind food aid provisions) for a global sample from the mid-1970s to 
late-2000s. It turns out that I cannot support the mostly negative results put forward by 
prominent scholars like Schultz (1960). In fact, giving more food aid does not cause 
lower overall food production but is rather positively related to wheat output one year 
after the nutritional support was provided. Chapter seven summarises the findings and 
provides directions for future research. 
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2. Globalisation and educational inequality during the 
18th to 20th centuries: Latin America in global 
comparison 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores inequality of numeracy and education by studying school years and 
numeracy of rich and poor, as well as tall and short individuals. To estimate numeracy, 
the age heaping method is used for the 18
th
 to early-20
th
 century. Testing the hypothesis 
that globalisation might have increased inequality of education, we find evidence that 
19
th
 century globalisation actually increased inequality in Latin America, but 20
th
 
century globalisation had positive effects by reducing educational inequality in a 
broader sample of developing countries. Moreover, we find strong evidence for 
Kuznets’ inverted U hypothesis, that is, rising educational inequality with GDP per 
capita in the period until 1913 and the opposite after 1945.  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on an article by Baten and Mumme (2010) and was published in 
the Journal of Iberian and Latin American History, 28(2), pp. 279-305. The concept of 
the paper was developed jointly, empirical analysis and writing were equally shared. In 
contrast to the published paper, British spelling conventions were followed in this 
thesis. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Inequality is an important factor in today’s globalisation of the world economy 
and one of the underlying causes of income inequality - educational inequality - is at the 
core of the debate. Educational inequality is in many cases difficult to measure because 
micro surveys, which are not normally comparable across countries and periods, are 
necessary. This contribution uses the numeracy difference between occupational groups 
as a measure of inequality for the period from the 18
th
 to the early-20
th
 century, and the 
difference in years of schooling between the taller and shorter half of the female 
population as a measure for late-20
th
 century educational inequality. For the earlier 
period we concentrate on Latin America, a region where 20
th
 century income inequality 
is famously high, and for the latter period we compare the countries of this region with 
less developed countries (LDCs) and medium-income countries elsewhere.  
The relationship between globalisation and educational inequality is one of 
today's major issues. Is it possible that the current globalisation will fail, just as the 
previous globalisation tendency in the period 1850-1914 did, because inequality 
stimulates anti-integration forces? Timmer and Williamson (1998) found that during the 
19
th
 century, inequality in new world countries such as the USA, Brazil, Argentina, 
Canada and Australia provoked anti-immigration policies that led to the disintegration 
of Atlantic labour markets. Rising inequality could also decrease the legitimation of 
international integration, so that those groups which normally benefit from it (e.g. the 
well-educated in rich countries and world inhabitants in general) might not give it their 
full support.  
There are other reasons why the study of educational inequality determinants is 
important. Firstly, inequality is now often considered as a component of the standard of 
living: Being at the bottom of the income distribution is much harder to bear if the 
distance to the wealthier part of the economy is large, and educational inequality is a 
determinant of later income inequality. This also applies to the inequality of schooling 
(Castello and Domenech 2002; Thomas et al. 2001). 
Wood (1997) argued that for the 1980s and 1990s more open trade increased 
wage inequality in some parts of the world, particularly in Latin America (Wood 1997; 
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UN 1995; Cepal 2004). His studies have focused on the 1980s and 1990s. The question 
is whether the relationship of globalisation and inequality holds before the 1980s. In our 
study we are not restricted to only two decades. We are able to analyse the relationship 
for three centuries and will assess the difference between educational inequality in the 
‘First Era of Globalisation Period’, as O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) defined 
it - namely, the 1850-1913 period - with the early phases. For a second study period, 
1945-1984, we will use the openness indices of Sachs and Warner as well as trade 
shares to assess whether openness increased educational inequality. Inequality, though, 
is a complex phenomenon and many potential determinants should be taken into 
account as well as globalisation. We will therefore control for as many other potential 
determinants as possible. 
Why should openness matter for educational inequality? Most research in this 
field has focused on income inequality in OECD countries, arguing that imports of 
goods mainly produced with unskilled labour could decrease the demand for unskilled 
labour within the rich OECD countries, depressing unskilled wages and increasing 
inequality. However, factor endowments and relative scarcities in developing countries 
(LDCs) differ fundamentally (Wood 1994, 1997, 1998).  
Our expectation is that openness in fact increases inequality in countries with 
abundant land, and lowers inequality if unskilled labour, relative to potential trading 
partners, is the abundant factor. In the absence of unusual complementarities between 
factor inputs and other counteracting forces, poor countries will increase their exports of 
unskilled labour-intensive products in globalisation periods because their abundant 
factors and their comparative advantage are likely to be in this segment. Increasing 
production with unskilled labour should increase unskilled labour demand and wages, 
and the opposite should be true for land-rich countries. If labour demand rises (falls), 
even children of unskilled workers should receive some schooling (or less), although in 
most cases not enough to move into the upper half of income recipients.  
Now, Latin America was clearly a land-rich region between the 18
th
 and early 
20
th
 century (Prados de le Escosura 2007). Therefore, the expectation would be a rise in 
inequality during the ‘First Era of Globalisation’ (1850-1913; O’Rourke and 
Williamson 1999). Does the expectation also hold for the broader sample of developing 
Chapter 2. Globalisation and educational inequality during the 18th to 20th centuries: 
Latin America in global comparison. 
 
12 
 
countries during the 1945-1984 period? It is somewhat less clear as some were already 
industrialising during the period and land became less important. 
A number of scholars have studied the influence of globalisation and de-
globalisation on within-country income inequality worldwide (Lindert and Williamson 
2001). Bourguignon and Morrison (2000) found a strong decline of within-country 
inequality during the de-globalisation phase of 1914-1945, whereas within-country 
inequality rises during globalisation phases. Prados de la Escosura (2007) finds 
increasing Latin American income inequality during this period. In section 2.6, we will 
assess whether educational inequality also increases with growing openness.  
 
2.2 Years of schooling, age heaping, occupations and inequality  
We will first discuss the general idea of the age heaping method in this section, 
before discussing our measures for inequality of human capital. Age heaping is often 
used nowadays as a basic numeracy indicator. The share of people who are able to 
report their exact age rather than report a rounded age has been found to be strongly 
correlated with numerical abilities (Crayen and Baten 2010a). A widely-used measure 
for age heaping is the ABCC index, as suggested by A’Hearn et al. (2009), which 
divides the number of people who reported non-preferred ages (i.e., ages that are not a 
multiple of five) by the total number of people.
4
 The index ranges from 0 to 100. If 
everybody reports the correct age, ABCC has a value of 100. Here, we restrict the 
evidence to the age groups 23-32, 33-42, 43-52 and 53-62, because ABCCs of younger 
and older individuals might be biased. Only units that have at least thirty cases per skill 
and age group are studied. The ABCC index can best be understood by considering an 
example. If we have 100 people with unskilled occupations of a specific age group 
reporting age in the census of, say, 1870, we would expect twenty of them to report an 
age ending in zero or five (because two of ten ages end in zero or five). For the 
remaining eighty individuals, the question is: do they report other ages or do they also 
choose an age ending in zero or five? If twenty do the latter, then one-quarter (of the 
eighty remaining persons) report probably a wrong age, and the ABCC is then 75 per 
                                                 
4
 It is called ABCC after the authors’ initials and Gregory Clark who gave comments on this index. 
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cent (one minus one-quarter). If the people with skilled occupations in the same country 
and birth decade have an ABCC of 85 per cent, then the social difference of numeracy 
between those occupational groups is ten (85-75 per cent).
5
 
It is important, however, to countercheck whether census-takers or recruitment 
officers did explicitly ask for the age (and did not ‘correct’ the reported ages 
afterwards). In the case of the samples studied here, we have good reasons to believe 
that the people were actually asked for their age, and the number of corrections made 
afterwards was not large. Otherwise, the relatively high level of age heaping that we 
observe in the data would probably not have occurred.6  
How close is the relationship between age heaping and other human capital 
indicators such as literacy and schooling? A’Hearn et al. (2009) used the large U.S. 
census sample to perform a very detailed analysis of this relationship. They subdivided 
by race, gender, high and low educational status and other criteria. In each case, they 
obtained a statistically significant relationship. The fact that the coefficients are 
relatively stable between samples is also or noteworthy, i.e. a unit change in age 
heaping is associated with similar changes in literacy across the various tests. The 
correlation was both statistically and economically significant for any country studied 
so far that had substantial age heaping.7 
Some uncertainty remains about whether age heaping in the sources contains 
information about the numeracy of the responding individual or, rather, about the 
diligence of the reporting personnel who wrote down the statements. A potential bias 
always exists if more than one person is involved in the creation of a historical source. 
For example, if literacy is measured by analysing the share of signatures in marriage 
contracts, there might have been priests who were more or less interested in obtaining 
                                                 
5
 This holds only if age distributions are relatively smooth. Crayen and Baten (2010a) studied the 
influence of famines, epidemics, wars and civil wars and found that the effect was randomly distributed 
and in the vast majority of cases not influential for individual age groups. The method also assumes that 
ages ending in zero and five are the most clearly preferred ages. This is least clear for the age group 23-32 
years because heaping also frequently takes place on multiples of two. Crayen and Baten (2010a) suggest 
reducing the ABCC for this age group, a recommendation that we also follow. 
6
 Even if the precise birthday (often related to a saint’s day or a holiday) is known to the individual, it 
might well be the case that the exact number of years since birth means little to an individual although the 
annual event is celebrated again and again. 
7
 On the regions of Argentina see, for example, Manzel and Baten (2009). 
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real signatures, as opposed to just crosses or other symbols. We find it reinforcing that 
we estimate generally much more age heaping (and less numeracy) for the lower social 
strata, and among the half of the sample population which had lower anthropometric 
values. Moreover, the regional differences of age heaping are similar to regional 
differences in illiteracy. 
We conclude that the age heaping method is now a well-established indicator for 
numeracy of groups, but the problem regarding how upper and lower group members 
can be distinguished from each other for historical populations for which we typically 
have no individual income data remains. Occupations have often been used to classify 
upper- versus lower-income group individuals and we will apply this criterion to Latin 
American data until the 20
th
 century (similarly to Crayen and Baten 2010b). Of course, 
occupations such as ‘day labourer’ or ‘agricultural worker’ typically yielded a low 
income, whereas professionals, noblemen, factory owners, and skilled craftsmen had 
higher incomes. As a caveat to this method, it should be noted that some occupations 
represent a wide income range (e.g. farmers). 
For the study of the 1945-1984 period, we also use an alternative, similarly 
rough proxy to distinguish between social groups, based on human stature as Crayen 
and Baten (2010b) have suggested. This involves contrasting the number of years of 
schooling of the taller and shorter 50 per cent of the sample. Almost all anthropometric 
studies that considered occupational or income groupings found that the well-off strata 
of society were taller.
8
 A second, very interesting aspect to this strategy is that tall 
individuals are much less likely than short individuals to have suffered from infant 
protein deficiency syndrome (IPDS), which reduces learning abilities to a certain extent. 
The syndrome was widespread during the 1945 to 1984 period in the poorest countries 
of the world, when malnutrition was so common that most populations were severely 
stunted (with adult males being shorter than 170 cm on average). Support for this claim 
comes from biologists and psychologists who have conducted experiments on the 
influence of protein malnutrition in childhood and intellectual ability later in life 
(Paxson and Schady 2007). 
                                                 
8
 For recent collections of anthropometric studies, see Steckel and Floud (1997) and Baten and Komlos 
(2004). 
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One caveat to the proposed anthropometric method is clearly that there is also 
genetic height variation (especially on the individual level, see Magnusson et al. 2006). 
Nonetheless, we are confident that most individual variation can be averaged out by 
means of sufficiently large sample sizes. 
Why do we use such a special method to measure inequality of education? Are 
there no other data sets available that contain some social classification criterion (such 
as occupation or income), as well as educational measures for the 1945-1985 period? To 
the best of our knowledge, for such a large number of countries as used here (forty-two 
countries), consistent data sets of this type do not exist.
 9
 
 
2.3 Data sources, selectivities and representativeness 
Many population counts were carried out in colonial Latin America, aiming at an 
overview of the population, taxpayers and the military potential. Most early counts were 
focused on limited regions or cities within a country. Larger censuses were carried out 
after the mid-18
th
 century, covering a higher share of the national population (Table 2.1; 
Manzel and Baten 2010). For the post-colonial period, censuses of the republics were 
carried out mostly after the mid-19
th
 century, while the early-19
th
 century is clearly less 
documented. The Latin American countries currently have the best source situation of 
historical population enumerations among today’s developing countries (Platt 1998, 
p.7). Our samples cover Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay and 
Venezuela
10
 and represent therefore a large part of this world region.  
                                                 
9
 Another interesting measure of educational inequality was proposed by Frankema (2008) who uses a 
‘comparative grade enrolment distribution’ to determine educational inequality. His idea is that the higher 
the secondary school completion shares of the attainment distribution, the larger the educational ‘middle 
class’, which might imply less educational inequality. Frankema (2008) finds that grade distribution in 
Latin America is skewed towards lower grades during the mid-to-late 20
th
 century with almost 43 per cent 
of the pupils leaving school without passing the first grade and more than 70 per cent dropping out of 
school with less than 4 years of school attendance. So, despite the fact that Latin America reached almost 
full primary school enrolment rates, levels of school completion were very low. Unfortunately, this 
alternative measure is not available for the early period studied here and it is not available by birth cohort 
for the later period. Yet another measure of human capital inequality uses skill premia, as studied for 
long-term periods by van Zanden (2009). He found, for example, that less developed countries such as 
Indonesia and India had quite high skill premia. 
10
 While borders changed during the colonial and post-colonial period, we always refer to today’s borders 
as far as possible. 
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Table 2.1: Data sources for the early period 
Country/Region Year 
No. Cases (age 23-
62) 
Potential bias relative to 
total population 
Source 
Buenos Aires, AR 1744 1,146 
Urban, military,  
including slaves 
Military Census in the Documentos para la 
Historia Argentina (Caillet-Bois 1919) 
Buenos Aires, AR 1771 4,756 Urban, including slaves Archivo Nacional de Argentina, Census 1771 
Argentina  1869 43,781 No Somoza and Lattes (1967) 
Santa Fé, AR 1887 808 Regional 
http://www.digitalmicrofilm.com.ar/censos/geogr
afico.php  
Argentina  1895 51,715 No Somoza and Lattes (1967) 
São Paulo, BR 1772 1,665 
Household heads, 
servants 
Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Cód 1270, 2096, 
see for a description Stolz, et al. (2013) 
Floresta, BR 1859 1,283 Household heads,slaves 
Arquivo Público do Estado de Pernambuco – 
Depositum Floresta 1859. 
São Cristovão, BR 1870 456 Regional Biblioteca do IBGE. 
Colombia 1870 2,362 Various regions 
Archivo Nacional de Bogotá: CE Cauca, 
Magdalena, Quibdo, Quindio, MF 2, 4, 6, 15,19. 
West Ecuador 1870 19,109 Various regions Archivo Nacional de Ecuador, Censo 1870 
Hidalgo/Guanajua-
to/Oaxaca, MX 
1740-43 1,383 regional 
AGI: CE Ixmiquilpan 1740, Ind, 107; CE Pozos 
1743, Ind, 107; CE Southern central Mexico 
1743, Ind, 108; CE Chichihualtepec 1743, Ind, 
108. 
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Table 2.1 (cont) 
Central and West Mexiko 1777 3,998 Regional AGI, Mex 2578/9. 
Mexico - City , MX 1790 3,079 
Capital, only Spanish 
and mestizo household 
heads 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e 
Informática: CE Revillagigedo (2003). 
Coahuila, MX 1823 1,598 Regional Grupo Explaroradores Coahuiltecos 
Mexico  1930 7,007 
Various regions, but 
nationally representative 
FSI: CE Guanajuato, Minas de Luz, Mineral de 
los Llamitos, Ahualuco, Benitez, Tepoztlán, 
Mezquital, Tetecala, Tlaltizapan: MF 4107114, 
4107751, 4107265, 4107065. 
Soriano/Maldonado 1834/36 588 Regional 
Archivo Nacional de R.O. Uruguay, CE 
Soriano/Maldonado 
Montevideo, UY 1846 1,569 Capital, prisoners Archivo Nacional de R.O. Uruguay 
Cumarebo /Quisque, VE 1818/20 1,476 Regional AGI: Cuba 759B 
Abbreviations: AGI: Archivo General de Indias; AR: Argentina; BR: Brazil; CE: Census of; FSI: Family Search Indexing Project; MF: microfilm; MX: Mexico, UY: 
Uruguay, VE: Venezuela. Sources: adapted from Manzel and Baten (2009), plus other sources as explained in column «source». 
 
Chapter 2. Globalisation and educational inequality during the 18th to 20th centuries: 
Latin America in global comparison. 
 
18 
 
All in all, the countries under study represent today around 80% of the Latin American 
population. An important question is whether our various sources are representative of 
the whole society during the period under study. This issue has been studied intensively 
by Manzel and Baten (2010) who used mostly the same sources to study long-run 
trends. The population enumerations were supposed to have universal coverage in the 
whole area considered as well as in all social strata. Manzel and Baten have assessed 
many potential weaknesses of the data, such as social and regional biases. For example, 
one potential criticism of the padrones of the 18
th
 century is under-enumeration. The 
government wanted to know the population number and age structure in order to learn 
about the potential of taxpayers. One could imagine that this stimulated avoidance 
behaviour among the richer part of the population. However, it was not easy for the rich 
and well-educated strata to avoid being included in the census. We find them in large 
numbers in our census lists, as is evident from the occupations listed.  
Another potential caveat is the problem regarding who really answered the 
question about the age. Is it possible that perhaps only the head of the household 
answered for the whole house? Manzel and Baten (2010) applied an indirect method by 
calculating the age heaping indices for household heads and other members of the 
household. The expectation was that the head knew his exact age more often than the 
age of other household members. The difference between the two groups, however, was 
not very large. Other scattered evidence comes from remarks of the census officials 
about heads and other household members. In both cases, there were statements such as 
‘she did not know her age’, combined with an age statement of a preferred age. This can 
be interpreted as evidence that other household members were also actually questioned. 
Ethnic composition is important for Latin America. Were Indios or slaves of African 
origin sometimes omitted from the padrones? The direct comparison of population 
structure by ethnic group given in the literature and the composition of 18
th
 century 
padrones
11
 revealed that the bias was limited (Manzel and Baten 2010; Table 3). In 
some Mexican censuses, there was some under-representation of American Indios and 
                                                 
11
 During the 19
th
 century, the New Republican governments forbade statements about ethnicity.  
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in one of the Buenos Aires padrones there was some under-representation of African 
Americans, but in general the samples were quite representative in terms of ethnicity. 
Regional bias is another issue that we need to address. Clearly, the early samples 
in particular were more often concentrated on the population of the capital (Tables 2.1 
and 2.2). Large cities tend to have higher levels of inequality (Baten 1999), and hence 
we expect higher inequality values for the 18
th
 century. We will assess this effect with 
appropriate dummy variables below.  
Finally, an important point for Latin America in particular is whether migrants should 
be included in the individual samples. Here, we are mainly interested in the educational 
inequality of countries and migrants who contributed to this inequality. Therefore, we 
decided to include migrants as well.
12
  
While the sources for the study of Latin American educational inequality during 
the 18
th
 to early 20
th
 century deserve the most scrutiny, the later 20
th
 century evidence, 
which we are employing for our second study period, is easier to use. The Macro 
International Inc. performs surveys of child health and health-related behaviour in order 
to create a solid and representative database for improving child health (among other 
aims). They recorded years of schooling and heights of women mostly born between 
1945 and 1984 in many developing countries. We included only those aged 20-50 years 
in many developing countries. As the height of adults is mostly determined in the three 
years after birth, the height of the mother can shed light on the development of status 
differences in this period after birth. One potential lacuna in our data is the 
environmental influence on growth at later ages, especially during the adolescent 
growth spurt. However, Baten (2000b) finds that this effect is negligible compared to 
the impact of the first three years, as long as individuals have reached their final height 
when measured. Second, there could be survivor bias effects, but Moradi and Baten 
(2005) and Guntupalli and Baten (2006) rejected this possibility in detailed studies.
13
 
                                                 
12
 See notes to Table 2.3. 
13
 The data set refers mostly to mothers. Moradi (2002) explored the potential difference between mothers 
and non-mothers. He finds a very moderate selectivity among young mothers. Mothers at age 20-25 years 
were slightly less educated than the reference population. By employing usual height elasticities for 
education levels, Moradi estimates about 1 mm shorter height of mothers, compared with the reference 
population of all women aged 20-25 years. There was no significant selectivity among older women. This 
result suggests that selectivity of mothers might not be a major problem. 
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Table 2.2: ABCC indices in several Latin American countries by birth decade and 
occupational group 
Country Birth decade Unskilled Skilled Difference 
Argentina 1680 24 41 17 
 
1690 24 43 19 
 
1700 38 47 10 
 
1710 44 58 14 
 
1720 41 56 15 
 
1730 51 59 8 
 
1740 56 64 8 
 
1810 63 77 14 
 
1820 68 80 12 
 
1830 71 84 14 
 
1840 72 84 11 
 
1850 77 89 12 
 
1860 81 90 9 
Brazil 1710 63 76 12 
 
1720 63 63 -1 
 
1730 60 76 16 
 
1740 53 67 15 
 
1810 72 92 20 
 
1820 79 88 9 
 
1830 70 83 13 
 
1840 60 82 22 
Colombia 1830 56 74 17 
 
1840 55 65 10 
Ecuador 1810 58 63 4 
 
1820 62 68 7 
 
1830 64 68 4 
 
1840 60 68 8 
Mexico 1730 56 63 6 
 
1740 66 61 -5 
 
1750 70 70 0 
 
1760 70 75 5 
 
1880 61 78 16 
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Table 2.2 (cont.) 
Country Birth decade Unskilled Skilled Difference 
Mexiko 1890 62 85 23 
 
1900 72 75 4 
Uruguay 1780 55 71 16 
 
1790 62 75 12 
 
1800 79 85 6 
 
1810 83 83 0 
Venezuela 1780 55 71 16 
 
1790 62 75 12 
Notes: «Skilled» refers to occupational groups that were skilled, or professionals. «Unskilled» refers to 
those with unskilled or only semi-skilled occupations. 
 
We consider here the difference in years of schooling of the taller 50 per cent 
compared with the shorter half, and organise the data by individual country and birth 
decade. 
It is remarkable that in most cases taller women had more years of schooling (Table 
2.3). Small differences refer to cases such as Ghana, Madagascar or Tanzania, in which 
the urban centres of education differed from the regions of tallest heights, which were 
sometimes characterised by a specialisation in cattle farming (Moradi and Baten 2005). 
In Latin America, some of the strong educational inequalities by height group are partly 
determined by the Indio vs. European ancestor difference. It is difficult to disentangle 
socio-economic differences from nutritional habit differences (and perhaps genetic 
ones) here. Hence, we will rely on fixed effects regressions below, which control for 
country-specific characteristics. 
 
2.4. Development of educational inequality 
We would expect levels of educational inequality in the various countries of 
Latin America to be quite different because the institutional and economic structures 
were so varied. For example, Mesoamerica and the Andes had large shares of 
indigenous or mestizo populations, who received less schooling and other public goods 
compared with the middle and upper strata of European origin. In these regions, the
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Table 2.3: Differences of school years by height (birth years 1945 – 1984) 
Country 
Difference 
of school 
years 
School 
years 
(tall) 
School 
years 
(short) 
Height 
(tall) 
Height 
(short) 
Bangladesh 0.9 3.3 2.5 1547 1460 
Burkina Faso 0.4 1.2 0.7 1663 1568 
Benin 0.8 2.1 1.4 1636 1537 
Bolivia 1.9 7.1 5.2 1557 1467 
Brazil 1.4 6.3 4.9 1607 1508 
Central African Republic 0.7 2.2 1.5 1639 1533 
Ivory Coast 0.5 2.5 2 1641 1545 
Cameroon 0.5 5.5 4.9 1651 1553 
Colombia 1.3 7.5 6.2 1592 1496 
Dominican Republic 0.9 7.3 6.5 1614 1516 
Egypt 1.2 5.5 4.3 1621 1532 
Ethiopia 0.3 1.7 1.4 1619 1521 
Gabon 0.7 6.2 5.6 1631 1533 
Ghana 0.3 4.9 4.6 1639 1541 
Guinea 0.4 1.2 0.8 1638 1541 
Guatemala 1.6 2.9 1.3 1518 1423 
Haiti 0.9 3.5 2.6 1632 1532 
India 0.9 4.2 3.3 1561 1470 
Kenya 0.7 6.2 5.5 1646 1544 
Kyrgyztan 0.6 11.3 10.7 1628 1538 
Comoros 0.7 2.6 1.9 1592 1504 
Kazakhstan 0.5 11.2 10.7 1637 1541 
Morocco 1.1 3.5 2.4 1630 1539 
Madagascar 0.1 3.4 3.3 1578 1487 
Mali 0.5 1.2 0.8 1664 1568 
Malawi 0.9 3.9 3 1607 1515 
Mozambique 0.8 2.6 1.8 1609 1512 
Namibia 0.7 5.4 4.7 1660 1561 
Niger 0.4 0.9 0.5 1654 1560 
Nigeria 1.3 5 3.7 1644 1529 
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Country 
Difference 
of school 
years 
School 
years  
(tall) 
School 
years 
(short) 
Height 
(tall) 
Height 
(short) 
Nicaragua 1.5 6 4.6 1586 1492 
Peru 1.9 8 6 1549 1461 
Ruanda 1 4.2 3.2 1631 1530 
Senegal 0.4 1.3 0.9 1670 1574 
Chad 0.5 1.3 0.7 1678 1578 
Togo 0.4 1.6 1.2 1638 1542 
Turkey 0.8 4.7 3.9 1600 1511 
Tanzania 0.2 3.5 3.2 1606 1508 
Uganda 0.5 4.6 4 1635 1534 
Uzbekistan 0.4 11 10.6 1649 1553 
Zambia 1 5.4 4.4 1628 1531 
Zimbabwe 0.8 7 6.1 1649 1552 
      
Notes: «Tall» is defined here as the tallest 50%, «short» as the shortest 50%. The difference in school 
years is the number of school years of the taller minus the shorter 50%. Female height is reported in 
millimetres. 
 
inequality heritage of land distribution in favour of the Spanish conquerors and later 
European immigrants might have been strongest (Lambert 1968, p. 581). Similarly, 
strong differences might have prevailed in the countries that kept slavery until the late- 
19
th
 century and whose population component of African origin was disadvantaged. In 
contrast, the population of the Southern Cone was more homogenous in ethnicity-
related aspects, because the Indio population share was smaller and slavery was 
abolished earlier. However, ethnicity, slavery and colonial heritage were not the only 
factors at work. O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) argued convincingly that the 
Southern Cone countries had strongly increasing inequality during the late-19
th
 century 
globalisation movement.  
Going further back in time, how might inequality have differed between colonial 
times and post-independence Latin America? Unfortunately, today we have little 
evidence for the pre-independence inequality history of Latin America. Williamson 
(2009) and Dobado and Garcia (2009) have recently raised some doubts about the early 
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colonial heritage hypothesis (of continuously high inequality). Dobado and Garcia 
argued that real wages were quite high in some parts of Bourbon Latin America, 
whereas average income was lower than in Europe. Hence, inequality might actually 
have been lower than in Europe. The question is, of course, whether this wage evidence 
is representative and can inform us about the situation of other poorer strata, which did 
not earn wages (such as the population majority of peasants). Williamson (2009) 
considered the fact that especially the low population density of the 17
th
 and early 18
th
 
centuries might have generated relatively low inequality, compared with Europe. In 
times of labour scarcity, wages tend to be higher and even the nutrition and general 
treatment of slaves and indigenous bound labour might be slightly less terrible. A recent 
study on Uruguay suggests that in the Southern Cone during the 18
th
 century, inequality 
might also not have been very pronounced (Vicario 2010). 
Economic policy differences certainly also mattered for country-specific 
differences. For example, the famous Mexican dictatorship era of Porfirio Díaz (1877-
1911) increased average income and education, but had a reputation for bringing about 
sharp increases in inequality (Tutino 2001, p. 700-701). In sum, during the 19
th
 century 
the variation of inequality between countries was probably large. Pre-independence 
inequality history is largely unexplored, but some authors have recently argued for a 
modest inequality level relative to Europe. 
In the following, we firstly compare numeracy of the upper and lower 
occupational strata in Latin American countries for the early period. For Argentina, we 
have some data for Buenos Aires for the birth decades until 1740 and some 
representative national data after this date. The ABCC Index increased from 24 to 56 for 
the lower-income groups in Buenos Aires from the late-17
th
 to the mid-18
th
 centuries 
(Table 2.2). The upper-income groups started with a level above 40 per cent age 
numeracy in the 1680s, but grew to just 64 per cent in the 1740s. The fact that the early 
evidence on Argentina covers only Buenos Aires is certainly a caveat. The gap for the 
19
th
 century was large and relatively constant, declining only slightly from a 14 per cent 
difference in the 1820s to a 9 per cent difference in the 1860s. 
Second, we have long-term data on Mexico covering sufficient observations to 
study both social groups between the 1730s and 1760s, and in the 1880s to 1900s. The 
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latter evidence is nationally representative, while the former relates to some Mexican 
regions, including Mexico City. In short, social differences in age numeracy were small 
and in one case even negative in 18
th
 century Mexico. This is consistent with the 
observation of Tanck de Estrada (1999) that the Bourbon reforms of the 18
th
 century 
had some positive impact even on school building in Indio villages, that is, for the 
poorest Mexicans. However, the late 19
th
 century saw a highly stratified society with 
large differences. This fits with available evidence on the Porfiriato. 
We have more scattered data for a number of other Latin American countries (Table 
2.2). In Brazil, the highest educational inequality levels were reached in the 1840s, 
which are the latest values we have.
14
 In Uruguay, inequality was declining, but this 
might have been caused by the fact that the later birth cohorts were based on data from 
prisons. Venezuela and Colombia had quite high inequality, whereas in poor Equador 
even the skilled groups had low levels of numeracy. Summing up, we can document a 
number of Latin American countries, but the cases for which we have sufficient 
numbers of observations are somewhat distributed over the different centuries. Most 
striking in Table 2.2 is the fact that, of the 40 cases studied, only two have negative 
values for the difference between the skilled and unskilled groups.  
Now we move to the birth cohorts of the mid-to-late 20
th
 century. We studied the 
difference of school years, subtracting the figure for the taller half from that of the 
shorter half (Figure 2.1). The years of schooling are a better measure for the mid-to-late 
20
th
 century than age heaping, which had already disappeared in many countries by 
then. It should be noted that there are many African countries in the sample, a few Latin 
American ones, but fewer countries from other regions. One important result from these 
samples is that the taller half of the population (those who probably came from more 
advantaged family backgrounds) always had higher or equal school year values, which 
tended to be lower among the shorter half of the population. Latin America had the 
highest difference (which means the largest educational inequality), whereas Soviet 
Central Asia had the lowest value (Figure 2.1).  
                                                 
14
 We thank Yvonne Stolz, who plans to study the Brazilian case in more detail, for providing the 18
th
 
century evidence.  
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Figure 2.1: School-year difference (vertical axis) in several world regions by birth years 
 
Notes: Difference in years of schooling, value of tallest 50 per cent minus the shortest 50 per cent 
(women). Years refer to the beginning year of a 5-year birth cohort. Central Asia includes only the former 
Soviet Republics.
 
2.5 Openness and other potential determinants of inequality 
We first describe the explanatory variables in Table 2.4 that we include in the 
regressions and then discuss the results. 
 
2.5.1. Openness 
How can we measure ‘openness’? Given the importance of this variable, much 
study has been done in this field. Most economists agree that simple trade shares of 
GDP are insufficient by themselves to capture the degree of openness of an economy. If 
two neighbouring free-trade countries have exactly the same factor endowments, it is 
possible that their trade is relatively low in spite of their openness simply because 
production is so similar. On the other hand, two highly protected countries can 
experience high trade shares if their endowments are sufficiently different. One 
alternative measure is the openness index of Sachs and Warner (1995a) for seventy-nine 
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countries. These authors consider high tariffs, important tariff barriers, plus state 
monopolies of major commodity exports, a high black market premium for national 
currencies, and a socialist economic system. This variable is coded as a binary variable. 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) criticised the fact that two factors in particular, the state 
monopoly and currency black market premium, might measure other economic 
characteristics rather than just a lack of openness. The currency value distortion also 
indicates other macroeconomic problems. However, if there is no perfect measure of 
openness, it is a promising strategy to use both this one and the trade share. In spite of 
our conceptual scepticism against the trade share of GDP as a measure of ‘openness’, 
we will also test this variable below.  
 
2.5.2. Kuznets curve effects  
Kuznets (1955) found that inequality first rises and then declines with economic 
development. He explained his inverted U curve by labour-market disequilibria: Since 
technological progress initially favours the rewards for some specialised skills, demand 
for unskilled labour decreases and its wage falls. Therefore, inequality rises initially. 
The diffusion of skills and economic policies serve as egalitarian forces which reduce 
inequality. We therefore add Kuznets variables by adding real GDP per worker in linear 
and quadratic form and expect a positive coefficient of the former and a negative effect 
for the latter.
15
 
 
2.5.3 Democracy 
Li et al. (1998) also emphasised the importance of political freedom for income 
equality. If dictatorship provides privileges to certain groups in society, this might lead 
to higher inequality. The research project ‘POLITY IV’, at the University of Maryland, 
created comprehensive surveys on the democratic or autocratic behaviour of 
                                                 
15
 Kuznets effects have recently been studied by Morrisson and Murtin (2007) for educational inequality. 
They construct a within-country indicator on the basis of primary, secondary, tertiary enrollment rates and 
confirm the existence of an educational Kuznets curve by studying this indicator for the 1870-2000 
period. Kuznets curves have also been a traditional field of study for income inequality research. For 
example, Prados de la Escosura (2008) recently found a Kuznets curve for Spain, 1850-2000. 
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Table 2.4: Determinants of educational inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE 
Birth decades 1680s-1900s 1680s-1900s 1940s-1980s 1940s-1980s 1940s-1980s 
World regions Latin America Latin America LDCs LDCs LDCs 
Openness concept Era of Globalisation Era of Globalisation 
Sachs/Warner 
(1995a) 
Sachs/Warner 
(1995a) 
Penn WT 
Openness 7.63** 8.79** -0.35*** -0.41** 0.01 
 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.004) (0.04) (0.94) 
Education average -0.12 -0.33* 0.09*** 0.13 0.11*** 
 
(0.26) (0.059) (0.008) (0.19) (0.002) 
Mature 3.12 0.29 
 
-0.01 
 
 
(0.29) (0.92) 
 
(0.50) 
 
Civil War 0.02 -0.96 -0.17* 
 
-0.19** 
 
(1.00) (0.77) (0.088) 
 
(0.042) 
GDP p.c. 
 
82.16** -0.60*** -0.47 -0.62*** 
  
(0.012) (0.00) (0.59) (0.00) 
GDP p.c. squared 
 
-43.08** 0.03** -0.01 0.03*** 
  
(0.011) (0.02) (0.95) (0.009) 
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Table 2.4 (cont.) 
Democracy (Polity2) 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
(0.97) (0.95) (0.76) 
Productivity lag 
    
-0.01 
     
(0.12) 
Constant 15.62** -0.78 1.22*** 1.54 2.06** 
 
(0.03) (0.93) (0.001) (0.2) (0.023) 
Observations 40 40 174 63 145 
R-squared 0.18 0.36 0.35 0.62 0.33 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 per cent. Dependent variable in columns 1 and 2: difference in numeracy, skilled 
versus unskilled occupations. Dependent variable in columns 3 to 5: difference of school years, tallest 50% versus shortest 50% (calculated as the difference between 
the two groups). As usual with fixed effects regressions, we reported the ‘R-sq within’. The models were also estimated including a prison dummy but there was 
almost no difference in the other coefficients. We also checked regressions with a capital city dummy, with almost no change in the other coefficients. In columns 3 to 
5, we included time fixed effects. Abbreviations: FE: Fixed Effects. LDCs: less developed countries. Glob.: Globalisation. GDP per capita is expressed in units of 1000 
$ (Geary Khamis $), source: Maddison (2001). Where GDP was lacking, it was linearly interpolated. Ecuador was assumed to have had the average GDP/c of Peru and 
Brazil. In columns 1 and 2, civil war data come from Clodfelter (2002), the share of mature was calculated from the age distributions in the censuses, see Table 2.1, 
and the same applies to the education average (using age heaping).  
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governments in recent history, approximating democracy with a numerical score. 
 
2.5.4 Demographic effects (‘mature’) 
Did competition reduce the wages of baby boomers? Demographic effects could 
have an influence on inequality. According to the normal life-cycle effect of income, 
people receive their highest income in their 40s and 50s. Teenagers and young adults 
between age 15 and 40 years earn less on average, and beyond the age of 60 years 
income starts to decline again. If ‘fat’ cohorts (e.g. the ‘baby boom’ generation of the 
1960s) enter the labour market, we would expect a rise in inequality because the supply 
of ‘young’ labour is very large, whereas the share of the richer ‘mature’ age group is 
relatively smaller. Higgins and Williamson (1999) found a robust influence of both 
cohort sizes of the mature age groups. We include cohort size effects by taking the share 
of the mature population (aged 40-59 years), relative to the total population of the age 
groups 15-69 years (working age), using the same specification as Higgins and 
Williamson (1999). 
 
2.5.5 Speed of structural change 
How much did agricultural productivity lag? Agricultural productivity, and 
therefore agricultural incomes, might lag behind industry and services and this could 
lead to rising inequality (Baten and Fraunholz 2004).  
 
2.5.6 Civil war 
Civil war is one of the strongest determinants of welfare and educational 
development in developing countries. Civil war has a very destructive effect on average 
schooling levels, but it is less clear whether this terrible military nightmare increases or 
decreases the inequality of schooling. In some cases, the better-off population might be 
able to flee to quiet parts of the country and their children might continue attending 
school. On the other hand, the destruction of expected human capital returns in the 
future might particularly affect those strata which otherwise would have invested a lot 
Chapter 2. Globalisation and educational inequality during the 18th to 20th centuries: 
Latin America in global comparison. 
 
31 
 
in the schooling of their children. Hence, it is an empirical question whether this 
variable increased or decreased educational inequality.
16
 
 
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Results for the early period 
All regression models are estimated as fixed effects in order to control for 
unobservable characteristics, such as cultural or geographic factors. In the regressions 
for the early period, we employed a dummy variable for the ‘First Era of Globalisation’ 
(1850-1913) as an indicator for openness. For the 18
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries, there is 
insufficient evidence to reconstruct the trade share or political protectionism, except 
perhaps for the last few decades of our study period (and for this period alone the 
number of observations would be too small). We find the regressions to have a positive 
coefficient of the First Era of Globalisation dummy variable (Table 2.4). 
The absolute level of numeracy might reduce the inequalities in this period 
slightly (only significant in column 2). The ‘baby boom effect’ of the ‘mature’ variable 
is not visible in this period. Civil war did not have strong and significant effects on early 
inequality. 
In the second regression, we also included GDP per capita as well as its squared 
term. The value of the former was large and positive while the latter had a large 
negative value. The former term is larger than the latter and has a greater effect on the 
observed values.
17
 Hence, for this early period the Kuznets curve was on the rise. 
 
2.6.2 Results for the 1945-1984 period 
We compare three regression models for the later period (Table 2.4, columns    
3-5). Openness actually reduced educational inequality in this period. The coefficients 
of Sachs and Warner openness are statistically significant, although the values of the 
                                                 
16
 Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are available in the appendix. Some variables are 
slightly skewed, but in most cases the skewness is only modest. Given that some of the values of the 
dependent variables are negative, we decided not to use a logarithmic transformation. 
17
 Predicted values are available from the authors. 
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coefficients are not very large. In column 5 of Table 2.4, we also included an alternative 
measure of openness, the trade share as reported in the Penn World Tables. However, 
this alternative measure is not significant (after adjustment for population size, it 
remains insignificant). 
In contrast, GDP per capita and its squared term are significant, except in 
column 4, which records a much smaller number of cases. The coefficient of the non-
squared GDP term is much larger than the squared term. This implies that educational 
inequality declines with increasing income during this period. At very high levels the 
decline stops. The results are also quite robust over different specifications.  
The level of average education increases the gap in less-developed countries, 
which is quite the contrary to what we might have expected. In contrast, civil war 
mostly reduces educational inequality - it appears that the richer strata do not send their 
children to school during a civil war either. Finally, there are no obvious effects of 
democracy, productivity lags, or the ‘baby boom’ effect (i.e. the ‘mature’ variable). The 
explanatory power of these models is in general quite large.  
Is openness endogenous here? The question is whether the lower educational 
inequality of children born in a specific birth decade would cause more openness. One 
could imagine that - based on the general Stolper-Samuelson view - labour-abundant 
countries with high inequality would open their economies during a globalisation period 
to profit from more demand and therefore higher wages in that sector or vice versa. This 
might at least be the case if unskilled workers have sufficient political power. On the 
other hand, especially among richer countries, there might be an economic or 
psychological effect of higher inequality leading to less openness. Baltzer and Baten 
(2008) tested these hypotheses and provided evidence that low inequality in Latin 
American countries in the mid-to-late 20
th
 century did not lead to more openness. 
Hence, we tentatively conclude that endogeneity is not a major problem here. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
We explored inequality of numeracy and education by studying school years and 
numeracy of rich and poor, as well as tall and short individuals. To estimate numeracy, 
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the age heaping method was used. In this study, we mobilised a large body of new 
evidence on inequality, going back to the 18
th
 century and covering a number of Latin 
American countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. Looking at the time trend of educational inequality, Mexico displays 
only modest numeracy advantage for the skilled groups in the 18
th
 century, but the gaps 
between the upper and lower strata increased strongly until the 19
th
 century. Similarly, 
Argentina suffered substantial educational inequality during the 19
th
 century. In a 
regression analysis, the “First Era of Globalisation” was mostly confirmed as having 
higher inequality than earlier periods.  
We studied many developing countries in the period from the 1940s to the 
1980s, looking at the schooling difference between the taller half of the population and 
the shorter half. One remarkable finding was that the taller half always had more years 
of schooling. This applied to forty-two different countries without exception. Latin 
America had the greatest educational inequality in this period, which is certainly one of 
the reasons for its high income inequality today. 
Testing the hypothesis that globalisation might have increased inequality of 
education, we found evidence that 20
th
 century globalisation had positive effects by 
reducing educational inequality. Moreover, we found strong evidence for Kuznets’ 
inverted U hypothesis, which was on the rise during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries in Latin 
America and tended to fall in the second half of the 20
th
 century in the developing 
world.  
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Appendix A 
Descriptives 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics, earlier sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Productivity lag (Edudiff) 40 10.15 6.62 -5.28 22.52 
Openness 40 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Education average (ab) 40 66.26 12.49 32.4 85.54 
Mature 40 0.43 0.36 0 1 
Civil War 40 0.13 0.33 0 1 
GDP p.c. 40 0.84 0.41 0.36 1.88 
GDP p.c. squared
 
40 0.86 0.91 0.13 3.53 
 
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics, later sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
edudiffabs 174 1.00 0.60 -0.15 2.58 
Openness 174 1.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
GDP p.c. 174 1.60 1.30 0.35 8.93 
GDP p.c. squared 174 4.19 8.69 0.12 79.78 
Education average 174 6.61 3.32 1.23 14.57 
Civil War 174 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Democracy 174 -3.82 5.50 -9.80 9.00 
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Definitions and sources of explanatory variables for the later sample 
 
Openness (Sachs/Warner): openness-dummy by Sachs and Warner (1995a), 0=closed; 
1=open; The SW openness indicator is a zero-one dummy which takes the value 
0 if the economy is closed according to one of the following criteria: 
1. average tariff rates = higher than 40% 
2. barriers cover on average more than 40% of imports 
3. socialist economic system 
4. state monopoly of major exports 
5. black market premium higher than 20% during the 1970s or 1980s 
Source: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Economics/Growth/datasets/sachs/sachs.htm 
 
Openness ‘Penn WT’ (M+X/Y): The trade share of GDP, unadjusted or adjusted for 
population size, with the regression given in Gylfason 1999. 
Source: Heston and Summers: Penn World Tables 5.6, 
http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/ 
 
Productivity lag: productivity ratio of industry and services to agriculture = Real GDP 
per worker in industry and services / Real GDP per worker in agriculture; 
calculated on basis of ‘Agriculture value added per Worker, constant 1995 USD’ 
(Source: 1999 World Development Indicators CD-ROM), ‘Labor Force in 
agriculture, % of total’ (Source: 1999 World Development Indicators CD-
ROM), ‘Real GDP per Worker, 1985 international prices’  
Source: Heston and Summers: Penn World Tables 5.6, 
http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/ 
 
Polity 2: democracy score, -10 (=autocratic) to 10 (=very democratic) 
Source: Marshall and Jaggers: Polity IV-data set; 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity 
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Civil war: this variable is coded as a dichotomous variable adopting the value 1 if civil 
war broke out in five-year period. It is defined as sustained combat between the 
armed forces of a government and forces of another entity for central control or 
for local issues. 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. Military and civilian deaths 
are counted. Sources: Correlates of War Project and Uppsala Conflict Data 
Project. We recorded all civil wars matching these criteria mentioned in 
Clodfelter (2002). 
 
GDP p.c.: Real GDP per Worker, 1990 international prices 
Sources: Maddison (2001), see also Alan Heston and Robert Summers: Penn 
World Tables 5.6, http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/ 
 
GDP p.c. squared: Real GDP per Worker, squared 
Source: see above. 
 
Mature: proportion of the adult population 15-69 who are 40-59 old, a measure of 
cohort size effects.  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau: International Data Base (IDB); 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html; The Latin American data were 
adapted from Baten and Fraunholz (2004). 
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Data Sources 
 
Sources for Argentina 
 
We were able to use a large number of primary sources on the development of 
numeracy in Argentina, the earliest source being the military census of 1744 for Buenos 
Aires reproduced in the Documentos para la Historia Argentina (Caillet-Bois 1919). 
The early data for the capital were completed by the census of Buenos Aires for 1771. 
Later information on the capital is provided by the census of Santa Fé 1887. Moreover, 
we can incorporate into our analysis the samples of the first two national population 
censuses of the years 1869 and 1895 that contain extensive information on a 
representative sample of the Argentinean population and were collected by Somoza and 
Lattes (1967).  
 
Sources for Brazil 
The Brazilian sample consists of early surviving censuses for a number of places 
in the regions of São Paulo, Floresta (a city in the province of Pernambuco), and São 
Cristovão (in the province of Rio de Janeiro). We might expect the latter data to be 
slightly biased as São Cristovão was populated by rather rich people. 
 
Sources for Ecuador 
In the case of Ecuador, we could include the western provinces of the country 
based on the census of 1870. Unfortunately, evidence for the Amazonas region did not 
survive. We thank Dacil-Tania Juif and Heike Schmutz for their data collection work. 
 
Sources for Mexico 
The Archivo General de Indias in Seville offers a considerable amount of 
primary sources for Mexico. For 1740-1743, population enumerations for Hidalgo, 
Guadalajara, and Oaxaca are included in our sample. For 1777, age data for Mexico 
City, Durango, Chihuahua, Baja California, Oaxaca, Puebla, and Veracruz are available. 
We also use a sample on the capital from the Censo de Revillagigedo carried out 
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between 1790 and 1794 in Mexico. This was the first enumeration to use a standard 
format for listing the population by name, age, sex, and family status. Not all census 
forms have survived but those remaining still provide information on 15 quarters of 
Mexico City.  
For the later period, data from various places in Mexico are available for the 
year 1930, which were taken to create a nationally representative sample of the country. 
 
Sources for Uruguay 
The National Archive in Montevideo offers interesting sources on the 
development of numeracy in Uruguay: the prison records (1846), the census of Soriano 
(1834), and the census of Maldonado (1836) that we used in this paper.  
 
Sources for Colombia 
The Colombian census data originates from the National Archive in Bogotá. For 
the 19
th
 century, the census of 1870 offers information on Cauca, Magdalena, Chocó, 
Quindio, and other departments. The great variety of Colombian provinces in our data 
enables us to analyse the development of basic numerical abilities in Colombia 
comprehensively.  
 
Sources for Venezuela 
The evidence on Venezuela comes from the Archivo General de Indias. We 
thank Christina Jedermann and Gerrit Ulrichs for their help. The data contains 1,476 
observations about age, occupation and sex of the individuals.
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Methodology and basic concepts of age heaping 
 
We study numerical abilities in this article, which are an important component of 
overall human capital. In order to provide estimates of very basic components of 
numeracy, we apply the age heaping methodology.
18
 The idea is that in less developed 
countries in the past, only a certain share of the population was able to report their own 
age exactly when census-takers, army recruitment officers or prison officials asked for 
it. The remaining population reported a rounded age, for example, 40, when they were 
in fact 39 or 41. In today’s world of obligatory schooling, passports, universities, birth 
documents, and bureaucracy, it is hard to imagine that people did not know their exact 
age. But in early and less organised societies this was clearly different. The typical 
result is an age distribution with spikes at ages ending in a five or a zero and an 
underrepresentation of other ages, which does not reflect the true age distribution. There 
was also some heaping on multiples of two, which was quite widespread among 
children and teenagers and to a lesser extent among young adults in their twenties. This 
shows that most individuals actually knew their age as teenagers, but only in well-
educated societies were they able to remember or calculate their exact age again later in 
life.
19
 
To give an example of rounding on multiples of five, the census of Mexico City 
1790 reports 410 people aged 40, but only 42 aged 41. This was clearly caused by age 
heaping. Apolant (1975, p. 333) gives individual examples of age misreporting: Joseph 
Milan, who appeared in February 1747 as a witness in a Uruguayan court should have 
been 48 years old, according to one judicial record. However, in the same year, but in 
another judicial record, he declared his age to be ’45 years’. Demographers see this age 
misreporting as a problem when calculating life expectancies and other population 
statistics. However, it is precisely this misreporting that enables us to approximate 
numerical abilities of historical populations. The ratio between the preferred ages and 
the others can be calculated by using several indices, one of them being the Whipple 
                                                 
18
 For more detailed surveys on the age heaping methodology see A’Hearn et al. (2009). 
19
 At higher ages this heaping pattern is mostly negligible, but interestingly somewhat stronger among 
populations who are numerate enough not to round on multiples of five. 
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index.
20
 To calculate the Whipple index of age heaping, the number of people reporting 
a rounded age ending with 0 or 5 is divided by the total number of people and this is 
subsequently multiplied by 500. Thus, the index measures the proportion of people who 
state an age ending in a five or zero, assuming that each terminal digit should appear 
with the same frequency in the ‘true’ age distribution.21  
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For an easier interpretation, A’Hearn et al. (2009) suggested another index, 
which we call the ABCC index.
22
 It is a simple linear transformation of the Whipple 
index and yields an estimate of the share of individuals who correctly report their age: 
(2) 100
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ABCC  if 100Wh ; else 100ABCC . 
The share of people able to report an exact age turns out to be highly correlated 
with other measures of human capital, like literacy and schooling, both across countries, 
individuals and over time (Bachi 1951, Myers 1954, Mokyr 1983, A’Hearn et al. 2009). 
A’Hearn et al. (2009) found that the relationship between illiteracy and age heaping for 
less developed countries (LDCs) after 1950 is very close. They calculated age heaping 
and illiteracy for not less than 270,000 individuals who were organised by 416 regions, 
ranging from Latin America to Oceania.
23
 The correlation coefficient with illiteracy was 
as high as 0.7. The correlation with the PISA results for numerical skills was even as 
high as 0.85, hence the Whipple index is more strongly correlated with numerical skills. 
They also used a large U.S. census sample to perform a very detailed analysis of this 
relationship. They subdivided by race, gender, high and low educational status and other 
                                                 
20
 A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen (2009) found that this index is the only one that fulfils the desired 
properties of scale independence (a linear response to the degree of heaping), and that it ranks samples 
with different degrees of heaping reliably. 
21
 A value of 500 means an age distribution with ages ending only on multiples of five, whereas 100 
indicates no heaping patterns on multiples of five, that is exactly 20 per cent of the population reported an 
age ending in a multiple of five.  
22
 The name results from the initials of the authors’ last names plus Greg Clark’s, who suggested this in a 
comment on their paper. Whipple indexes below 100 are normally caused by random variation of birth 
rates in the 20
th
 century rich countries. They are not carrying important information, hence normally set to 
100 in the ABCC index. 
23
 See A’Hearn et al. (2009), appendix available from the authors. 
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criteria. In each case, they obtained a statistically significant relationship. The fact that 
the coefficients are relatively stable between samples, i.e., a unit change in age heaping 
is associated with similar changes in literacy across the various tests, is also remarkable. 
The results are not only valid for the U.S and in any country with substantial age 
heaping that has been studied so far, the correlation was both statistically and 
economically significant. 
In order to assess the robustness of those U.S. census results and the similar 
conclusions drawn from late-20
th
 century LDCs, A’Hearn et al. (2009) also assessed age 
heaping and literacy in 16 European countries between the Middle Ages and the early-
19
th
 century. Again, they found a positive correlation between age heaping and literacy, 
although the relationship was somewhat weaker than for the 19
th
 or 20
th
 century data. It 
is likely that the unavoidable measurement error when using early-modern data caused 
the lower statistical significance.  
Age heaping has also been compared to other human capital indicators, for 
example primary schooling rates. The widest geographical sample studied so far was 
created by Crayen and Baten (2010a), who were able to include 70 countries for which 
both age heaping and schooling data (as well as other explanatory variables) were 
available. They found that primary schooling and age heaping were closely correlated in 
a series of cross-sections between the 1880s and 1940s, with R-squares between 0.55 
and 0.76 (including other control variables; see below). Again, the coefficients were 
relatively stable over time. This large sample also allowed the examination of various 
other potential determinants of age heaping. To assess whether the degree of 
bureaucracy, birth registration, and government interaction with citizens is likely to 
influence the knowledge of one’s exact age, independently of personal education, the 
authors used the number of censuses performed for each individual country for the 
period under study as an explanatory variable for their age heaping measure. Except for 
countries with a very long history of census-taking, all variations of this variable turned 
out to be insignificant, which would suggest that an independent bureaucracy effect was 
rather weak. In other words, it is sometimes the case that societies with a high number 
of censuses had high age awareness. But, at the same time, these societies were also 
early in introducing schooling and this variable clearly had more explanatory power in a 
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joint regression than the independent bureaucracy effect. Crayen and Baten also tested 
whether the general standard of living had an influence on age heaping tendencies 
(using height as well as GDP per capita to serve as a proxy for welfare) and found a 
varying influence: in some decades there was a statistically significant correlation, but 
in others this was not the case. Cultural determinants of age heaping were also 
observable, but their strongest influence was visible in East Asia, not in the Latin 
American countries under study in this article. 
In this article, we employ the ABCC measure of age heaping, computing indexes 
for different countries and birth decades. In order to do so, we use the age groups 23-32, 
33-42, etc.
24
 The age range from 63 to 72 was omitted as this age group offers too few 
observations, especially for the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries when mortality was relatively 
high.
25
  
An advantage of the age heaping methodology is that age statements are more 
widely available than other human capital proxies like signature ability or school 
attendance. As Reis (2008) argues, the age heaping measure is a very basic measure of 
human capital. It is, therefore, especially valid to study human capital development in 
Latin America in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries when more advanced human capital 
indicators were quite scarce and reflected only the skills of the elite. 
 
                                                 
24
 An advantage of this method is to spread the preferred ages, such as 25 or 30, more evenly within the 
age groups and it also adjusts for the fact that more people will be alive at age 50 than at age 54 or at age 
55 than at age 59 (Crayen and Baten 2010a). 
25
 Given that young adults aged 23 to 32 round partly on multiples of two rather than five, we use the 
adjustment method suggested by Crayen and Baten (2010a) to increase the Whipple value (minus 100) by 
24 per cent before calculating the ABCC measure. 
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3. Does inequality lead to civil wars?                              
A global long-term study using anthropometric 
indicators (1816-1999). 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We test for the influence of absolute and relative deprivation – proxied by 
anthropometric methods – on civil war risk. A comprehensive height data set allows us 
to go back to 1816 for a global sample. We measure absolute deprivation using human 
stature and we use height inequality within birth cohorts to measure relative deprivation. 
We take care that selectivity caused by missing values does not bias the results. We find 
that relative economic deprivation within populations (i.e., inequality) had a strong and 
consistent impact on the propensity to start civil wars. By contrast, absolute deprivation 
was significant in most but not all specifications. We also attend to potential 
endogeneity through instrumental variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the paper by Baten and Mumme (2013) and was published in 
the European Journal of Political Economy, 32, pp. 56-79. The concept of the paper 
was developed jointly, empirical analysis and writing were equally shared. In contrast to 
the published paper, British spelling conventions were followed in this thesis. 
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3.1. Introduction and literature overview 
Despite an extensive literature and the existence of a journal dedicated to the 
study of civil war, there have been no definitive conclusions about the reasons for civil 
war.
26
 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004, 2009) ask whether civil wars can be 
explained best by ‘grievance’ such as inequality or a lack of political rights, or by 
‘greed’. The latter can entail control over natural resources or control over government 
in general to extract rents from the population. Arnson (2005) states that, although 
resources are central to the duration and intensity of war, the roots and objectives of war 
can be explained best by grievances. The factors that have been commonly found to 
underlie civil war are poverty, ethnic or religious discrimination, lack of democracy, 
and opportunities for rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
We focus on inequality as the determinant of the onset of civil war. Early 
theoretical studies often consisted of consideration of the appropriate functional form 
for the relationship between inequality and the onset of civil war. See for example 
Muller (1985), Davis (1954), Havrilesky (1980), Parvin (1973), Nagel (1974), and the 
review by Lichbach (1989). The studies that have assessed the relationship between 
inequality and civil war empirically (see for example Alesina and Perotti 1996; Cramer 
2003; Muller and Seligson 1987, among others) have reported both positive and 
negative findings.
27
 
Some authors admit that the empirical results are compromised by severe data 
problems for the poor and conflict-prone regions in the world. Only incomplete or 
imprecise estimates of GDP per capita or Gini indices are in general available for 
countries affected by civil war. Miguel et al. (2004) conclude that, as a result of lack of 
reliable data on income inequality, especially with respect to African countries, it is not 
possible to assess the relation between income inequality and onset of civil war. Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) state: “The poor quality of the inequality data, available for only 108 
                                                 
26
 Relevant studies include Sambanis (2001), de Soysa (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Ross (2004), 
Collier and Sambanis (Eds.) (2005), Ron (2005), Lujala et al. (2005), Fearon (2005), Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005), Blattmann and Miguel (2010), World Bank (2011), etc. 
27
 Thaize Challier (2010) analysed the whether greater social distance was positively related to socio-
political conflicts in France between the 11
th
 and 14
th
 century, but did not find a clear impact. 
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countries, does not allow us to go beyond the claim that there appears to be no powerful 
cross-national relationship between inequality and onset (…).” 
By using a comprehensive data set, we are able to overcome the data problems 
that have hindered other studies. We hypothesize that populations in which people feel 
deprived compared to others are more likely to start a civil war and we also propose a 
positive relationship between absolute deprivation and increased risk of civil war. The 
absolute deprivation therefore depicts the average level of poverty or well-being within 
a population, while relative deprivation is defined here as inequality measured by 
anthropometric indicators. The novelty of our study is that we do not define poverty or 
inequality in monetary terms but take an approach that is close to Amartya Sen’s 
capability-emphasising approach to human well-being.
28
 Martha Nussbaum, who 
refined the approach by developing a list of the most fundamental capabilities a society 
should have, proposes health – defined as “being able to have good health, including 
reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter” – as one of 
the central human capabilities (Nussbaum 2003). Our proxies for well-being and 
inequality – average height and the inequality thereof – are determined to a large extent 
by this capability.
29
 While recent studies limit their scope to the time period since World 
War II or even the post-Cold War period, our method allows us to investigate a much 
longer period. We assess civil wars from 1816 onwards, amounting to 306 conflicts. We 
also take into account potential endogeneity issues, a problem that has been ignored in 
many earlier empirical studies. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents our data and 
introduces our proxy for absolute and relative deprivation as well as the subsequent 
hypotheses. Section 3.3 presents the estimation framework and results. Section 3.4 
concludes.  
 
                                                 
28
 Capabilities in Amartya Sen’s approach are opportunities that depend on peoples’ personal and social 
circumstances. 
29
 Of course, bodily health is also positively related to monetary wealth as richer people have better 
access to food and health services. 
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3.2. Data, methods and hypotheses 
Because of the extended time period covered, we use an enlarged version of the 
Correlates of War (COW) project’s data30 on intrastate wars, beginning in 1816.31 The 
onset of civil war is coded as a dichotomous variable adopting the value 1 if at least one 
new civil war started in a given country during a ten-year period. The COW database 
only contains information on those conflicts that caused at least 1,000 battle-related 
deaths (of all participants) per conflict year.
32
 Furthermore, a civil war is only included 
in the data set if one of the conflict parties is the government of a state
33
 and both sides 
are organised armed forces, capable of “effective resistance”.34 As the COW database 
excludes colonies, we apply the same definition to Clodfelter’s compilation of civil 
wars (Clodfelter 2002) and hence obtain global coverage, as far as historical sources 
commented on such large-scale civil war events.  
Economic deprivation has often been mentioned as one of the major 
determinants of civil conflict, but so far it has always been measured in terms of 
purchasing power in the literature. Moreover, it has never been possible to assess this 
factor over two centuries. Instead of using GDP per capita, we introduce adult male 
height as an indicator of the biological components of well-being, with low heights 
functioning as a proxy for absolute deprivation.
35
 There is comprehensive 
anthropometric theory documented in the literature that cannot be reported here in detail 
                                                 
30
 Cf. Sarkees (2000). 
31
 For further information, see Singer, and Small (1972), or: http://www.correlatesofwar.org. 
32
 In order to be considered a war participant, a state has to contribute at least 1,000 troops or suffer 100 
battle-related deaths while the war participant non-state group is already considered a war participant if it 
commits 100 armed people or suffers 25 deaths. 
33
 This criterion differentiates classical intrastate conflicts from so-called ‘New Wars’ in which the 
government does not have to be involved (see Münkler 2003; Chojnaki 2005). Please note that according 
to the new definitions of the COW project, war types 6 and 7, Regional internal and intercommunal wars, 
are also considered to be intra-state wars, but no civil wars. Civil wars are either Civil wars for central 
control (type 4) or Civil wars over local issues (type 5). 
34
 Effective resistance means that either “(a) both sides had to be initially organised for violent conflict 
and prepared to resist the attacks of their antagonists, or (b) the weaker side, although initially 
unprepared, is able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five per cent of the number of fatalities 
it sustains.” The definition of wars is explained in the Intra-State war Codebook, available at 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/WarList_NEW.html (last access, 
January 16th, 2013). 
35
 For collections of recent examples, see Komlos and Baten (1998a), Steckel and Floud (1997), and 
Komlos and Cuff (1998). On height inequality research, see Soltow (1992) and Quiroga and Coll (2000). 
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(Komlos 1985; Steckel 1995; Baten 2000b; and on height inequality especially Baten 
2000a). These studies provide proof that genetic factors matter strongly at the individual 
level, while population averages are mostly determined by nutrition and health 
conditions. If a person’s parents were tall, he or she is also tall for genetic reasons, but, 
at a population level, the Dutch were very short during a period of severe protein 
malnutrition during the mid-19th century, for example. Many patterns that earlier 
anthropologists considered to be attributable to genetics (such as tall Masai and Tutsi) 
turned out to be the results of special nutritional and health environment features.  
Information on adult male height was obtained from Baten and Blum (2012) 
who collected a very large number of height estimates, comprising 165 countries and all 
world regions since 1810.
36
 If the average height of people (that are adults at the time of 
measurement) that were born during a certain decade is relatively low (high) compared 
to individuals born during other decades, we know that there is a high probability that 
malnutrition and a bad (good) health environment prevailed during the birth decade.
37
 
The influence of the environment on an individual is strongest during the first three 
years after birth (Eveleth and Tanner 1990; Baten 2000a).
38
 Hence the existing height 
                                                 
36
 To be more precise, we have data on average heights of adults and we know their exact time of birth. 
On the basis of this information, we estimate the decade in which the individuals were born. Baten and 
Blum obtained the data on the basis of a very large range of available height estimates, plus the Measure 
DHS (Demographic and Health Surveys) project data (http://www.measuredhs.com/), where available, 
plus estimates using the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Global Database on Child Growth and 
Malnutrition (http://www.who.int/gdgm/p-child_pdf/). Stature measurements of adults that were recorded 
decades later can be used to shed light on the period of the first years after birth (Fogel 1982, 1986; 
Steckel 2009; Komlos 1985; Moradi and Baten 2005). In late 20
th 
century, there may be a modest effect 
of intergenerational height transmission at a population level in wealthy populations due to nutritional 
customs (for example, in Japan; Baten 2006). The nutrition and health impact on height is confirmed by 
studies such as the one by J.P. Habicht et al. (1974), who found that upper class groups of African 
countries were of similar height as the average U.S. citizen, whereas the middle and lower class in these 
countries were severely stunted. Correspondingly, educated young Chinese in Beijing today are only 
marginally shorter than the U.S. standard would predict. There may be exceptions with very isolated 
populations, such as the Pygmies, for whom genetic height potential may play a limiting role at the 
population level. In other words, for those populations even optimal diet and health conditions would not 
produce height levels similar to Western averages. But those exceptional populations have never 
accounted for a substantial share of the world population during the past two centuries. 
37
 For example, we have data on a large number of people who are now adults (and therefore full-grown) 
and were born in the 1960s and 1970s. If the average height of people that were born during the 1970s is 
relatively low compared to those born in the 1960s, we can assume that living conditions were worse in 
the 1970s and that these living conditions hampered the growth of people born during this decade. 
38
 The height data points and their limitations are documented in detail there. Following Baten and Blum 
(2012), we use estimates that were transformed into male equivalents, since the vast majority of historical 
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evidence is aggregated by country and birth decade. The countries and birth decades 
covered are shown in Table B1.  
One could imagine the potential problem that heights were measured in a 
selection of countries, for example, countries with a long tradition of measurement and 
academic study. This could cause sample selection bias due to missing values for the 
other countries. Fortunately, our data coverage of poor world regions is very 
comprehensive. Still, we take care that selectivity caused by missing values does not 
bias the results. Sources and detailed explanations of other explanatory variables than 
the main variables described above can be found in the appendix.  
Malnutrition has been previously assessed in the literature as a potential cause of 
conflict, uprisings, and civil wars. Grain price shocks, for example, were often 
associated with periods of malnutrition. Increasing grain prices as a determinant of 
conflicts turned out to be particularly important for research on the French Revolution 
and the conflicts of 1830 and 1848 that occurred after seasons of unusually bad harvests 
(Labrousse 1948). Marie Antoinette’s recommendation to eat cake when bread was 
lacking was hardly of advantage to the starving population. Similarly, Berger and 
Spoerer (2001) found that in the European case “it was economic misery, rather than 
‘ideas’ that caused the outbreak of revolutions in early 1848.” More recently, Moradi 
(2005) studied the effect of malnutrition on the probability of civil war in African 
regions. He found that an increase in calories per day from 1800 to 2500 reduced the 
risk of civil war outbreak by 11 per cent. These examples suggest that internal armed 
conflicts typically break out one or more years after a famine. Lags in estimating the 
effect of anthropometric deprivation on civil war occurrence should therefore be taken 
into account. Following findings in prior literature, we assume that a civil war is less 
likely to occur if people are economically well-off and therefore hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the extent of absolute deprivation in a country during the 
decade prior to the time of observation, the more likely a civil war is to break out in that 
country. 
                                                                                                                                               
height estimates are for males. For further discussion of the topic and advantages of this method, see 
Baten and Blum (2010), pp. 8. 
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Adverse living conditions lead to dissatisfaction of the society, which might at a 
certain point result in the onset of a conflict. It is important to keep in mind that it would 
not be the individuals whose height we are using that would lead the revolt as these are 
still children at that point in time. The measured individuals merely shed light on the 
living conditions during the years after their time of birth (and they share these living 
conditions with adults at the same time who might start a civil war).  
Of course, discontent does not always lead to violent conflict. But if conflict 
results from discontent, it generally takes some time until the dissatisfaction is great 
enough to result in the onset of civil war. We therefore look at the living conditions in 
the decade prior to the onset of a civil war. Aggregation to time periods – unavoidable 
due to the availability of evidence – is common in the civil war literature39 as it might 
also remove some of the random noise.  
Despite our expectation that there is a negative relationship between well-being 
and onset of civil war, it might also be the case that it is not absolute deprivation of an 
entire society that makes people engage in conflict but rather relative deprivation. 
Nafziger and Auvinen (1997) argue that conflict is likely to occur if people feel 
disadvantaged relative to others. Moreover, some parts of the population might feel 
especially deprived if they observe different consumption patterns of the richer strata 
even if severe deprivation in absolute terms does not exist (Nafziger and Auvinen 
1997). Barron et al. (2004) show that there is a significant and positive relationship 
between (income) inequality and conflict in Indonesia, especially on the village level. 
Furthermore, recruiting activities might be most successful in regions with high 
inequality, as Macours (2011) shows for Nepal between 1996 and 2006.  
As a second main methodological contribution, we assess relative deprivation 
measured by the coefficient of height variation. This variable measures how unequal the 
access to good nutrition and healthcare is for different social groups in society. We use 
the coefficient of height variation (CV from here) to estimate height inequality – and 
thereby the inequality of living standards – of a population within a designated birth 
decade. The coefficient of height variation is a good proxy for income inequality, as  
                                                 
39
 Most of the other studies use 5-year-periods, see for example Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier et al. 
(2009). 
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Table 3.1: Regressions of the relationships between (a) height inequality and (b) 
average height and GDP/c. 
 
Model (1) – Source: van Zanden et al. (2014), Table 3, Appendix A. Model (2) – 
Source: Moradi and Baten (2005), Table 2, Column 2. Data sources of their study: 
Demographic and Health Surveys. The income Gini coefficients were derived from 
twelve primary sources listed in Deininger and Squire (1996). Models (3) and (4) – 
Source: Baten and Blum (2012).  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
Gini 
coefficient of 
income 
inequality 
Gini 
coefficient of 
income 
inequality 
GDP/c (log) GDP/c (log) 
Height inequality 10.46*** 20.93*** 
  
Height 
  
0.105*** 0.143*** 
Significance 
p-value t-stat. p-value p-value 
-0.006 2.87 0 0 
Geography World Africa World World  
Period 1820-2000 1950-1980 1870-1949 1950-1989 
Observations 129 78 
  
Adj*. R
2
 0.26 0.44 0.47 0.44 
Note: *** refers to 1% of significance level. Height inequality is the coefficient of variation 
(CV) of height, while average height refers to height in cm, both organised by country and birth decade. 
The R
2
 in model (2) is adjusted, whereas the ones in the other columns are unadjusted. Model (1) - 
Source: van Zanden et al. (2014), Table 3, appendix. The coefficient of height inequality of the World 
includes decade fixed effects. Estimates are weighted-least-squares (weights: population sizes). The 
authors further subdivided into an early and late sample, and the correlation between height and income 
inequality remained robust. Model (2) – Source: Moradi and Baten (2005), Table 2, Column 2. The 
regressions include fixed effects for population coverage and income definition. Data sources of their 
study: Demographic and Health Surveys. The population definition fixed effects differentiate between 
inequality referring to households, total economically active population, all income recipients and 
taxpayers, with the income definitions referring to expenditure, net income and income not nearer 
specified. The income gini coefficients were derived from twelve primary sources listed in Deininger and 
Squire (1996).  Model (3) and (4) – Source: Baten and Blum (2012). For model (4), the authors excluded 
Japan and Guatemala (height sources refers to Indios only). Model (3) includes all countries, also Japan 
and Guatemala. The authors assessed the effect of outliers such as Japan in further regressions and found 
them not to influence the overall relationship. 
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shown in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1. In Table 3.1, we summarise previous results (Baten 
2000a; Moradi and Baten 2005; Van Zanden et al. 2014) on the relationship between 
income and height inequality, as well as on the relationship between GDP per capita and 
average height. Independent of geographic and temporal scope, earlier studies found a 
relatively close – given that all inequality statistics contain measurement error – and 
significant correlation.  This holds similarly for the relationship between average height 
and GDP per capita (models 3 and 4 in Table 3.1). To obtain a graphical impression, we 
aggregated the inequality evidence by world region and half century units of birth 
(Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1. The relationship between height inequality and income inequality by world 
region and half century 
 
Notes: The abbreviations refer to the world region and the half century (start year is given). Abbreviations 
of world regions: ea = East Asia; eeu = Eastern Europe; lac = Latin America and Caribbean; men = 
Middle East/North Africa; naa = North America, Australia, New Zealand; wee = Western Europe; sa = 
South Asia; sea = Southeast Asia; ssa = Sub-Saharan Africa; birth half centuries from 1850s are included. 
Source for income gini coefficients: van Zanden et al. 2014. See their appendix also on the linear 
transformation of height CV into height “ginis”. The correlation coefficient between the two variables 
above is 0.51 (p=0.023). 
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As a result, Latin America during the early 19
th
 century displays both high income and 
height inequality, and East Asia and Eastern Europe had low values for both inequality 
indicators. One deviation from the regression line was Sub-Saharan Africa during the 
early 20
th
 century, but this was most likely due to measurement error as there is little 
informative evidence on income inequality in Africa before the 1980s.
40
 The overall 
correlation between the two measures was – even including early 20th century Africa – 
0.51 (p-value 0.023). Obviously, the correlation between the two measures is not a 
perfect one. Measurement error is always a possibility, especially in inequality 
measures. In addition, human height is influenced by public goods, such as the 
healthcare system within the society. We argue that anthropometric inequality measures 
can be advantageous compared to income-based inequality indicators in civil war 
studies as height captures important aspects of living standards, in particular nutrition 
and health (Komlos 1985; Steckel 1995). More specifically, although income inequality 
is an important factor for dissatisfaction, people might be even more inclined to rebel if 
they feel deprived of very basic factors of well-being while other groups of the society 
have access to these. We therefore hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher inequality within a country, measured by the coefficient of height 
variation, leads to a higher probability of the onset of civil war. 
We calculate the coefficient of height variation on the basis of our height data. 
For a country i and birth decade t, the CV is defined as: 
 
A high coefficient of height variation therefore implies that a society is highly unequal. 
 
                                                 
40
 Interestingly, Western Europe moved from high income- and height inequality during the late 19
th
 
century to lower inequality levels during the early 20
th
 century (i.e. when the welfare state was 
introduced). 
100
it
it
itCV


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3.3 Estimation framework and results 
We analyse the probability of the onset of civil war within a ten-year period in a 
country from the 1810s to 1990s. Our basic model is a logit regression of the form 
Civil Warit = β0 + β1 heighti,t−1 + β2 inequalityi,t-1 + BX + ηi + γt + εit 
where t refers to a decade, and i refers to the country in question. X is the vector of 
control variables, while γt denotes time fixed effects that have been added to control for 
unobserved factors. Geographic fixed effects ηi are controlled for with world region 
dummies or country fixed effects estimation. We use clustered standard errors to avoid 
potential consequences of serial correlation.
41
  
Civil War is an indicator that equals one if a new civil war started in country i 
during decade t and equals zero otherwise, so we only look at the determinants of the 
onset of war, not ongoing wars. We are lagging height and inequality levels in all but 
the instrumental variables specifications to avoid contemporaneous correlation, because 
heights as well as inequality might be influenced by civil wars. Civil wars are likely to 
increase absolute deprivation by destroying infrastructure and harvests and therefore 
complicating access to food and healthcare. Inequality might rise for the same reasons 
mentioned above, especially because already poor people will have less access to scarce 
resources. Moreover, one could imagine that the poorer sections of society that have 
neither political nor economic power will be disproportionally burdened with the costs 
of reconstruction and other costs that incurred during and after the war. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that inequality is reduced if the assets of richer people are 
heavily affected by civil war and the society therefore becomes relatively more equal.  
Apart from our key variables that are proxies for absolute and relative 
deprivation, there are several other variables that might be potential determinants of 
civil war and that were included in our models.
42
 As these variables are usual controls in 
                                                 
41
 Our estimates are in fact heteroskedasticity-robust and cluster-robust, see Cameron and Trivedi (2009), 
p. 85. 
42
 Especially for the description of the variables and the material on the literature review, we thank Sonja 
Bohnet, née Rabus; see also Baten and Rabus (2007).   
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empirical studies on conflicts, we will discuss them only briefly. The sources and exact 
definitions of these variables can be found in the appendix. 
Democracy. Intuitively, we would expect that a democratically organised 
country would have less risk of facing a civil war (Skaperdas 2008; Reynal-Querol 
2005). On the other hand, one could imagine that repressive regimes try to impede the 
outbreak of civil wars through repression (Hegre et al. 2001).
43
 As a large strand of 
literature is engaged in disentangling the effects of the ethnic composition (Sambanis 
2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003), we also control for these effects.
44
 In addition, we 
include population size as a control variable, because a larger population makes it more 
likely that the critical threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths will be reached.  
 
Figure 3.2: The probability of civil war onset subject to inequality 
 
                                                 
43
 We test the non-monotonic hypothesis by introducing the squared term of this variable in one of our 
models. Another strategy would be concessions: Aidt and Jensen (2011) as well as Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2000) showed that European governments increased voting rights from the 19
th
 to 20
th
 century 
when they were faced with the threat of a conflict. We also test a specification with a percentage change 
in democracy from the previous to the current period to control for policy changes that have been driven 
by the threat of political unrest. 
44
 As there is no agreement in previous literature which measure of ethnic composition is best, we take the 
most common ethnic fractionalisation measure but test whether our results change if we introduce 
different measures in Table B5. 
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We also consider the country's colonial background that might be positively or 
negatively correlated with the onset of civil war, depending on whether dissatisfaction 
of the colonised outweighs the fear of military reactions to riots. Finally, we test 
whether the idea holds true that rebels finance their activities based on natural 
resources, and therefore introduce a dummy variable for diamond deposits as a “greed” 
component.
45
 As other papers have found diamonds to be positively correlated with 
civil wars (Ross 2006; Smillie 2002), we expect a positive sign.  
 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
How did the general trend of civil war occurrence develop over the last two 
centuries? In general, the number of conflicts was relatively constant until WWII, with 
approximately 10-15 major civil wars per decade exceeding the threshold of 1,000 
battle-related deaths. After WWII, there was a clear increase in the number of civil 
wars, followed by a boom in the most recent period (over the past decade, the number 
has slightly declined again; see Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3: Civil Wars 1820-2000 
 
Sources: Data taken from the Correlates of War Project. 
                                                 
45
 A potential shortcoming is that we do not differentiate between primary (difficult to loot) and 
secondary (easy to loot) diamonds. 
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If we compare this development with the evolution of height over the past two 
centuries, we actually observe a modest correlation – one that is opposite to the 
expected direction. Heights were relatively constant in the first period (until 
approximately 1860-1890) and started to increase in the 20
th
 century, most notably in 
Western and Eastern Europe and European settlements. In Africa and East Asia, a 
certain increase in height between the 1890s and 1950s can also be observed (Figure 
3.4a). Hence, if we observe some influence of height on the probability of civil war 
outbreak, it is most likely not due to a trend correlation – the trend developments of the 
two series would suggest a correlation in the opposite direction. Notwithstanding these 
observations, Africa experienced a period of decreasing heights afterwards (Moradi 
2005).  
Looking at inequality trends by world region, no overall trend is visible (Figure 
3.4b). The levels of inequality were generally quite high in Latin America, at least since 
the late 19
th
 century, which is also confirmed in other studies (Van Zanden et al. 2014). 
In Europe (both East and West) and Asia inequality levels were generally lower. 
Western Europe’s inequality levels decreased between the 19th and 20th centuries. Sub-
Saharan African inequality in contrast increased substantially between the first and the 
second half of the 20
th
 century, consistent with what we know about civil war trends. 
An examination of the descriptive statistics already offers insight into possible 
outcomes of our regression analyses. We observe, for instance, that civil war-ridden 
countries are less democratic (-2.57) than their peaceful counterparts (-0.21). Lagged 
height was in fact lower in the observations with incidence of civil war. Most important 
for the present study, we do observe higher inequality within countries that experienced 
a civil war. The coefficient of height variation equals 3.93 in countries that experience a 
new civil war compared to 3.75 in countries without a new civil war. In the upper panel, 
we document all of the cases, whereas the bottom panel shows the descriptives for the 
cases of Table 3.3 in which none of the explanatory variables are missing. The 
correspondence between both panels is high. We will assess missing value selectivity in 
greater detail below. We also took a closer look at the functional forms of inequality, 
height and democracy. Theories of non-monotonic relationships between inequality and 
civil war cannot be confirmed for our data. Figure 3.2 shows that civil war probability is 
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rising in an almost linear way, at the most a slightly exponential function can be 
assumed.  
 
Figure 3.4.a: Height trends estimated by world regions. 
 
 
Figure 3.4.b: Inequality trends estimated by world regions 
 
Note: We omitted data points with less than four countries per given decade in a world region. 
Source: Baten and Blum (2012). 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Mean if 
cwon=1 
Mean if 
cwon=0 
Civil War Onset 3380 0.07 0.25 1 0 
Inequality 708 3.77 0.37 3.93 3.75 
Height 1330 1.68 0.05 1.66 1.68 
Av. Conflict years t-1 3211 0.19 0.99 1.07 0.13 
Colony 3380 0.22 0.41 0.09 0.23 
Democracy 1525 -0.54 6.69 -2.57 -0.21 
Democracy
2
 1525 0.45 0.35 0.31 0.47 
Diamond 3380 0.13 0.34 0.24 0.12 
Ethn. Fract. 3140 0.46 0.26 0.47 0.46 
Language Fract. 3100 0.40 0.28 0.38 0.40 
Religious Fract. 3200 0.43 0.23 0.37 0.43 
Population (log) 3199 7.85 1.84 9.31 7.74 
Peace Duration 3380 7.39 5.70 5.20 7.55 
Only nonmissing values for main specification of Table 3 (model 1 and 2) 
Civil War Onset 403 0.16 0.36 1 0 
Inequality 403 3.80 0.36 3.94 3.77 
Height 403 1.69 0.05 1.66 1.69 
Av. Conflict years t-1 403 0.41 1.45 0.96 0.30 
Colony 403 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.06 
Democracy 403 -0.16 6.78 -2.29 0.23 
Democracy
2
 403 0.46 0.35 0.29 0.49 
Diamond 403 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.14 
Ethn. Fract. 383 0.41 0.28 0.44 0.40 
Language Fract. 375 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.33 
Religious Fract. 384 0.44 0.24 0.39 0.45 
Population (log) 403 9.43 1.39 9.61 9.40 
Peace Duration 403 7.53 5.96 4.10 8.16 
Note: The sample includes 224 country-decade observations in which a civil war took place. The absolute 
number of civil wars within the observed time period is higher (306 civil wars). Height and inequality are 
lagged by one decade. Source: see Appendix B.
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When we tested the relationship by controlling for inequality and its squared 
term in a regression analysis, we did not find a significant non-monotonic relationship 
either.
46
 We therefore abandoned the idea that inequality might affect civil war 
probability in a non-monotonic way and do not use other functional forms of inequality 
in our regressions.
47
 
As units are probably statistically related over time, we have to account for 
potential serial correlation problems. Beck et al. (1998) propose to use the discrete 
logistic model of the form  
P(y𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖.𝑡) = h(t|𝑥𝑖.𝑡) =
1
1+𝑒−(𝑥𝑖,𝑡ß+Ƙ𝑡−𝑡0)
  
where κt-t0 denotes a dummy variable measuring the time of peace until time t. This 
model has been applied, among others, by Aidt and Jensen (2009). However, temporal 
dummies should not be applied if the null hypothesis of temporal independence is not 
rejected as unnecessary multicollinearity would be the consequence (Beck et al., 1998, 
p. 1269). This is the case in our data (p=0.4312), possibly not because there is no path 
dependence at all, but rather because we use decades instead of yearly observations. 
Although the above mentioned model does not seem to fit for our data, we are taking 
potential serial correlation seriously. We therefore cluster standard errors at the country 
level in every specification and employ variables that control for war persistency.
48
 War 
persistency is either measured by the absolute number of peace decades, which is 
adopted from the idea of introducing spell counters above, just using the absolute values 
instead of dummy variables.
49
 As an alternative measure we introduce the variable 
“warlast” that measures how many years of conflict took place in country i during the 
previous decade. While the former variable takes into account the entire period of time, 
                                                 
46
 Regressions not reported here, but available from the authors. 
47
 The probability of the onset of civil war subject to democracy is decreasing linearly with higher levels 
of democracy (Figure B1). However, regression analysis suggests that there might also be a non-
monotonic relationship between the political regime and civil war probability. To avoid functional form 
misspecifications, we always use democracy and its squared term in the regression analyses.  
48
 This is the standard solution to this problem in civil war literature, see for example Miguel et al. (2004). 
49
 The underlying assumption would be that the probability of facing a civil war decreases linearly with 
peace duration, which might be a rather strong assumption. However results do not change if we only 
take into account the previous decade. 
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the latter shifts the focus to the short run, relying on the assumption that it might be 
rather violent action in the recent past that leads to the outbreak of new conflicts. We 
ran the regressions with both specifications and received the same outcome for our main 
variables, so we generally keep to the long-term perspective of war persistency and use 
the short-term variable only in some of the specifications to prove the robustness of the 
results.  
 
3.3.2 Regression analysis 
We use different sets of variables and models to test the robustness of our 
results. We expect that inequality increases the likelihood of civil war, whereas height is 
negatively related with the onset of civil war. 
In models 1 to 4 of Table 3.3, we use the same set of variables – only 
exchanging long- and short term war persistency controls in one specification- with 
pooled logit, panel logit and rare events logit models. The rare events model takes into 
account that the event of a civil war is rather rare compared to periods without new civil 
wars and generates approximately unbiased and lower-variance estimates of logit 
coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix.
50
 We find that inequality in fact 
increases the probability of civil war. Similarly, height – as a measure of non-
deprivation – reduces this probability. Hence, both hypotheses were confirmed and 
statistically significant throughout the models.  
Apart from our two main variables, we find that countries under colonial rule were at 
higher risk of facing civil strife.
51
 Our long-term measure of peace duration indicates. 
                                                 
50
 It was not possible to report marginal effects for the rare events logit model with our statistical 
software. But it is possible to calculate the probability of the onset of civil war manually: If we set all 
explanatory variables at their mean and increase inequality from the 20
th
 to 80
th
 percentile, the possibility 
of a new civil war increases by 0.031 or by 0.164 if we increase inequality from the mean to the 
maximum level. 
51
 The coefficients for the population size are positive and sometimes positive, as expected. In some 
cases, the relationship between democracy and civil war seems to be bell-shaped. However, the turning 
point would be beyond all data points we observe in our panel, therefore our data set only covers the 
observations left to the turning point. We tentatively conclude countries with very high levels of 
democracy are at lower risk of experiencing a new war, as squared democracy has a negative sign. But 
this squared term of the political system variable is only significant in some of the specifications. The 
possibility of a new civil war does not seem to be reduced if a country experiences a shift towards more 
democracy (model 5). 
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Table 3.3: Regressions of civil war onset 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Estimation 
Method 
PLOG XTLOG XTLOG RELOG PLOG XTLOG  XTLOG XTLOG XTLOG XTLOG 
Marginal Effects? Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Inequality 0.051* 0.055* 0.059* 0.685** 0.067** 0.070*  0.088** 0.059* 0.069* 0.079*** 
 (0.066) (0.075) (0.068) (0.031) (0.013) (0.057)  (0.019) (0.078) (0.094) (0.005) 
Height -0.885* -0.989** -1.064** -9.701** -0.923* -1.148**  -1.069** -1.079** -1.267*** -0.819*** 
 (0.051) (0.032) (0.019) (0.045) (0.063) (0.026)  (0.035) (0.019) (0.006) (0.005) 
Population (log) 0.028* 0.033** 0.038** 0.208 0.018 0.035**  0.020 0.016 0.043**  
 (0.056) (0.036) (0.014) (0.106) (0.101) (0.037)  (0.150) (0.252) (0.012)  
Democracy 0.001 0.038 0.021 -3.649 -0.352 -0.036  -0.245 -0.350 0.193  
 (0.997) (0.907) (0.951) (0.188) (0.119) (0.918)  (0.499) (0.237) (0.581)  
Democracy
2
 -0.057 -0.068 -0.078* -0.920*  -0.046  -0.109* -0.109*   
 (0.211) (0.139) (0.093) (0.082)  (0.426)  (0.056) (0.051)   
Colony 0.144** 0.151** 0.151** 1.224**  0.179*** 0.146** 0.106*   
 (0.030) (0.021) (0.015) (0.043)  (0.010)  (0.049) (0.065)   
Peace Duration -0.006* -0.004  -0.076** -0.010*** -0.003  -0.005 -0.008**   
 (0.064) (0.225)  (0.040) (0.001) (0.320)  (0.135) (0.032)   
Warlast   0.010         
   (0.200)         
Policy Change     -0.001       
     (0.737)       
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Table 3.3 (cont.) 
 
Height Growth      -2.002     
      (0.445)      
Diamond       0.024 0.024   
       (0.699) (0.666)   
Ethn. Fract.       0.031 0.030   
       (0.727) (0.645)   
Time dummies? Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y 
Wreg dummies? Y Y Y N N Y N N Y N 
N 403 403 403 375 356 364 383 383 403 663 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust (country-) clustered standard errors applied in every model. P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level 
respectively. Note: Diamond mining and colonial status are defined as dummy variables. Fractionalisation measures are time invariant. For expository purposes, we 
divided the variables democracy and democracy squared by 100 before running the regressions. Marginal Effects reported except for rare events logit model (model 5). 
Inequality is proxied by height cv, absolute deprivation is proxied by height, both lagged by 1 decade. Peace duration: sequence of decades where no war has started up 
to current period. Abbreviations: PLOG: pooled logit, XTLOG: panel logit, RELOG: rare events logit. Wreg dummies: Dummies for world regions.
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that countries that have not faced civil war for longer time periods are less prone to face 
conflicts in the future. In contrast, the warlast variable suggests that countries that were 
susceptible to war during the previous decade do not face higher risk of having a new 
war in the near future.  
Model 6 introduces the growth rate of height to assess whether changes in well-being 
rather than absolute or relative well-being are responsible for dissatisfaction. For 
example, people might feel more deprived if the overall well-being in previous periods 
was better compared with the current situation. Changing conditions in well-being 
proxied by height growth does not seem to generate sufficient dissatisfaction for 
conflict (model 6).  
Ethnic fractionalisation and the existence of diamonds are added in models 7 and 
8. None of these variables turns significant. In most of the models, we include time and 
world region effects, but omit them in some of the models to see whether our results 
stay robust. In sum, inequality and absolute deprivation remain significant in every 
model (see Appendix B for the robustness of the results).  
As a robustness test, we also ran linear probability regressions (Table 3.4). Our 
main variable inequality remains positive and significant throughout the different 
models, while absolute deprivation only becomes significant in the random and fixed 
effects models.
52
  
In Table 3.5, we test whether the results remain stable across different income 
levels by omitting either very rich or very poor countries.
53
 Inequality turns insignificant 
if we exclude least developed countries. If we exclude rich countries, inequality is 
significant and positively related with the onset of civil wars and the coefficients are 
much bigger than in our baseline specifications. We therefore conclude that the impact  
                                                 
52
 Note however, that we do not regard the fixed effects specification as the best model for our data. 
Statistical literature argues that using fixed effects might lead to inefficient results if the between-
variation is better measured than the within variation, because it puts much less focus on the between 
variation (see Cameron and Trivedi 2009, p. 244, among others). Moreover, if we use fixed effects we 
have to assume that unobserved heterogeneity is consistent over time, which is a very strong assumption 
for such a long time period. Therefore, we only include some fixed effects specifications as robustness 
tests. 
53
 To exclude poor countries, we drop countries with a GDP p.c. less than 1,000 US $. We define rich 
countries as those that have a GDP with more than two standard deviations above the mean GDP of our 
sample. 
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Table 3.4: Linear probability model of civil war outbreak 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation Method XTREG RE XTREG FE  
Inequality 0.121** 0.135** 0.124** 0.084*  
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.056)  
Height -0.47 -0.965* -0.626 -1.351**  
 (0.469) (0.055) (0.370) (0.037)  
Population (log) 0.026 0.018 0.028*   
 (0.201) (0.202) (0.092)   
Democracy 0.298 -0.176 0.382   
 (0.521) (0.579) (0.428)   
Democracy
2
 -0.056 -0.0762 -0.065   
 (0.341) (0.202) (0.260)   
Colony 0.161* 0.143* 0.157   
 (0.093) (0.091) (0.105)   
Spell Counter -0.006 -0.009** -0.005   
 (0.199) (0.021) (0.291)   
Ethn. Fract.   -0.051  
   (0.686)   
Diamond   0.019  
   (0.810)   
Time dummies? Y Y Y Y 
Wreg dummies? Y N Y N 
Constant 0.196 1.124 0.414 2.041*  
 (0.853) (0.216) (0.713) (0.062)  
N 403 403 383 663 
Log lik.    -17.06 
Chi-squared 274.6 60.41 345.1   
R
2
 0.169 0.169 0.052 0.052 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors. P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant 
on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. Note: Diamond mining and colonial status are defined as dummy 
variables, Fractionalisation measures are time invariant. For expository purposes, we divided the 
variables democracy and democracy squared by 100 before running the regressions. Inequality is proxied 
by height cv, absolute deprivation is proxied by height, both lagged by 1 decade. Peace duration: 
sequence of decades where no war has started up to current period. In model 4, the within-R
2 
is reported. 
Other notes: see Table 3.3.
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Table 3.5: Robustness tests: panel logit omitting the very rich and very poor countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Omitted GDP p.c.<1000 US$ GDP p.c.>13200 US$ 
Inequality 0.023 0.063 0.106** 0.098*  
 (0.497) (0.126) (0.041) (0.087)  
Height -1.113*** -0.986** -0.790 -1.275*** 
 (0.004) (0.046) (0.159) (0.006)  
Population (log) 0.027* 0.003 0.014 0.020  
 (0.072) (0.863) (0.474) (0.245)  
Democracy 0.114 -0.191 0.132 -0.094  
 (0.651) (0.555) (0.774) (0.817)  
Democracy
2
 -0.044 -0.082 -0.033 -0.071  
 (0.321) (0.142) (0.554) (0.264)  
Colony 0.062 0.020 0.155** 0.160**  
 (0.491) (0.872) (0.038) (0.031)  
Peace duration -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006  
 (0.660) (0.139) (0.189) (0.120)  
Diamond  0.044  0.025  
  (0.607)  (0.631)  
Ethn. Fract.  0.043  0.032  
  (0.621)  (0.649)  
Time dummies? N Y Y Y 
Wreg dummies? Y N Y N 
N 303 284 287 284 
Log lik. -95.32 -100.1 -97.62 -98.46  
Chi-squared 342.5 245.0 147.1 157.8  
Notes: Estimation: Pooled logit with heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors. P-values in 
parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. Marginal effects reported. 
Note: Diamond mining and colonial status are defined as dummy variables. Fractionalisation measures 
are time invariant. For expository purposes, we divided the variables democracy and democracy squared 
by 100 before running the regressions.
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of inequality on the onset of civil war is much higher in poor countries. Absolute 
deprivation plays a role across all income levels.  
When looking at the different models, differences in the number of observations 
can be observed, which is mainly due to missing values for some of the explanatory 
variables. We want to determine whether these missing values might have resulted in a 
missing value sample selection problem. In other words, do we have a very special 
subsample due to missing values in some of the specifications? We tested this 
possibility by assessing whether countries of a certain income range have been over- or 
underrepresented in one of the models. We also checked whether the distribution of 
observations within certain income groups changed between the models (Figure 3.5). 
We found that our models with few explanatory variables draw an almost perfect mirror 
image of the real income distributions in the world (Table 3.3, model 10 compared to 
calculations of the World Bank).  
 
Figure 3.5: Data selection within the models of Table 3 by income group compared to 
representative income distributions as reported by the World Bank. 
 
Source of data for models: Baten and Blum (2012). Notes: Income levels as defined by World Bank: low 
income: 1,005$ or less, lower middle income: 1,006$-3,975$, upper middle income: 3,976-12,275$, high 
income: 12,276$ or higher. Source of income classifications and distribution of income: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators. 
 
In the other models, high income countries are modestly overrepresented, while 
lower middle income countries are modestly underrepresented. However, income levels 
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do not differ vastly from the real distribution in any of the models. Low income 
countries are always sufficiently covered. It is also important to note that particularly 
war-struck regions such as Africa and Latin America are quite well covered in our 
data.
54
 Therefore, we conclude that missing value sample selection that might lead to 
omitting the poorest countries is not a problem here.  
 
3.3.3 Instrumental variable models 
In what follows, we will dwell on endogeneity issues. The results of the ordinary 
least squares regressions could be affected by reverse causality. Civil war may lead to a 
decrease in children’s height (see, for example, Bundervoet et al. 2009) and perhaps 
also a change in height dispersion.
55
 Instrumental variable (IV) estimation allows us to 
circumvent these issues of endogeneity. Which instrumental variables could be suited 
for this purpose? Easterly (2007) and Galor et al. (2009) have recently advocated the 
use of climatic, geological and similar variables, which proxy types of agriculture that 
correlate either with higher or lower efficient sizes of scale.
56
 Our instrumental variables 
for inequality will be: (1) the ratio of soil and climatic suitability for sugar cane relative 
to wheat and (2) low population density in 1500 interacted with southern location. 
Sugar plantation and cattle-raising for hide and beef exports are typical examples for 
economies of scale in agricultural production: The owner of a sugar plantation in Cuba 
or Brazil will aim at producing on a large scale by employing a high number of slaves 
or – later – free labourers on large plantations, because higher scale increases revenues 
much more than costs. Likewise, an Argentinean or Australian cattle baron will increase 
his herd and the amount of pasture to enormous values. Relative to sugar cane, wheat 
production is already highly productive on much smaller farm units as has been amply 
demonstrated in the agricultural economics literature. Sugar and wheat production 
requires relatively clear-cut climatic and soil characteristics. Hence, we can use those to 
proxy the suitability for the “inequality crop” sugar and the “equality crop” wheat. In 
                                                 
54
 Table available from the authors. 
55
 See also Gupta et al. (2004) on the armed conflict effects on macroeconomic stability (albeit not on 
health spending). 
56
 The reason behind this is that economies of scale usually go hand in hand with more inequality, as 
more people will be working for large landowners without having their own piece of land. 
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the spirit of Easterly’s (2007) famous instrumental variable, we take the ratio between 
the two.  
The cattle-raising activity associated with inequality is unfortunately less 
concentrated on specific soils. But there is a clear correlation with Southern location 
and initially low population density. Consequently, we use the interaction term of these 
two variables as additional instrumental variable.
57
  
The advantage of the ratio between the climatic and geological suitability ratio 
of sugar and wheat is its intrinsically exogenous nature, whereas the actual crop use 
could be influenced by civil wars. Similarly, population density around 1500 is a very 
popular instrumental variable, because it captures human development in a very early 
time period (it was prominently used by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002, for 
example). The autocorrelation of early population densities and those of the 20
th
 century 
is quite limited due to the unequal population increase in some world regions and the 
massive migration movements. Similarly, it is likely that Southern latitude is 
exogenous. The second IV is only included in some of the specifications, as our first 
stage results show that the IV’s correlation with inequality might not be strong enough. 
We find that the results do not depend on it. 
For height levels, we use lactose tolerance as an instrumental variable. Baten and 
Blum (2012) have summarised the literature on diminished protein consumption as a 
result of lactose intolerance and find clear empirical evidence for this relationship in 
their econometric analysis. As we use lactose tolerance instead of lactose intolerance as 
an instrument, we expect positive signs for this IV. 
In addition to an IV probit model, we test two-stage least squares (from now on: 
2SLS) models. Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 19) argue that using OLS models might 
also be preferable in the case of limited dependent variables, as they have conceptual 
robustness advantages. Wooldridge (2002: 594 and 596) confirms that the 2SLS 
estimates of a linear model provide good approximates for the average partial effects of 
                                                 
57
 Argentina became the prototype of this type of land use, because the indigenous Indian population on 
its great plains was always very sparse, and in contrast to the United States, European immigration was 
relatively limited in numbers until the late 19
th
 century. Apart from Argentina and Australia, also South 
Africa, New Zealand and Uruguay had very unequal distributions following the colonial land grab 
(Eastwood et al. 2010; Juif and Baten 2014). Thus, we instrument this kind of inequality agriculture with 
Southern latitude interacted with population density in 1500. 
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bivariate probit models. We use limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) 
techniques in cases where our F-statistics were relatively low.  
The results of the two-stage least squares regressions confirm that we have 
strong instruments for inequality and height.
58
 The respective instruments for height and 
inequality are strongly correlated with our endogenous variables, as shown in the first 
stage of Table 3.6. The Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test is above or near the critical 
threshold of 10 (Stock and Yogo 2002) in case of the 2SLS specifications (models 2 and 
3). The F-value for the inequality instruments is below the critical threshold in the 
LIML specifications, but the Anderson-Rubin test, which is robust to the presence of 
weak instruments, rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous 
regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero in every model. We 
conclude that we do not have a weak instruments problem here. The Kleibergen-Paap 
statistic clearly shows that our reduced form model is not underidentified. 
Looking at the second stage, the effect of inequality on the likelihood of civil 
war is confirmed. The relative importance of our inequality variable is not trivial. With 
full standardisation, we find that an increase in inequality by one standard deviation 
results in more than half a standard deviation increase in the onset of civil war (0.67 in 
model 2 of the IV Table 3.6). This is certainly a substantial economic effect. Using the 
OLS results above, a one standard deviation increase in inequality leads to only 0.1 
standard deviation effects (if we use model 1 of Table 3.3). The higher impact in the IV 
models is probably a result of the reduced measurement error compared to previous 
models without instrumental variables. Nunn (2008, pp. 159-163) emphasised that the 
second function of instrumental variable techniques – to estimate with less measurement 
error – results sometimes in larger coefficients of the second stage, compared to OLS 
estimates. If the instrumented variable is measured with a certain amount of error, while 
the instruments are not, it is not astonishing if the coefficients are larger. 
                                                 
58
 As we have two endogenous variables, we use the Angrist-Pischke F-statistics, as the use of the overall 
F-statistic might dissemble a well-identified first stage, although only one instrument is the reason for a 
high F. 
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Table 3.6: IV-regressions of civil war 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation Method IVPROBIT TSLS TSLS LIML LIML 
First stage     Dependent Variable: Inequality 
(1) Lactose Tolerance 0.235** 0.240 0.235 0.197 0.243 
 (0.028) (0.104) (0.208) (0.328) (0.221) 
(2) Wheat/Sugar -0.610*** -0.623*** -0.610*** -0.626** -0.613*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
(3)Lowpop*Southern     0.000 
     (0.891) 
First stage     Dependent Variable: Height 
(1) Lactose tolerance 0.691*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.068*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
(2) Wheat/sugar 0.024* 0.028 0.024 0.059* 0.020 
 (0.093) (0.315) (0.483) (0.085) (0.575) 
(3) Lowpop*Southern     0.000 
     (0.904) 
Second stage      Dependent Variable: Civil War Onset 
      
Inequality 2.614** 0.464*** 0.515** 0.502** 0.527**  
 (0.050) (0.004) (0.036) (0.045) (0.044)    
Height -8.218 -1.758 -1.666 -1.664 -1.762 
 (0.184) (0.113) (0.220) (0.216) (0.208)    
Population (logs) 0.231** 0.025 0.037 0.043 0.037    
 (0.021) (0.255) (0.277) (0.201) (0.294)    
Democracy -2.755  -0.253 -0.365 -0.243    
 (0.211)  (0.602) (0.491) (0.622)    
Democracy
2
 -0.126  0.002 0.046 0.015   
 (0.792)  (0.988) (0.686) (0.901)    
Colony 0.316 -0.091* 0.035 0.136 -0.026    
 (0.616) (0.059) (0.777) (0.273) (0.822)    
Peace Duration -0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.000 0.001    
 (0.996) (0.526) (0.716) (0.967) (0.833)    
Constant 0.430 1.085 0.634 0.295 0.754    
 (0.973) (0.598) (0.816) (0.918) (0.780)    
Time dummies? N N N Y N 
N 250 368 250 250 242 
AP-F height  33.82 24.48 31.13 13.2 
AP-F inequality  11.65 9.53 6.49 4.6 
Kleinbergen-Paap Lm stat. p-val. 0.002 0.005 0.014 0.023 
Anderson-Rubin p-val.  0.000 0.013 0.003 0.012 
Hansen p-val. exactly identified 0.578 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors. Instruments: (1) Lactose tolerance; (2) 
Sugar/wheat suitability ratio; (3) Low population density * southern latitude. It was not possible to obtain 
marginal effects for IVPROBIT two-step estimates (model 1), therefore no marginal effects are reported 
in this table. P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. AP-F 
are Angrist-Pischke F-tests. Colonial status is defined as dummy variable. For expository purposes, we 
divided the variables democracy and democracy
2
 by 100 before running the regressions. 
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This is certainly the case for our variable “inequality”, because all inequality evidence is 
known to suffer from some degree of measurement error. Hence, the seriousness of this 
caveat is reduced with the instrumental variable techniques as well. 
We would argue that the instruments influence the dependent variable only 
through the potentially endogenous variable, inequality (see the discussion on the 
exclusion restriction below). The p-value of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, which could 
be calculated for models 2 (p-value: 0.037) and 3 (p-value: 0.178), indicates that the IV- 
approach is not strictly necessary in every case, as the results are not significantly 
different from OLS estimates, at least if we control for democracy and its square. Any 
endogeneity among the explanatory variables would not have deleterious effects on 
OLS estimates. Nevertheless, given the general suspicion that all macroeconomic 
variables could be endogenous, it is reassuring that the significant impact of inequality 
remains a consistent determinant of an increased risk of civil war. In contrast, height 
levels are not significant once instrumental variables are used. This might also be 
caused by the lower number of cases available for this estimation – the sizes of the 
coefficients are not small. Most of the other controls are insignificant.  
 
3.3.4 The exclusion restriction 
One of the biggest challenges in any instrumental variable approach is the 
requirement of the exclusion restriction, which implies that the instrumental variables 
do not have a direct influence on the ultimate dependent variable except via the 
potentially endogenous variable. In his seminal paper, Easterly (2007) studied the 
applicability of the exclusion restriction of relative soil and climatic suitability by using 
both theoretical reasoning and econometric tests. One possibility for such a direct causal 
channel is that wheat and sugar have different effects on the wealth of the local 
population. This wealth difference could be a potential direct causal influence on 
dissatisfaction and conflict. On the other hand, Easterly argues convincingly that the 
difference in the wealth effects of those agricultural goods are quite limited compared to 
all of the other goods that countries are producing. 
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Another potential violation of the exclusion restriction could stem from the 
widely discussed concept of the “natural resource curse”. Exceptionally high incomes 
from raw material exports might generate rents that in turn could lead to political 
economy problems (Sachs und Warner 1995b; Auty 1993, see also the recent review by 
Frankel 2010). Sugar cane is a primary product that might produce such high windfall 
profits, for example. Isham et al. (2005) have developed a theory of “point-source” 
agricultural exports. Typical cases are exports such as sugar cane. The idea is that the 
“point-source” export revenues can more easily be captured by ruling elites than 
“diffuse” exports such as wheat. Easterly (2007) argues that if these “resource curse” 
effects operate via inequality, the exclusion restriction is of course not violated. Most of 
the studies discussing these issues emphasise that the behaviour of rich elites and their 
interactions with the institutional environment is the main issue, which is consistent 
with the inequality story (Easterly 2007; Isham et al. 2005).  
Nevertheless, one can still imagine that the resource curse works through other 
channels. One strategy to address these issues is to directly include additional controls 
for a resource-oriented export structure and determine whether inequality, measured 
with the sugar/wheat suitability variable, turns insignificant. We again follow the 
literature in applying this strategy (Easterly 2007; Juif and Baten 2014). We construct a 
variable of the share of raw material and mining exports relative to the country’s total 
exports. The “resource curse” variable is insignificant and does not affect the 
significance of inequality measured by the sugar-wheat-suitability variable (Table 3.7).  
What about the theoretical properties of the instrumental variable “low 
population density in 1500 interacted with southern location”? Low population density 
could, for example, be negatively correlated with civil wars, because the probability of 
facing a civil war decreases in sparsely populated countries. However, the population 
density around 1500 does not have much in common with the population density in the 
19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. To be on the safe side we only included this IV in model 5 of 
Table 3.6, and the inequality coefficient does not differ much from the others.  
In the case of the last instrument, lactose tolerance, the discussion of the 
exclusion restriction is relatively straightforward, as lactose tolerance is difficult to 
imagine having a separate impact on a civil war onset, except via the anthropometric
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Table 3.7: IV-regressions on civil war onset, controlling for primary goods exports 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  IVPROBIT TSLS LIML 
First stage      Dep. variable: Inequality 
(1) Lactose tolerance 0.156 0.072 0.082 
 (0.158) (0.692) (0.667) 
(2) Wheat/Sugar -0.708*** -0.855*** -0.858*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(3) Lowpop*Southern   0.000 
   (0.790) 
First stage dep. variable: height  Dep. variable: Height 
(1) Lactose tolerance 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
(2) Wheat/sugar 0.025* 0.069* 0.069* 
 (0.116) (0.062) (0.066) 
(3) Lowpop*Southern   -0.000 
   (0.829) 
Second stage      Dep. variable: Civil war onset 
Inequality 2.156* 0.431** 0.435**  
 (0.067) (0.019) (0.019)    
Height -8.760 -1.847 -1.721 
 (0.212) (0.121) (0.145)    
Natural Resources -0.002 -0.002 -0.002   
 (0.685) (0.272) (0.299)    
Population (logs) 0.022 -0.015 -0.018    
 (0.854) (0.401) (0.323)    
Democracy -1.048 0.147 0.132    
 (0.653) (0.790) (0.813)    
Democracy
2
 -0.027 0.042 0.042    
 (0.957) (0.723) (0.719)    
Colony 0.254 0.147 0.099    
 (0.686) (0.159) (0.348)    
Peace Duration 0.008 0.003 0.001  
 (0.811) (0.535) (0.832)    
Constant 4.996 1.521 1.320 
 (0.722) (0.535) (0.587)    
Time dummies? N Y Y 
N 228 228 225 
AP-F height  17.98 5.23 
AP-F inequality  10.6 9.17 
Kleinbergen-Paap Lm stat. P-val. 0.020 0.065 
Anderson-Rubin p-value  0.001 0.000 
Hansen p-val. exactly identified 0.316 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors. P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * 
significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. It was not possible to obtain marginal effects for 
IVPROBIT two-step estimates (model 1), therefore no marginal effects are reported in this table. 
Instruments: (1) Lactose tolerance; (2) Sugar/wheat suitability ratio; (3) Low population density * 
southern latitude. Angrist-Pischke F-values are reported. Colonial status is defined as dummy variable. 
For expository purposes, we divided the variables democracy and democracy
2
 by 100 before running the 
regressions. 
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causal channel. We conclude that the issue of the exclusion restriction does not pose a 
major problem 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
Several studies have documented the negative effect of economic deprivation on 
civil war for the last few decades. In most cases, GDP per capita or its growth rate has 
been used to indicate an economy’s level of development. When assessing the 306 civil 
wars that took place between 1816 and 1999, we find that anthropometric measures are 
powerful indicators for explaining the onset of civil war. A negative correlation of 
absolute welfare levels and the probability of civil war outbreak was confirmed in most 
of our results, but did not pass the instrumental variables tests. Relative deprivation 
measured by the height inequality, on the other hand, was positive and significant in all 
of the models and passed robustness tests.  
We also explicitly addressed the issue of endogeneity of absolute and relative 
deprivation by introducing instrumental variables. We used lactose tolerance as well as 
climatic and geological factors that are correlated with inequalities. These turned out to 
be strong instruments. The IV regressions confirmed the robustness of our results 
regarding the effect of inequality on onset of civil war. The inequality coefficients 
remained negative and significant throughout every specification, passing robustness 
tests as well as instrumental variables estimation.  
Our study took a long-term view, analysing civil wars over the last two 
centuries. This was only possible by the use of innovative methods of measuring 
absolute and relative deprivation. Relative deprivation has not been used in empirical 
civil war literature as there is a lack of data on inequality in several countries. Our study 
overcame the problem of data scarcity because of an extensive data base for inequality 
in well-being. The impact of inequality on civil war probability could be systematically 
tested and a significant impact is found in our study. 
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Appendix B 
 
 Variable definitions 
 
Civil war is coded as a dichotomous variable adopting the value 1 if civil war broke out 
in given country and five-year period. It is defined as sustained combat with at 
least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year that takes place between the armed 
forces of a government and forces of another entity for central control or for 
local issues. Military and civilian deaths are counted. Sources: Correlates of War 
Project and Uppsala Conflict Data Project: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
 
Colonydummy is coded as a dichotomous variable adopting the value 1 if a country was 
a colony. Source: Correlates of War 2 Project. Colonial/Dependency Contiguity 
Data, 1816-2002. Version 3.0 
 
Democracy indicates the openness of democratic institutions in a country and is 
measured on a scale of -10 (low) to 10 (high). Source: Polity IV Project. 
 
Diamond is coded as a dichotomous variable adopting the value 1 if a country had 
diamond deposits that could be extracted. 
 
Ethnic fractionalisation: based on a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics 
and defined as 1 minus the Herfindahl index of group shares of these 
characteristics. Source: Alesina et al. (2003). Data available at 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1.  
 
Height describes the average adult male height in the respective country ten years prior 
to the time of observation (except for the instrumental variables regressions, 
where we take current height); measured in centimetres. Sources: Baten and 
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Blum (2012), Measure DHS (Demographic and Health Surveys) project and the 
World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Global Database on Child Growth and 
Malnutrition. 
 
Height growth is the growth rate of heights between two decades: (heightt – height t-1)/ 
heightt-1  
 
Inequality is the coefficient of height variation at time t in the case of instrumental 
variables regressions and t-1 for all other specifications. 
 
Language Fractionalisation is defined as 1- Herfindahl Index of linguistic group shares, 
which reflects the probability that two randomly selected persons belong do 
different groups. Source: Alesina et al. (2003). Data available at 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1.  
 
Natural resource exports: percentage value of raw materials and mining products, 
relative to total exports, around 1980. Source: World Bank Data 1999 (CD-Rom) 
 
Religious Fractionalisation is defined as the probability that 2 randomly selected 
individuals belong to different religious groups. Source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
Data available at http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1.  
 
Peace duration is the number of decades that country i has not been affected by conflict. 
Source: Intra-State war data set (version 4.1, posted in March 2011) from the 
Correlates of War project 
 
Population (log) is the log of a country’s population at the beginning of a ten-year 
period. Sources: The World Bank and Maddison (2001). 
 
Warlast counts the number of months a country has experienced internal conflicts 
during the previous decade and divides them by 12 to get the average number of 
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years. We include all intrastate conflicts (apart from civil wars also regional 
internal and intercommunal conflicts) as we want to capture the overall 
dissatisfaction. Source: Intra-State war data set (version 4.1, posted in March 
2011) from the Correlates of War project. 
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Table B.1: World regions, individual countries, and birth decades: coverage of the data 
set (grey indicates that real data was available and was accepted for height and civil 
war) 
  Birth decade 
  18.. 19.. 20 
World Country 
Iso-
Code 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 
region 
as BD                                         
as CN                                         
as HK                                         
as ID                                         
as IN                                         
as JP                                         
as KH                                         
as KP                                         
as KR                                         
as LA                                         
as LK                                         
as MM                                         
as MN                                         
as MY                                         
as NP                                         
as PG                                         
as PH                                         
as PK                                         
as SG                                         
as TH                                         
as TP                                         
as TW                                         
as VN                                         
eeu AL                                         
eeu AM                                         
eeu AZ                                         
eeu BA                                         
eeu BG                                         
eeu BY                                         
eeu CS                                         
eeu CZ                                         
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
  Birth decade 
  18.. 19.. 20  
World 
Country 
Iso-
Code 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 
eeu EE                                         
eeu GE                                         
eeu HR                                         
eeu HU                                         
eeu KG                                         
eeu KZ                                         
eeu LT                                         
eeu LV                                         
eeu MD                                         
eeu MK                                         
eeu PL                                         
eeu RO                                         
eeu RU                                         
eeu SI                                         
eeu SK                                         
eeu TJ                                         
eeu TM                                         
eeu UA                                         
eeu UZ                                         
lac AR                                         
lac BO                                         
lac BR                                         
lac CL                                         
lac CO                                         
lac CR                                         
lac CU                                         
lac DO                                         
lac EC                                         
lac GT                                         
lac GY                                         
lac HN                                         
lac HT                                         
lac JM                                         
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
  Birth decade 
  18.. 19.. 20 
World 
Country 
Iso-
Code 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 
lac MX                                         
lac NI                                         
lac PA                                         
lac PE                                         
lac PR                                         
lac PY                                         
lac SV                                         
lac TT                                         
lac UY                                         
lac VE                                         
men AF                                         
men DZ                                         
men EG                                         
men ER                                         
men IL                                         
men IQ                                         
men IR                                         
men JO                                         
men KW                                         
men LB                                         
men LY                                         
men MA                                         
men OM                                         
men SA                                         
men SY                                         
men TN                                         
men TR                                         
men YE                                         
naa AU                                         
naa CA                                         
naa NZ                                         
naa US                                         
ssa AO                                         
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
  Birth decade 
  18.. 19.. 20 
World 
Country 
Iso-
Code 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 
ssa BF                                         
ssa BI                                         
ssa BJ                                         
ssa BW                                         
ssa CD                                         
ssa CF                                         
ssa CG                                         
ssa CI                                         
ssa CM                                         
ssa ET                                         
ssa GA                                         
ssa GH                                         
ssa GM                                         
ssa GN                                         
ssa GQ                                         
ssa GW                                         
ssa KE                                         
ssa KM                                         
ssa IR                                         
ssa IS                                         
ssa MG                                         
ssa ML                                         
ssa MR                                         
ssa MU                                         
ssa MW                                         
ssa MZ                                         
ssa NA                                         
ssa NE                                         
ssa NG                                         
ssa RW                                         
ssa SD                                         
ssa SL                                         
ssa SN                                         
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
  Birth decade 
  18.. 19.. 20 
World 
Country 
Iso-
Code 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 
ssa SO                                         
ssa SZ                                         
ssa TD                                         
ssa TG                                         
ssa TZ                                         
ssa UG                                         
ssa ZA                                         
ssa ZM                                         
ssa ZW                                         
wee AT                                         
wee BE                                         
wee CH                                         
wee CY                                         
wee DE                                         
wee DK                                         
wee ES                                         
wee FI                                         
wee FR                                         
wee GR                                         
wee IE                                         
wee IT                                         
wee NL                                         
wee NO                                         
wee PT                                         
wee SE                                         
wee UK                                         
Note: Migrant heights (unadjusted), with the number of birth decades in parentheses, was used in the 
following countries: Algeria (2), Armenia (1), Bangladesh (4), Croatia (Hrvatska) (1), Czech Republic 
(1), India (6), Israel (1), Korea (North) (6), Malawi (1), Mozambique (1), Pakistan (1), Poland (2), 
Romania (1). Source: Baten and Blum (2012).”men” denotes countries from the middle East and North 
Africa. The group “naa” includes North America, Australia and New Zealand. 
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Figure B.1: The probability of onset of civil war subject to democracy 
 
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
P
r(
c
w
o
n
)
-10 -5 0 5 10
democracy
Chapter 3. Does inequality lead to civil wars? A global long-term study using 
anthropometric indicators (1816-1999).  
 
84 
 
Table B.2: Multicollinearity statistics. variance inflation factors for the independent 
variables and correlation between height inequality and lagged average height 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Inequality 1.17 0.855 
Lag height 1.45 0.689 
Democracy 1.40 0.717 
(Democracy)
2
 1.51 0.663 
Population (logs) 1.31 0.765 
Ethnic polarisation 1.17 0.856 
Colony 1.16 0.862 
Diamond mining 1.18 0.845 
Mean VIF 1.29  
 
 Lag height Inequality 
   
Lag height 1  
Inequality -0.045 1 
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Table B.3: Horserace between inequality and lagged inequality 
 (1)  
 Panel Logit  
  
Inequality 0.041  
 (0.143)  
Inequality t-1 0.040*  
 (0.094)  
Height -0.464  
 (0.173)  
Population (log) 0.013 
 (0.172)  
Peace Duration -0.002  
 (0.302)  
Colony -0.023  
 (0.431)  
Time dummies? Yes 
  
N 454  
Chi-squared 101.7  
Notes: * significant on the 10% level.
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Table B.4: Within- and between variation of variables 
Variable  Mean Std. dev 
Onset of civil war Overall 0.07 0.25 
 Between  0.10 
 Within  0.23 
Inequality Overall 3.77 0.37 
 Between  0.28 
 Within  0.27 
Height Overall 1.68 0.05 
 Between  0.03 
 Within  0.03 
Democracy Overall -0.01 0.07 
 Between  0.05 
 Within  0.05 
Democracy
2
 Overall 0.45 0.35 
 Between  0.23 
 Within  0.27 
Colony Overall 0.22 0.41 
 Between  0.26 
 Within  0.32 
Diamond Overall 0.13 0.34 
 Between  0.34 
 Within  0.00 
Ethn. Fract Overall 0.46 0.26 
 Between  0.26 
 Within  0.00 
Population (logs) Overall 7.86 1.84 
 Between  1.67 
  Within  0.80 
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Table B.5: Robustness test of the results on ethnic fractionalisation.  
Comparison of fractionalisation measures. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Marg. Effects? Y Y Y 
Inequality 0.054* 0.049* 0.052* 
 (0.053) (0.062) (0.066) 
Height -0.607** -0.429 -0.574* 
 (0.047) (0.116) (0.076) 
Peace duration -0.005 -0.006* -0.004 
 (0.162) (0.098) (0.215) 
Ethn. Fractionalisation -0.075   
 (0.216)   
Language Fract. -0.034  
  (0.523)  
Religious Fract.  -0.000 
   (0.996) 
Time dummies? Y Y Y 
Wreg dummies? Y Y Y 
N 637 632 643 
Log lik.    
Chi-squared 153.0 154.
8 
142.9 
Notes: This table includes solely our deprivation variables and different fractionalisation measures. As 
fractionalisation has been mentioned as one of the main drivers of civil wars in the previous literature on 
civil wars, we introduce ethnic fractionalisation, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and religious 
fractionalisation separately to assess whether perhaps fractionalisation rather than deprivation is the actual 
driver of a conflict, or whether the deprivation coefficients change dramatically if we include 
fractionalisation measures. As a result, fractionalisation does not turn significant in any of the 
specifications in our long-run study. Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors applied in every 
model. P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. Inequality 
is proxied by height cv, absolute deprivation is proxied by height, both lagged by one decade. Peace 
duration: sequence of decades where no war has started up to the current period. Other notes: see Table 
3.3.  
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4. How effective is development aid? Human stature as 
a new indicator in a core debate. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
How can we assess development aid effectiveness? Previous studies mostly used GDP 
per capita growth to assess whether aid has welfare enhancing effects, although the 
problems of this measure for developing country performance – especially during the 
1960s to 1980s – is well-known. We argue that indicators related to human stature are 
reliable indicators that can complement our abilities to measure aid outcomes, as they 
are directly linked to malnutrition and are often available for countries for which GDP 
data is missing. We find that development aid had significantly negative effects on well-
being in the short-run during the 1960s to late-1970s while the impact was still negative 
but not significantly so during later periods. In the long-run, however, higher aid flows 
seem to be positively related to well-being outcomes, although this effect is mostly 
insignificant.  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on a paper by Mumme and Baten (2013). The concept of the paper 
was jointly developed, the empirical analysis and the writing was equally shared. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Can the rich West help the less developed world? During the past decades, 
developed countries have tried to advance the development process of poorer nations by 
transferring a part of their income and wealth via development aid. But the question 
whether the attempts to help poor countries have been fruitful still remains unresolved. 
Mixed results have been reported by existing studies. Many individual initiatives have 
been assessed and found to have been beneficial. However, studies that assessed the 
effect of foreign aid on GDP growth have yielded mostly disappointing results: either 
the effect of aid was found to be insignificant, or even negative (Boone 1996; Rajan and 
Subramanian 2008, among others). New hope with regard to the effectiveness of aid 
policies arose with a study by Burnside and Dollar (2000) who argued that aid per se 
might not lead to beneficial outcomes, but aid given to countries with good institutions 
does in fact result in growth. The initial euphoria caused by these results diminished as 
an extension to this study found that Burnside and Dollar’s positive results became 
insignificant once the data set was expanded in years and countries (Easterly et al. 
2004). Other studies showed that the aid effectiveness rather depends on the donor than 
the recipient: developmental aid – defined as aid provided by donors who are known to 
give aid for developmental instead of political motives – had a large and significant 
positive impact on long-run growth (Minoiu and Reddy 2010).  
While there is a substantial – yet controversially discussed – literature regarding 
foreign aid’s impact on growth, studies analysing aid’s effect on alternative indicators 
of well-being remain scarce. However, an assessment of aid effectiveness with regard to 
non-monetary development outcomes is particularly necessary considering that 
countries with rapid GDP growth do not necessarily experience increasing standards of 
living. Oil exporting countries such as recently Angola or Gabon, for example, achieved 
high GDP growth rates without significantly improving the general well-being.
59
 Hence, 
the effects of development aid need to be studied using a broader set of living standard 
indicators. In the present study, we argue that indicators determined by the fulfilment of 
basic human needs – such as nutrition and healthcare – can help to put the aid 
                                                 
59
 The phenomenon of declining biological well-being in times of economic prosperity, also known as the 
antebellum puzzle, have been extensively studied by Komlos, see for example Komlos (1996, 2012). 
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effectiveness debate into a broader and more development-oriented context. Examples 
for such indicators are human stature, stunting or weight.  
Malnutrition is one of the severe problems in the developing world. People in 
poor countries are confronted with a bad disease environment and lacking access to 
medical treatment and clean water. In addition, developing countries are faced with 
frequent natural disasters that lead to increases in food prices and several other issues 
that negatively affect living and health standards. Donors and recipient countries have 
pinned their hopes on foreign aid to ease poverty and hardship in general and the above 
mentioned difficulties in particular.  
The objective of our study is to analyse whether foreign aid does fulfil these 
expectations and actually leads to improved well-being in developing countries.
60
 We 
introduce adult height – using a comprehensive and new data set on height as a proxy 
for human well-being – and stunting of children as indicators of well-being to this 
debate. Although anthropometric indicators can behave completely different from 
monetary aspects of well-being in certain periods of time (Komlos 1996, 1997, 1998, 
2012), average height is often closely correlated with these indicators (see Figure 4.1). 
Particularly for earlier periods, this allows researchers to overcome the problem 
of missing data they are faced with if indicators of welfare are not available for some 
very poor countries; said countries are more likely to receive aid but less likely to 
collect data on well-being. Moradi (2010), for example, shows that anthropometric 
indicators provide a very good picture of the nutritional status and health of people 
living in Sub-Saharan Africa. These indicators are strongly influenced by food 
availability (with proteins playing a major role), the disease environment and access to 
medical treatment. This is why average height is also very closely correlated with 
composite measures of well-being, such as the Human Development Index (Figure 4.2). 
Of course, the factors outlined above do not represent a full list of parameters 
that might affect our health indicators. Factors such as natural disasters, the quality of 
infrastructure (which is needed to be able to reach the next hospital or market), income, 
                                                 
60
 A few studies that try to address the same question exist, but the authors rather consider the impact of 
health aid on infant mortality, which will be discussed below. 
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Figure 4.1: The relationship between average adult height and the GDP per capita (in 
logs) in the 1980s 
 
Notes: For the purpose of improved clarity, we only took data points from one decade, the 1980s. Source 
of the GDP data: World Bank Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. Source of height data as 
described in the appendix 
 
Figure 4.2: The relationship between average adult height and the Human Development 
Index in the 1980s 
 
Notes: For the purpose of improved clarity, we only took data points from one decade, the 1980s. Source 
of the Human Development Index data: United Nations Development Programme homepage, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html. Source of height data as described in the appendix. 
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the agricultural structure and productivity also play a major role.
61
  
We will also assess the long-term effects of foreign aid on well-being as we 
suspect that it takes a while until project initiatives are effectively implemented and 
finally lead to measurable responses in anthropometric values. The article is organised 
as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the aid effectiveness literature that focuses on aid’s 
impact on well-being. We will then discuss our data and the method of estimation in the 
subsequent two sections and present our results in section 4.5. The article closes with 
concluding remarks. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
While there is an abundant literature on the effects of aid on GDP growth, few 
studies address the impact of aid on well-being and health, with rather mixed results. 
Boone (1996) finds no evidence for positive impacts of aid on human development 
measures, such as infant mortality or primary schooling. Moreover, his results show that 
the impact of aid does not vary according to whether it is given to a more democratic or 
repressive regime. This is in line with Wilson’s (2011) finding for health-specific aid, 
showing that aid is generally given to countries with declining mortality, but it does not 
generate a decline in mortality. However, he finds some evidence that spending on HIV 
and infectious diseases yielded statistically significant – though modest – effects on 
mortality. The results of studies analysing the impact of foreign aid on infant mortality 
are rather mixed: while some authors do not find any impact of aid on infant mortality 
(Williamson 2008), others show that infant mortality can be significantly reduced by 
providing foreign aid (Mishra and Newhouse 2007; Gomanee et al. 2005). Masud and 
Yontcheva (2005) provide evidence that aid is only effective in reducing infant 
mortality if it is provided by an NGO, while bilateral aid flows to the recipients’ 
governments do not have significant impacts on mortality, according to their results. 
The latter finding is particularly interesting as it indicates that NGO aid – which is 
assumed to be development-oriented – is more effective in improving recipients’ lives 
                                                 
61
 This is the fundamental reason for using overall aid instead of sector-specific aid in this study, which 
will be explained in more detail in section 4.4. 
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than bilateral aid, which is supposed to be motivated by political reasons. This should 
be considered when empirically assessing aid’s effectiveness. Finally, no significant 
impact of aid has been found for different health indicators, such as life expectancy, 
death rates and immunisations (Williamson 2008). 
Other studies assess the effectiveness of aid on the country or continent level 
instead of providing a global view. Batana (2010) has done so for ten Sub-Saharan 
African countries and observes welfare improvements in seven of them since the 1990s. 
However, the author points out that the amount of aid provided or the degree of 
government effectiveness do not seem to have been the major driving-forces of these 
developments. In the Ethiopian case, food aid was found to have increased child growth 
in the mid-1990s (Yamano et al. 2005). A case study for 3,000 Indonesian villages 
shows that recipients of incentivised aid – meaning that a better health performance of 
the village relative to other villages led to higher grants in the future – had better health 
outcomes than villages receiving non-incentivised aid (Olken et al. 2010). This finding 
can be considered as an important contribution to the aid effectiveness debate, as it 
indicates that aid can help, but the effectiveness depends on the way how aid is given. 
In summary, empirical evidence with regard to the effects of foreign aid on 
human well-being is mixed. In the light of the results of previous studies, we will take 
into consideration various potentially influential factors and challenges, such as 
endogeneity issues, donor-specific interests and the fungibility of aid. Last but not least, 
we also focus on the long-term impacts of aid.  
 
4.3 Data  
We divide our empirical study into two time periods, hereafter referred to as the 
“early period” and the “later period”. The research on the early period analyses the 
impact of aid flows provided between 1960 and 1979 on anthropometric outcomes in 
the subsequent period. The later period examines the effects of foreign aid provided 
between the early-1980s and late-2000s. The first period is particularly interesting 
because many authors who discuss the effectiveness of aid in improving well-being 
only look at later periods, as data on conventional indicators are often scarce or 
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unreliable in the case of particularly poor countries between the 1960s and early-1980s. 
Using the new and very comprehensive data set on human stature provided by Baten 
and Blum (2012) allows us to look at the change in average height from one decade to 
another, taking into account individuals born between the 1960s and 1980s. We can 
therefore assess the improvement or deterioration in health standards by using 
anthropometric data organised by birth decade, including countries for which 
conventional indicators are often not available for the early period.
62
 For instance, the 
data set provides an extensive coverage of African countries. To sum up, we use the 
change of mean adult height of people born during a certain birth decade compared to 
people born in the subsequent decade as a dependent variable for the early period: 
[(heightt+1 –heightt) / height t]*100. As heights are mostly determined by the living 
conditions during the first years of life, we organise all evidence by birth cohort. 
Looking at changes in countries and periods with high or low aid intensities, we can test 
whether foreign aid actually led to an improvement in a population’s living conditions.  
We use a quite similar indicator as dependent variable for the later period, 
namely the change in the proportion of children that are not stunted: (% children not 
stuntedt+1 – % children not stuntedt)*100.
63
  Since there is more data available from the 
1980s onwards, we can organise this data in 4-year periods, as it has often been done in 
other studies on aid effectiveness.
64
  
Why is it necessary to use different dependent variables for the two periods at 
all? First of all, limited data on stunting of children are available until the 1980s, which 
is particularly true for poor countries. However, these are the countries we are most 
interested in, as poor countries are expected to receive more aid (if we assume aid to be 
given for the purpose of alleviating poverty and not for fostering political relationships). 
                                                 
62
 We could also take the absolute average height of a population as dependent variable, as the average 
human height of a population group is not influenced by genetics as long as the composition of the 
population is not altered through large-scale migration. Changes in height, however, are often taken to 
rule out any possible influences stemming from genetics as they are not affected by genetic factors 
(Komlos 1994). To make the dependent variables of the later period more easily comparable to the 
change in height, we also use changes instead of absolute values here. 
63
 For children up to two years of age height is measured by recumbent length. For older children height 
is measured by stature while standing. The data are based on the WHO’s new child growth standards 
released in 2006.  
64
 We assume that it generally takes some years until aid flows actually have a visible effect because 
investments in infrastructure, health care etc. can hardly be undertaken immediately. 
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Using the comprehensive data set on adult height by Baten and Blum (2012) for the 
early period has the advantage that it also contains abundant information on countries 
for which data on well-being are relatively scarce or not available at all. In addition, this 
data set has been carefully checked for sample selectivity bias (SSB), as this issue has 
been quite intensively discussed in the recent height literature.
65
 We cannot use this 
height data set for the later period, though, given that there are obviously no data on 
mean adult height for this period yet (as people born in this period are not yet adults). 
Luckily, the WHO data on child stunting is very comprehensive for the later period. The 
percentage of stunted children according to the WHO definition is calculated by 
measuring the percentage of children under the age of 5 whose height for age (stunting) 
is more than two standard deviations below the median for the international reference 
population aged 0-59 months. Figure 4.3 shows that there is a strong correlation 
between adult height and stunting (with a correlation coefficient of -0.8224) for the 
countries and time periods in which data for both indicators were available, therefore we 
can assume that our dependent variables for the earlier and the later period reflect the 
same underlying fundamentals. 
Furthermore, it might be an advantage to analyse the two periods separately, 
because the foreign aid policy design changed at the beginning of the 1980s. While 52 
per cent of total OECD aid in the mid-1970s consisted of aid given for a specific 
purpose (project aid), aid was shifted to programme aid (aid given for a specific sector) 
on an increasing scale since the beginning of the 1980s (Mosley and Eeckout 2000, 
pp.132 ff.). Dividing our research into two periods where different policy approaches 
prevailed might enable us to see which policy approach is more effective. Mishra and 
Newhouse’s (2007) findings that aid became more effective since the 1990s, especially 
in countries with high quality institutions, might already be an indication that 
programme aid led to more favourable developmental outcomes. 
 
 
                                                 
65
 Especially sample selectivity bias of data sets based on voluntary army records have been the topic of 
this debate. However, the observations on developing countries included here are exclusively based on 
systematic and representative measurements by anthropologists and health projects. 
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Figure 4.3: The relationship between average adult height and child stunting for several   
countries during the 1970s to 1980s. 
 
 
Notes: Data points reflect those countries and time periods where data on both stunting and average 
height does exist and are labelled with the country’s ISO-code and the relevant decade. Data on stunting 
was extracted from the World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. Source of height data as 
described in the appendix. 
 
The data on net official development assistance was taken from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) data set of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. The data set contains information on commitments and 
disbursements by recipient and type since the 1960s.
66
 While most studies on aid 
effectiveness use data on donor commitments, donor disbursement data are used in this 
study. Disbursements are more exact measures of the funds that have been transferred to 
the recipient because commitment data generally overstate the amount of aid that was 
actually paid during a certain period. The net official development assistance is the 
difference between the value of aid received by a country and the principal repayments 
of received loans and return of unspent balances. The sources and definitions of other 
explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in the appendix.  
 
                                                 
66
 While commitments are recorded in the full amount of the expected transfer, irrespective of the time 
required for the completion of disbursement, disbursements are the actual funds that have been transferred 
to a recipient. It can take several years until a commitment has been disbursed 
(www.oecd.org/dac/glossary). 
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4.4 Estimation strategy 
In our study, we assess the impact of foreign aid on height growth and change in 
child stunting, using several robustness tests and instrumental variable techniques to 
control for potential endogeneity. In this chapter, we use overall aid to avoid potential 
crowding out effects that often arise in poor countries receiving sector-specific aid. 
More specifically, Fielding (2008, p. 2 ff.) argues that if aid is in general fungible, then 
the government who receives health-specific aid might reduce government spending on 
health (as this sector is now supported by foreign aid) and increase expenditures in other 
areas instead. The author therefore suggests to model total aid expenditure rather than 
sector-specific aid if fungibility is likely to exist. Furthermore, improved nutrition and 
health might be related to investments in other sectors, such as infrastructure (which is 
needed to be able to reach the next hospital or market) or agriculture. We therefore 
respond to these concerns by taking a look at the effects of overall aid in this paper. The 
effects of sector-specific aid, more specifically: food aid, will be analysed individually 
in the subsequent chapters.  
We test the impact of foreign aid on well-being with different identification 
strategies. In every specification we average our data to ten-year periods for the 1960s 
to 1970s
67
 and to 4-year periods for the later period to reduce measurement errors and 
annual fluctuations.
68
 We then use different types of models to test our assumption that 
foreign aid increases well-being outcomes. In a first step, we use ordinary least squares 
as well as GLS random-effects and fixed effects models.
69
 
We then apply two-stage least-squares (2SLS) models to take into account the 
potential endogeneity of the aid variable. Endogeneity has been widely addressed in the 
literature as it is assumed that more aid is generally given to countries that are worse 
off, either in monetary terms or in terms of the biological standard of living. In a 
                                                 
67
 More specifically, we estimate how aid flows during the 1960s and 1970s affect height growth from the 
current to the subsequent period. 
68
 If we used 4-year periods, as it is usually done in the aid effectiveness literature, and applied our 
dependent variable for the later period in all the cases, we would only obtain one observation for the 
period 1966-1970, 15 for the period starting in 1978, but already 97 observations for the period 1998-
2001. 
69
 While random effects are the preferred model for the early period, the fixed effects model is the better 
model for the later period according to the Hausman test. 
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nutshell, while aid might influence the well-being of recipients, the latter might just as 
well be a determinant of the amount of aid received. We tackle the problem of potential 
endogeneity by using two-stage least squares models, which is the most frequent 
approach to dealing with endogeneity in the aid effectiveness literature.
70
 Although our 
F- statistics on the excluded instruments pass the critical threshold of 10 (Stock et al. 
2002), we also introduce a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) in some 
cases. Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp.209) recommend to use LIML when instruments 
are rather weak and to check overidentified 2SLS with LIML, as the bias in 2SLS 
results increases with the number of instruments and LIML estimates render less biased 
results.  
The set of instrumental variables implemented here has already been widely 
used in the aid effectiveness literature (Burnside and Dollar 2000, among others). It 
addresses special relationships between donors and recipients. More specifically, we use 
a “French”-dummy as it has been found that French-speaking countries – particularly 
former French colonies – receive more aid from their former coloniser. Furthermore, we 
use dummies for Egypt and Central America, given the special interest of the United 
States in these countries. As small nations have been found to receive relatively large 
amounts of aid as donors expect to be able to have a stronger political influence on 
them, population (in logs) also enters as an instrumental variable. 
The basic equation looks as follows: 
Δhti,t = α + ß1 aidi,t + ß2 hti,t + BX + ηt + uit 
where Δht represents the height growth from period t to period (t+1) for the earlier 
period and the change in the percentage of children who are not suffering from stunting 
from period t to period (t+1) for the later period. Aid is the share of average official 
development assistance to GDP in period t and country i (expressed as a fraction 
between 0 and 1). ηt represents time fixed effects, while uit is the disturbance term. In 
addition, hti,t is the mean height of the population in country i during period t for the 
early period or the percentage of children that were not stunted in period t for the later 
                                                 
70
 GMM models have been tested. However, applying GMM procedures led to a sharp reduction in the 
number of observations.  
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period, respectively. This variable accounts for the effect that countries with relatively 
high levels of well-being in the past are likely to experience less catch-up growth in 
following periods. We therefore expect the coefficients to be negative. 
We also controlled for a variety of other exogenous factors in our regressions, 
represented by the vector X. For example, we introduce ethnic fractionalisation scores 
that range between 0 and 1, as fractionalisation has regularly been included as a variable 
controlling for institutional quality in the aid effectiveness literature. As civil strives 
severely affect the nutritional situation in a country, we include a dummy variable that 
takes on the value 1 if an intra-state war took place in country i during period t. We 
expect civil unrest to increase malnutrition and therefore negatively affect our 
dependent variable. The political regime is controlled for by including a commonly-
used political participation indicator constructed by the Polity IV project.
71
 To capture 
the effects of the health environment and access to medical treatment on heights and 
well-being per se, we control for the number of physicians per 1,000 people. We 
implement a Sub-Saharan Africa dummy, because this part of the world is known to 
suffer from a particularly bad disease environment, high HIV rates, a significant number 
of natural catastrophes and other circumstances that negatively affect our dependent 
variable. As openness to trade is an indicator that relates good polies and a favourable 
trade environment, which might also positively affect well-being outcomes, we include 
the openness indicator by Sachs and Warner (1995).
72
 
Most of the aid studies so far have only analysed the short-term effects of aid, 
indirectly assuming that aid received today will have a measurable effect in the near 
future. In our study, we take into account the possibility that it takes a rather long 
period, maybe even decades, until aid effects become visible. More specifically, it takes 
a while to implement measures to improve health and nutrition. The construction of 
hospitals, the education of doctors or the implementation of agricultural reforms are 
only a small selection of examples for projects that will only become effective after a 
                                                 
71
 The original polity4 variable is coded between -10 (complete autocracy) and +10 (democracy). We ran 
a linear transformation and recoded the variable between 0 and 20, where 20 is a completely democratic 
country. 
72
 Baltzer and Baten (2008) also find that highly unequal societies have a tendency to close the economy. 
On the issue of height inequality, see also Blum (2013; 2014). 
Chapter 4. How effective is development aid? Human stature as a new indicator in a 
core debate.  
 
100 
 
certain amount of years. In this case, merely looking at short-term achievements might 
understate the actual effectiveness of foreign assistance. For instance, Minoiu and 
Reddy (2010) find that a one per cent increase in the average bilateral Aid/GDP ratio 
given by a particular donor group (Netherlands and Scandinavian countries) between 
1960 to 1990 increased per capita GDP growth rates by 1.2 to 1.3 percentage points in 
the 1990s. Against this background, we find it reasonable to complement the short-term 
results with a long-term perspective of aid effectiveness. We therefore analyse the effect 
of mean and total aid transfers during the 1960s to 1980s on stunting in the 1990s to 
2000s.  
We also take potential multicollinearity issues into consideration. Although our 
calculated variance inflation factors do not indicate a multicollinearity problem, we 
avoid including variables that appear to be too closely connected simultaneously. For 
instance, we do not include the number of physicians and the infant mortality rate or 
initial GDP p.c. and initial height at the same time, as these factors might be strongly 
correlated. 
 
4.5 Estimation results 
In a first step, aid is considered to be exogenous. This allows us to obtain 
baseline estimates which can later be compared with two-stage least square estimates. In 
a first step, we use ordinary least squares as well as fixed effects and random effects 
models (Table 4.1). The results show that an increase in Aid/GDP in the 1960s to 1970s 
period leads to a significant decrease in height growth. This result stays significant both 
in the random effects model
73
 and the fixed effects model, although the coefficient 
increases in size in the latter model. For the later period, the sign of the aid coefficients 
is negative, except for the fixed effects model – which is, according to the Hausman 
test, the preferred model
74
 – but insignificant in all cases (column 4-6 of Table 4.1).  
 
                                                 
73
 According to the Hausman test, the random effects model is the preferred model for the early period (p-
val.: 0.42). However, it is generally reasonable and accepted to use fixed effects in cross-country studies. 
74
 The p-value of the Hausman test is 0.017. 
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Table 4.1: Determinants of height growth: short- term aid effectiveness  
(Ordinary least squares, random effects and fixed effects regressions)  
        (1)        (2)        (3)       (4)       (5)       (6) 
 
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
 1960s to late 1970 1980s to late 2000s 
 Aid -0.15*** -0.22** -0.15*** -0.12 0.99 -0.19    
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)    (0.71) (0.47) (0.58)    
Initial height 0.04*** -0.17 0.04*** 
   
 
(0.01) (0.11) (0.01)    
   Initial non-stunted 
   
-0.14*** -0.54*** -0.20*** 
    
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.37** 
 
0.41*** 1.03 
 
0.77 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)    (0.63) 
 
(0.74)    
Intra-state war -0.17** -0.14 -0.19*** 1.56 1.11 1.75 
 
(0.02) (0.19) (0.00)    (0.37) (0.74) (0.35)    
Democracy 0.01 0.04* 0.01**  -0.07 0.39** -0.06    
 
(0.12) (0.09) (0.04)    (0.29) (0.05) (0.46)    
Physicians (log) -0.07 -0.26 -0.08*   0.50 2.81 0.91   
 
(0.13) (0.20) (0.09)    (0.37) (0.20) (0.16)    
SSA -0.79*** 
 
-0.84*** -1.94 
 
-1.57 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00)    (0.29) 
 
(0.42)    
Openness 0.04 -0.02 0.04    1.04 -2.19 0.77 
 
(0.67) (0.88) (0.61)    (0.58) (0.23) (0.67)    
Constant -6.46*** 27.58 -6.49*** 10.16** 41.56*** 14.94*** 
 
(0.01) (0.12) (0.00)    (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)    
# groups 
 
39 39 
 
75 75 
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 68 68 68    141 141 141    
R2 0.66 0.41 
 
0.19 0.40 
 Hausman p-val.   0.423     0.02   
Note: P-values in parenthesis, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. (Country-) cluster robust standard errors applied in every model. 
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The results for the later period show that countries with an already generally 
high level of well-being– measured by the percentage of children that are not stunted – 
are less likely to experience further large improvements: the respective coefficient is 
negative and significant. Intra-state wars and Sub-Saharan Africa are significantly and 
negatively correlated with height growth in the early period, while democracy has 
mostly positive effects in both periods. The density of physicians does not greatly affect 
height growth, the coefficient only turns negative and significant in the random effects 
model of the early period. This might be caused by the fact that countries with a high 
number of physicians per capita already have high average height levels and therefore 
experience less catch-up growth. Similar regressions with infant mortality rates instead 
of physician density
75
 show that high infant mortality rates were significantly and 
negatively correlated with our dependent variable. Consequently, we conclude that a 
good health environment generally has a positive influence on height growth and on the 
reduction of undernourishment. 
In the following, we use two-stage least-squares regressions and limited 
information maximum likelihood models to circumvent the endogeneity issue (Table 
4.2 for the early period and Table 4.3 for the later period). For the early period, foreign 
aid stays negative and significant in the IV specification. More specifically, a one 
standard deviation increase in Aid/GDP implies a decrease in height growth by between 
0.128 and 0.827 per cent, the latter if country fixed effects are introduced.
76
 As average 
initial height was 168.8, this corresponds to a height decline of between 0.48 and 1.40 
cm – per decade (!). Komlos and Baten (1998b) estimated that one centimetre of height 
corresponds with 1.2 years of life expectancy, hence this amount is not negligible. If we 
express this in standard deviations of the dependent variable, we arrive at 0.65 and 0.92 
standard deviations, i.e. between two thirds and more than 90 per cent of its standard 
deviation. This is clearly a substantial size.
77
  
                                                 
75
 Not reported here, but available from the authors. 
76
 The size of the coefficient increases once we introduce fixed effects or an interaction term of aid and 
political rights, however, the number of observations also decreases dramatically in the latter case. 
77
 (0.23*1.25)/0.44 for model 1 of table 4.2 and (0.66*1.25)/0.44 for model 5 of table 4.2. 1.25 is the 
standard deviation of log (Aid/GDP), 0.44 is the standard deviation of the dependent variable.  
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Table 4.2: Determinants of height growth: short- term aid effectiveness  
(2SLS and LIML for the 1960s – late 1970s period) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  2SLS LIML 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS FE 
Aid -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.32* -0.29* -0.66*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.05) (0.00)    
Initial height 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 
-0.57**  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.03)    
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.37** 0.37* 0.21 0.12                 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.59) (0.67)                 
Intra-state war -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.36*** -0.21** -0.20    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.24)    
Openness 0.11 0.11 0.43** 0.04 -0.19    
 
(0.21) (0.20) (0.01) (0.72) (0.35)    
Democracy 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.09**  
 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.88) (0.52) (0.02)    
Physicians (log) -0.11** -0.11** -0.11** 
 
                
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
                
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.79*** -0.79*** -0.66** -0.49***                 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)                 
Aid*political rights 
  
0.02 
 
                
   
(0.42) 
 
                
Infant mortality (log) 
   
-0.02 -1.11**  
    
(0.93) (0.02)    
Initial GDP p.c. 
   
-0.07                 
    
(0.48)                 
N 68 68 31 59 58    
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? No No No No Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap p-val. 0.13 0.13 0.43 0.10 0.04 
Anderson Rubin  p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Hansen p-val 0.55 0.55 0.10 0.14 ex.id. 
No. of clusters 39 39 31 34 29 
F aid 7.10 7.10 14.94 3.59 11.63 
F aid*pol. rights 
  
7.94 
  Wu-Hausman 0.04
 
0.90 0.12
 Davidson-MacKinnon        0.03
Notes: P-values in parenthesis, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust (country-) clustered standard errors applied in every model. Anderson Rubin p-
val. is the p-value of the Anderson Rubin Chi-squared test. 
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Table 4.3: Determinants of (non-) stunting: short- term aid effectiveness  
(2SLS and LIML for the 1980s – late 2000s period) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML 
Aid -0.26 -0.28 -0.01 -1.21    
 
(0.65) (0.66) (0.98) (0.76)    
Initial non-stunted -0.15*** -0.15*** 
 
-0.20*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00)    
Ethnic fractionalisation. 0.91 0.89 0.76 1.56    
 
(0.64) (0.65) (0.71) (0.49)    
Intra-state war 1.45 1.43 0.34 0.58    
 
(0.37) (0.38) (0.84) (0.74)    
Openness 1.05 1.05 0.66 0.48    
 
(0.56) (0.56) (0.74) (0.81)    
Democracy -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.39    
 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.62)    
Physicians (log) 0.47 0.46 
 
                
 
(0.38) (0.38) 
 
                
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.80 -1.78 -3.62*** -3.20    
 
(0.31) (0.31) (0.01) (0.11)    
Aid*political rights 
   
0.34    
    
(0.66)    
Infant mortality. (log) 
  
-0.93 -2.84    
   
(0.52) (0.35)    
Initial GDP p.c. 
   
-0.07 
    
(0.48) 
N 141 141 146 165    
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? No No No No 
Kleibergen-Paap p-val. 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.13 
Anderson Rubin p-val 0.06 0.06 0.53 0.31 
Hansen p-val 0.37 0.37 0.28 0.58 
No. of clusters 75 75 70 78 
F aid 11.95 11.95 44.89 5.78 
F aid*pol. rights 
   
0.63 
Wu-Hausman 0.81  0.69 0.53 
Note: P-values in parenthesis, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. Cluster-
robust standard errors applied in every model. KP p-val. is the p-value of the Kleibergen- Paap statistic, 
while AR p-val. is the p-value of the Anderson Rubin Chi-squared test. 
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Our first-stage F-statistics suggest that we might have a weak instruments 
problem in some of the specifications, as they do not pass the rule of thumb of a first-
stage F-statistic greater than 10 as suggested by Stock et al. (2002). Weak instruments 
might lead to biased estimators and may increase the risk of unreliable test results. In 
such a case, Fuller’s limited information maximum likelihood estimates render more 
robust estimators. The coefficients of the LIML specifications are indeed slightly bigger 
than the 2SLS coefficients, but foreign aid provided during the 1960s and 1970s stays 
significantly and negatively correlated with height growth.  
The consistently significant negative impact of aid on height growth implies that 
foreign aid was not effective or did indeed worsen the situation in poor countries in the 
early observation period. We should keep in mind that during the 1960s to 1970s project 
aid was the major instrument of development aid, meaning that money was spent on 
specific projects, such as constructing a specific school in a certain area. This type of 
aid is criticised for merely evoking local results, having high transaction costs and 
ignoring structural and systemic problems in recipient countries (Leiderer 2009). 
Further issues are the lack of coherence with the recipient country’s policies, the lack of 
transparency and the fact that donors do not use national procedures in the project 
implementation process, thereby failing to build institutional capacities (Jelovac and 
Vandeninden 2008). We therefore conclude that the prevailing aid policies of the early 
period were rather inefficient and therefore failed to increase overall well-being. In 
other words, positive outcomes of certain projects were probably visible on the local 
level, but not on the country level.  
For the later period, beginning in the early-1980s, our results suggest that 
foreign aid did not significantly affect well-being. Although the aid coefficients still 
have a negative sign, they do not turn significant in either of the 2SLS or LIML 
specifications (Table 4.3).
78
 Hence, we conclude that overall aid did neither 
significantly harm nor improve well-being during the later period: the well-known 
                                                 
78
 Please note that we could not add the fixed effects model and the same set of control variables as in 
model 4 of table 4.2, as these specifications did not pass our weak instruments test statistics. This would 
render such a model spurious, as the Hausman test in table 4.1 indicates that country fixed effects should 
be used for the later period. However, our Wu-Hausman test statistics indicate that aid does not suffer 
from serious endogeneity and therefore our results from table 4.1 might be a good approximation. 
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“curse of aid” effects were probably counter-balanced by positive effects of an 
improved aid design. 
All of the above-mentioned results refer to the short-run effects of aid. 
Considering the relatively negative findings for short-term aid effectiveness, especially 
during the early period, it is interesting to analyse whether these negative effects can 
also be found if a long-term view is taken. We use average aid flows (Table 4.4) and the 
sum of all foreign aid payments (Table 4.5) from 1960 to 1989 to assess how aid flows 
during this period affect later developmental outcomes. 
Our results for the long-term effects of foreign aid show that both average and total aid 
flows between the 1960s and late-1970s had a positive – although mostly insignificant – 
impact on well-being. The positive sign remains across OLS and 2SLS specifications 
and even becomes significant in one case. This result might underline the argument that 
aid has rather positive effects on well-being in the long-run or, at least, does not do any 
harm.
79
 
We conclude that overall aid did have a negative effect on well-being during the 
1960s and 1970s, but a similarly negative impact of aid cannot be confirmed for later 
periods. In the long run, aid seems to have a positive impact on well-being, although 
this impact is insignificant in most of the cases.  
 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
The objective of this paper was to find out whether overall well-being in a 
country is significantly affected by official foreign assistance. We contributed to the 
growing body of aid effectiveness literature by introducing new proxies for well-being, 
namely height development and changes in the share of stunted children. Our 
comprehensive height data set enabled us to include countries and periods for which 
evidence on other human well-being indicators is often lacking or imprecise. This 
reduces data selectivity problems. We find that development aid had significantly 
negative effects on well-being in the short-run during the 1960s to 1970s, while the 
impact was still negative but not significantly so during later periods. 
                                                 
79
 This result is not implausible, as Minoiu and Reddy (2010) found similar effects for GDP growth.  
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Table 4.4: Determinants of height growth: long-term effects of average aid flows during 
the 1960s to 1980s on improved well-being in the 1990s and 2000s 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
  y90-93 y94-97 y98-01 y02-05 y90-05 
Av. aid6080 0.71 0.16 0.94* -0.35 0.50 
 
(0.44) (0.82) (0.09) (0.72) (0.47) 
Initial non-stunted -0.29** -0.14** -0.25*** -0.08 -0.22*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.49) (0.00) 
Democracy 0.05 -0.28** -0.08 0.11 -0.09 
 
(0.73) (0.01) (0.50) (0.59) (0.17) 
Ethnic Fract. 6.11 -0.73 0.31 -3.27 1.55 
 
(0.10) (0.84) (0.93) (0.76) (0.45) 
Inf. Mort. (log) -6.31** -3.12 -7.03** 0.97 -4.82*** 
 
(0.05) (0.22) (0.01) (0.74) (0.00) 
SSA -2.18 -2.97 -0.37 0.35 -1.68 
 
(0.47) (0.13) (0.90) (0.96) (0.19) 
Openness -0.33 
   
-0.21 
 
(0.91) 
   
(0.92) 
Period 1994-1997 
    
-0.41 
     
(0.81) 
Period 1998-2001 
    
-0.33 
     
(0.85) 
Period 2002-2005 
    
-1.68 
     
(0.41) 
Constant 46.78** 29.62** 51.07*** 2.50 39.21*** 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) 
N 29 52 42 22 145 
R2 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.11 0.24 
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? No No No No No 
Kleibergen-Paap p-val. 
    
0.07 
Anderson Rubin Chi2 p-val 
   
0.00 
Hansen p-val 
    
0.47 
no. Of clusters 29 52 42 22 78 
F aid 
    
13.65 
Wu-Hausman         0.86 
Note: P-values in parenthesis, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. (Country) 
cluster-robust standard errors applied in every model. KP p-val. is the p-value of the Kleibergen- Paap 
statistic, while AR p-val. is the p-value of the Anderson Rubin Chi-squared test.
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Table 4.5: Determinants of height growth: long-term effects of the total aid flows 
during the 1960s to 1980s on an improved standard of living in the 1990s and 2000s 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
  y90-93 y94-97 y98-01 y02-05 y90-05 
Sum aid6080 0.95 0.19 0.55 0.30 0.16    
 
(0.15) (0.81) (0.22) (0.83) (0.82)    
Initial non-stunted -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.22** -0.10 -0.20*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.44) (0.00)    
Democracy 0.09 -0.29** -0.08 0.29 -0.08  
 
(0.43) (0.04) (0.51) (0.29) (0.26)    
Ethnic Fract. 5.08 1.60 -2.24 -4.86 1.40    
 
(0.15) (0.67) (0.60) (0.68) (0.43)    
Inf. Mort. (log) -5.85** -5.70* -4.62* 0.06 -4.34*** 
 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.99) (0.00)    
SSA -3.86* -1.44 -0.80 1.98 -1.23    
 
(0.08) (0.49) (0.81) (0.77) (0.32)    
Openness -2.59                 
  
-1.66    
 
(0.11)                 
  
(0.26)    
Period 1994-1997 
    
0.54    
     
(0.66)    
Period1998-2001 
    
0.94    
     
(0.45)    
Period 2002-2005 
    
-0.45    
     
(0.79)    
Constant 39.96*** 41.25*** 37.82*** 5.41 34.40*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.78) (0.00)    
N 27 47 36 20 130 
R2 0.45 0.33    0.31 0.19 0.23    
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? No No No No No 
Kleibergen-Paap p-val. 
    
0.08 
    
0.00 
Hansen p-val 
    
0.34 
no. Of clusters 27 47 36 20 66 
F aid 
    
8.58 
Wu-Hausman         0.81 
Note: P-values in parenthesis, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively. (Country) 
cluster-robust standard errors applied in every model. KP p-val. is the p-value of the Kleibergen- Paap 
statistic, while AR p-val. is the p-value of the Anderson Rubin Chi-squared test. 
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In the long run, however, an increase in aid flows is positively related to well-
being outcomes, although this effect is mostly insignificant. 
We interpret this change from significantly negative impacts in the early period 
to neutral short-run effects in the later period as a result of counter-acting forces. On the 
one hand, development aid leads to a phenomenon that is frequently described as “the 
curse of foreign aid”: transferring resources into a poor country often leads to rent-
seeking behaviour. To put it in a nutshell, instead of efficiently investing foreign aid in 
projects and sectors it was aimed at and thereby enhancing well-being and growth, 
recipient governments use aid transfers to enrich themselves. On the other hand, foreign 
aid strategies have improved over time and, furthermore, aid payments became less 
influenced by power politics: while the political situation during the cold war heavily 
influenced donors’ behaviour in the early period, aid has become more development-
oriented over the years. These improvements in the aid design have apparently counter-
acted against the adverse effects resulting, for example, from rent-seeking behaviour. 
However, positive effects were not strong enough to provide a significant contribution 
to the improvement of anthropometric values in the short-run. 
In the long-run, the impact of development aid tends to be positive, probably 
because the effects of investment in education and health are more clearly observable 
within a larger time frame. However, the effect stays insignificant in most of the 
specifications and therefore it would be too daring to conclude that aid actually leads to 
visible effects in a long-run perspective. 
The policy implications that we can draw from these results are twofold. First of 
all, the aid strategies that are followed by donors nowadays, including the shift from 
project to programme aid, seem to work far better than aid strategies that have been 
used at the beginning of food aid flows and, therefore, the food aid policies seems to be 
on a good way. Given that food aid provided since the 1980s has already yielded clearly 
better short-term results than aid provided in previous decades (or at least adverse 
effects have been reduced substantially), we can expect that the long-term effects that 
might not be visible yet are even more promising. 
Secondly, the evaluation of the effectiveness of foreign aid should not only be 
assessed by using indicators of economic prosperity, such as GDP or the growth thereof. 
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It is rather necessary to use a broader definition of well-being and therefore also 
introduce indicators that measure the biological well-being of recipient countries. To be 
able to do so, it is necessary to improve the data base on non-monetary indicators of 
welfare (for poor countries, in particular). 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1: Countries for which evidence is available in the respective period 
      
1960s to late-1970s 1980s to late 2000s 
Benin    Albania  
Bolivia  
 
Algeria  
Brazil  
 
Angola  
Burkina Faso  Armenia  
Cameroon  
 
Azerbaijan  
Central African Republic  Bangladesh  
Chad  
 
Benin  
China  
 
Bolivia  
Colombia  
 
Botswana  
Congo  
 
Burkina Faso  
Côte D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) Cambodia  
Democratic Republic of the Congo  Cameroon  
Dominican Republic  Central African Republic  
Egypt  
 
Chad  
Gabon  
 
Chile  
Ghana  
 
China  
Guatemala  
 
Colombia  
Honduras  
 
Comoros  
India  
 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Indonesia  
 
Cote d'Ivoire  
Iran  
 
Djibouti  
Jordan  
 
Dominican Republic  
Kenya  
 
Ecuador  
Madagascar  Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Malawi  
 
El Salvador  
Mali  
 
Equatorial Guinea  
Morocco  
 
Eritrea  
Nepal  
 
Ethiopia  
Nicaragua  
 
Gambia, The 
Niger  
 
Georgia  
Nigeria  
 
Ghana  
Peru  
 
Guatemala  
Rwanda  
 
Guinea  
Senegal  
 
Guyana  
Togo  
 
Haiti  
Turkey  
 
Honduras  
Uganda  
 
India  
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Table C.1 (continued) 
 
1960s to late-1970s  1980s to late 2000s 
Zambia  
 
Indonesia  
Zimbabwe  
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
  
Jamaica  
  
Jordan  
  
Kazakhstan  
  
Kenya  
  
Kuwait  
  
Lao PDR 
  
Macedonia, FYR 
  
Madagascar  
  
Malawi  
  
Mali  
  
Mauritania  
  
Mongolia  
  
Morocco  
  
Nepal  
  
Nigeria  
  
Oman  
  
Pakistan  
  
Peru  
  
Philippines  
  
Rwanda  
  
Senegal  
  
Sierra Leone  
  
South Africa  
  
Syrian Arab Republic  
  
Tajikistan  
  
Tanzania  
  
Thailand  
  
Togo  
  
Tunisia  
  
Turkey  
  
Ukraine  
  
Uzbekistan  
  
Venezuela, RB 
  
Vietnam  
  
Zambia  
  
Zimbabwe  
 
 
Chapter 4. How effective is development aid? Human stature as a new indicator in a 
core debate.  
 
113 
 
Table C.2: Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
Period 60s to late 70s 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid in mio. 68 124.41 253.46 4.32 1456.87 
Aid/GDP 68 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.24 
Central Am. 68 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Civil War 68 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Democracy 68 5.49 4.78 0 19 
Egypt 68 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Ethn. fract. 68 0.66 0.20 0.15 0.93 
French-dummy 68 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Height growth 68 0.03 0.44 -0.89 1.54 
Initial height 68 168.78 3.38 159.80 174.74 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 60 7.13 0.70 5.82 9.10 
Infant mortality (log) 67 4.79 0.28 4.02 5.35 
Physicians (log) 68 -2.49 1.24 -4.58 -0.04 
Population (log) 68 15.96 1.48 13.12 20.62 
Openness 68 0.18 0.38 0 1 
SSA 68 0.59 0.50 0 1 
Period 80s to late 2000s 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid in mio. 141 576.15 648.73 4.97 4423.59 
Aid/GDP 141 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.34 
Central Am. 141 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Change in nutrition 141 2.97 5.41 -11.50 25.2 
Civil War 141 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Democracy 141 10.81 6.04 .75 20 
Egypt 141 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Ethn. fract. 141 0.49 0.25 0 0.88 
French-dummy 141 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 122 7.63 0.98 5.85 10.75 
Infant mortality (log) 141 3.93 0.63 2.09 4.88 
Physicians (log) 141 -1.03 1.40 -4.17 1.49 
Population (log) 141 16.56 1.54 13.02 20.95 
Openness 141 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Share not stunted 141 64.63 16.33 28.33 97.53 
SSA 141 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Notes: Numbers calculated for first two-stage least-squares model of Table 4 and 5 where included 
variables are non-missing. Aid/GDP minimum values not exactly zero, but very small values below 
0.005. Only cases with aid >0 are included in our regressions. 
Chapter 4. How effective is development aid? Human stature as a new indicator in a 
core debate.  
 
114 
 
 Definitions and sources of variables 
 
Aid is defined as the log share of net official development aid disbursements in current 
U.S. dollars and GDP in current U.S. dollars. Source: OECD DAC 2a data set 
(aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions). Data available at 
http://stats.oecd.org.  
 
Aid*Pol.rights is an interaction term of aid and the political rights index as calculated 
by Freedom House. The extent of political rights in a country is coded from 1-7 
(7 being the worst), the data is taken from the World Development Report 2011. 
Av. Aid6080 is the average flow of Aid/GDP (in logs) to a recipient country from 1960 
to 1989. 
 
Centam is a dummy variable that is equal to one if country i is located in Central 
America and zero otherwise. 
 
Change in stunting (short dht) is the dependent variable for the later period. It is 
calculated as the percentage change of non-stunted children from period t to 
period t+1: non-stuntedt=1- non-stuntedt=0.  
 
Intra-state war is coded as a dichotomous variable adopting the value 1 if an intra-state 
war took place in given country and period. Intra-state wars are wars that are 
fought within state borders and include wars between non-government forces 
and a government (civil war) as well as wars between two non-government 
forces. Sources: Correlates of War Project: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
 
Democracy indicates the openness of democratic institutions in a country and is 
measured on a scale of 0 (low) to 20 (high). The original scale from the Polity 
IV project ranges from -10 to +10. Source: Polity IV Project, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
 
Egypt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is Egypt and zero otherwise. 
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Ethnic fractionalisation: based on a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics 
and defined as 1 minus the Herfindahl index of group shares of these 
characteristics. Source: Alesina et al. (2003). Data available at 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1.  
 
GDP p.c. is the average GDP per capita in period t. The data was extracted from the 
World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
 
Height describes the average adult male height in the country; measured in centimetres. 
Sources: Baten and Blum (2012), Measure DHS (Demographic and Health 
Surveys) project and the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Global Database 
on Child Growth and Malnutrition. 
 
Height growth or Ght if the abbreviation is used (dependent variable for early period) is 
the growth rate of heights between two decades: 
[(heightt+1 –heightt) / height t]*100 
 
Human Development Index or hdi is a composite measure of health, education and 
income. It is an alternative measure of economic progress and was first 
introduced in the Human Development Report 1990. The data was extracted 
from the United Nations Development Programme homepage, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html (last access: October 17
th
, 
2013). 
 
Initial GDP p.c. is the per capita GDP (in logs) at the beginning of period t.  
 
Initial height is the average height of the population in country i in t=0. 
 
Initial non-stunted is the fraction of children in country i that were not stunted in t=0. 
Stunted are children with heights of more than two standard deviations below 
the mean. 
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Openness is a variable that ranges between 0 and 1, with 1 being a country with open 
trade. Source: Sachs and Warner, 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. 
 
Physicians is defined as the number of physicians per 1,000 people. Physicians include 
generalist and specialist medical practitioners. Source: World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
 
Population (log) is the log of a country’s population at the beginning of a ten-year 
period. Sources: The World Bank and Maddison (2001). 
 
SSA is a dummy variable that is 1 if a country is located in Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Sum aid6080 is the sum of all flows of Aid/GDP (in logs) to a recipient country from 
1960 to 1989. 
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5. Does food aid improve child nutrition? An 
anthropometric assessment of children’s nutritional 
status in recipient economies 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this study is to empirically assess the impact of food aid on the 
nutritional status of children in 80 recipient countries between 1995 and 2010. 
Moreover, we test whether multilateral food aid and U.S. food aid are particularly 
effective or ineffective compared to aid provided by other donors, as often claimed. The 
results show that food aid is significantly related to less stunting, while there is no 
significant relationship between nutritional support and children’s weight. There is no 
clear indication that multilateral donors or the United States perform better or worse 
than other donors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 and 6 were written without co-authors. However, the author will still be referred to in the plural 
due to stylistic reasons and for the sake of consistency. 
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5.1 Introduction  
Malnutrition is still a persistent problem in many countries nowadays, driven by 
severe poverty, high volatility of food production or sudden natural disasters. One tool 
to alleviate malnutrition is food aid, which aims at (or is supposed to do so) alleviating 
general malnutrition, supporting economic and social development and contributing to 
disaster relief in recipient countries (Colding and Pinstrup-Andersen 2000, p. 195). 
Modern food aid is not a very recent development tool, but has already been applied in 
the 1950s. New attention has been drawn to this topic in consequence of the devastating 
effects of recent disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and the food crisis 
in 2007/2008. 
However, the renewed awareness of the importance of food aid to people in need 
has not spared food aid donors from being in the firing line of the critics. The cause lies 
partly in the early stages of food aid, when it was a major tool for the disposal of surplus 
agricultural commodities and aimed primarily at rising profits in the donor country’s 
agricultural sector (Barrett and Maxwell 2005; Clapp 2012, among others). Apart from 
the doubts about donors’ political or economic motivations for providing aid, further 
concerns have been raised, for example with regard to the right targeting, the speed and 
flexibility of distribution or the quality of the food distributed, to name only a few. 
Against the background of these allegations, it is reasonable to ask whether food aid 
does have positive impacts on the recipients’ nutritional status at all or whether it fails 
to fulfil its purpose. Are the critical statements (still) justified or are they just remnants 
of past experiences? Indeed, the design of food aid has changed over the years in part 
because of the change in recipients’ needs and in part because donors have learnt from 
earlier mistakes. For instance, tied
80
 in-kind food assistance and programme food aid 
have become less popular, especially since the 1990s. Instead, donors have shifted 
towards more flexible and emergency-oriented aid. In this paper, we want to examine 
whether food aid has yielded a measurable outcome in well-being and nutrition of the 
recipients.  
                                                 
80
 If aid is tied, donors are only allowed to spend the received aid on products or services from certain 
countries, mostly the donor country. In the case of food aid, aid is often tied to food produced in the donor 
country and shipped to the recipient. 
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Moreover, we consider one particular point of debate, namely the finding that 
the effectiveness of aid differs substantially, depending on who provides it. In fact, a 
vast strand of literature has addressed potential donor-specific interests in providing 
aid.
81
 As a result of the research findings, certain donors – in particular the United 
States – have been suspected of being inefficient in providing help to recipients, as their 
primary goals might not be linked to recipients’ needs but to donors’ interest in 
supporting the local economy or strengthening their political influence. Minoui and 
Reddy (2010), for example, have empirically shown that official development assistance 
(ODA) given by certain donors with predominantly developmental goals were more 
successful in enhancing growth than other donors. With respect to food aid, Neumayer 
(2005) finds that donors often give preferential treatment to geographically close 
countries and countries with the same voting patterns in the UN, but his results do not 
confirm that food aid flows are linked to export interests or military-strategic 
considerations. Other authors show that non-U.S. project aid is given to populations 
with high nutritional requirements, while U.S. project aid is allocated towards politically 
stable and rural regions (Kuhlgatz and Abdulai 2012). As for food availability in the 
recipient country, U.S. food aid was found to have rather destabilising effects because it 
was often delivered in times of high U.S. grain surpluses instead of periods with severe 
nutritional shortages (Barrett 2001). In contrast, multilateral food flows under the World 
Food Programme were rather provided in times of need, thus flowing counter-cyclically 
(Barrett and Heisey 2002). However, these studies are mostly conducted for various 
restricted earlier periods, including food aid flows in the 1960s or 1970s. Therefore, the 
findings may reflect bad policies during the early stages of food aid and conceal 
improvements that have been made during the past decades. Not only food policies have 
gone through a revision process, but donor allocation decisions have changed as well. 
Donors have been found to be increasingly responsive to need after 1990, which is also 
true for the U.S. who has targeted countries with low average calorie consumption 
                                                 
81
 The different motives underlying food aid and differences between donors have been studied 
extensively in the overall aid literature. Alesina and Dollar (2002), for example, find that large donors 
have rather political and strategic motives for providing aid, while Gates and Hoeffler (2004) provide 
evidence that Nordic countries have developmental motives and provide aid to particularly poor 
countries. 
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(Young and Abbott 2008), while a clear indication of the superiority of multilateral 
organisations’ targeting over bilateral donors’ targeting could not be confirmed 
(Gabbert and Weikard 2000).
82
 Disentangling the effects of food aid by major donors 
might be useful to make sure that positive effects provoked by one donor are not offset 
by the negative effects of other food aid flows and therefore result in misleading 
outcomes if we use overall aid in our regression analysis. 
Hence, the objective of this paper is twofold: first, to evaluate the impact of food 
aid on the nutritional status of children in recipient countries and thereby investigating 
whether food aid’s poor reputation is warranted. Second, to analyse whether the 
effectiveness of food aid varies, depending on the donor by whom it was provided. We 
investigate food aid’s impact on height for age and – in fewer cases – weight for age of 
children under the age of five for a global sample since 1995. Although the 
effectiveness of food aid has always been a hotly debated topic, empirical literature on 
this topic has remained scarce. The difficulty to obtain sound anthropometric data and to 
disentangle effects of food aid from other variables that have an impact on the 
nutritional status (Clay et al. 1998) may have contributed to the fact that the topic has 
been insufficiently studied.  
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we give an overview of 
the development of food aid since the early stages and describe the changes that it has 
gone through ever since. We then discuss the most frequent criticisms and empirical 
evidence. Section 5.3 elaborates on the empirical design and the data used for this study. 
Empirical results will be presented in section 5.4, the last section concludes. 
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 Gabbert and Weikard (2000) show that while the US had the lowest performance for project food aid, it 
performed well for emergency aid. According to the authors the bad results for US project aid stem from 
the fact that the US is the largest bilateral donor and donates to a wide range of countries, including not 
only countries with the worst nutritional levels but also those with higher levels of nutrition. This leads to 
a low performance index. 
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5.2 Food aid: its history, potential drawbacks and actual achievements 
5.2.1 The history of international food aid 
International food aid has not only existed for a few decades. In the United 
States, for example, its history reaches as far back as the early 19
th
 century when the 
“Act for relief of Citizens of Venezuela” was passed by the Congress. Food aid was also 
provided during and after the First and the Second World War.
83
 Modern food aid, 
however, began with the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, more 
commonly known as Public Law 480 (PL 480), that was approved by the U.S. Congress 
in 1954. This law provided a legal framework for U.S. food programmes and originated 
due to several factors. To name only two motives: the U.S were faced with enormous 
agricultural surpluses and the government, which was the buyer of last resort in farm 
price support programmes until the 1980s, had to find a way to dispose of the excess 
production. Furthermore, spreading communism was a concern and providing food aid 
to developing countries was seen as a possibility to strengthen the bond between 
recipient countries and the Western world (Shaw 2001, pp. 29). Thenceforward, the PL 
480 also served as a model for other bilateral and multilateral aid programmes. 
In the early stages of modern food aid, that is, the 1950s and 1960s, food 
disbursements were primarily given on a bilateral government-to-government basis and 
were mainly driven by surplus disposal policies and geopolitical motives (Cathie 1986, 
pp.6; Clapp 2012, p. 1). Moreover, until the 1960s, U.S. food aid represented such a 
high share of total food disbursements, that one could actually say it was overall food 
aid (Shaw and Clay 1993, p. 5). In the 1970s, international food crises became a major 
issue. While developing countries were faced with food insecurity, volumes of food aid, 
however, decreased dramatically as a result of the rise in world commodity prices 
(Cathie 1986, p. 14). But the devastating nutritional situation, particularly in Asia and 
Africa, increasingly caught the attention of the international community and enhanced 
international cooperation on food aid matters. Food and hunger crises, especially in 
Africa, also remained a central issue in the 1980s. However, it was also a period in 
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 I will not dwell on the indeed very interesting programmes such as the Marshall Plan, as the history of 
food aid is not the main focus here. 
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which a rethinking and restructuring progress took place (Shaw and Clay 1993, pp. 5.). 
Food aid distribution became less donor-driven and more emphasis was put on 
emergency relief. Moreover, there was a clear shift towards the coordination of food aid 
issues via multilateral organisations, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) (Clapp 
2012, pp. 7, p. 25).
84
 The increasing importance of multilateral food aid also relates to 
the fact that different restrictions and laws in the various donor countries as well as the 
increasing complexity of the food aid system
85
 made bilateral transactions less popular 
(Barrett and Maxwell, p. 56; Shaw and Clay 1993, p. 8). While the United States is still 
the biggest bilateral donor today, the World Food Programme (WFP) has become the 
primary international provider of food aid with clear humanitarian motives. The shift 
from bilateral to multilateral aid came along with a transition from programme to 
emergency aid as the preferred type of food aid.
86
 
In general, food aid can be subdivided into three different types. Programme 
food aid is given on a bilateral government-to-government basis on soft repayment 
terms or as a grant for distribution or sale abroad.
87
 Project food aid can be provided by 
governments, NGOs or other donors for specific projects, for example food for work or 
school feeding programmes. Relief or emergency food aid is typically given for 
emergency situations, such as wars or natural disasters (Shaw and Clay 1993). 
Programme food aid used to be the most frequent form of food aid, until – with the 
growing importance of multilateral donors – emergency situations shifted to being the 
dominant factor for receiving food assistance (Barrett and Maxwell 2005).
88
 Especially 
the increasing number of large natural disasters during the last years has increased the 
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 The World Food Programme (WFP) was created in 1961. It became increasingly important as a channel 
for international food aid after the mid-1970s. For a comprehensive overview of the WFP history, see 
Shaw (2001). 
85
 Since the 1980s, new forms of food aid, such as triangular-relationships evolved, which rendered food 
aid distribution even more complex. 
86
 The chance from programme to emergency aid is not to be confused with the change in policy designs 
that took place for overall development assistance, where programme aid became increasingly important 
over time. 
87
 Programme food aid is often in-kind food aid that is either distributed directly or sold in the recipient 
countries, such that the revenue can be spent on developmental issues. 
88
 Different types of food aid may have different effects on recipients’ nutritional status, as was analysed 
in former research, for example by Arndt and Tarp (2012). In this paper, however, the main question is 
whether food aid in general has beneficial effects for recipients’ well-being and we will therefore not 
differentiate between the different types in our analysis.   
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perception that food aid should be delivered in a faster and more flexible way. The 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, for example, required quick large-scale food 
assistance to the affected population. Food aid shipments from donor countries would 
have been too slow to provide immediate help and, furthermore, would have been 
dependent on the availability of commodities in the donor country. The increasing 
awareness of the need for a quick and flexible provision of food encouraged more cash-
based responses in emergencies as well as local and regional procurement of food 
(Lentz et al. 2013). Figure 5.1 shows that the switch from programme food aid as the 
predominant form of delivery towards emergency food aid took place around the turn of 
the millennium. 
 
Figure 5.1: Shares of project, programme, and project food aid, 1988-2012 
 
Source: WFP FAIS database. http://www.wfp.org/fais/. 
 
Although the popularity of international food aid donations and the enthusiasm 
for more flexible solutions increased, the share of food aid with regard to total official 
development assistance (ODA) decreased over time. While food aid still accounted for a 
16% share of total aid flows in the mid-1970s, the share diminished to around 12% 
during the 1980s and decreased even further in the subsequent periods, as Figure 5.2 
shows.  
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Figure 5.2: The development of food aid as share of total ODA over time  
 
Notes: data from DAC 2a data set of the OECD. ODA: Official development assistance. 
 
It is interesting to note that – apart from the fact that food aid to developing 
countries has always been extremely volatile – there was a sharp decrease in food 
disbursements since the 1990s. Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that food 
aid flows are driven by supply-side influences (Harvey et al. 2010). The sharp drop in 
food aid in the mid-1970s, for example, can be viewed as a result of the world food 
crisis of the 1970s and the corresponding tightening of food markets. As food aid 
programmes were often budgeted in financial terms and not in tons, fluctuations can 
also be explained with the fluctuation of prices of food. The 1990s were a period of 
several policy changes with respect to food aid. A large number of donors, including the 
European Union and Canada, turned their backs on programme aid which also resulted 
in a sharp decline of the overall food aid flows. Moreover, the U.S. as the major donor 
of food aid has continuously reduced its overall development assistance, including food 
aid (Clay and Stokke 2010).  
The destination of food assistance was also subject to changes over the decades. 
Asia, who was the main recipient of food aid during the 1970s, was gradually replaced 
by Sub-Saharan Africa as the main beneficiary of food support during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. At this point in time, Asia was able to increase its cereal production and 
finance imports commercially, while Sub-Saharan Africa was faced with a gap in food 
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production and demand. Large food aid donations were also temporarily provided to the 
former Soviet countries at the beginning of the 1990s (Maxwell and Barrett 2005; Clay 
and Stokke 2010). 
 
5.2.2 Points of criticism with regard to food aid’s effectiveness 
One of the main criticisms which has been expressed in the food aid debate has 
its origins in the 1950s and 1960s, when food aid was often used as a means of 
disposing of developed nations’ surplus agricultural products, especially grain, in order 
to increase local farmers’ incomes (Clapp 2012, p. 1; Levinsohn and McMillan 2007, p. 
562; Barrett and Maxwell 2005, p. 19). This donor-driven approach to aid has been 
widely criticised for several reasons. First of all, it is obvious that bilateral food aid 
flows undertaken by donors to support local agriculture are procyclical with supply and 
countercyclical with prices. Therefore, food aid flows are particularly high when grain 
stocks are high and prices low and thus during periods when developing countries might 
not face severe malnutrition problems (Clapp 2012, p.35).
89
 Conversely, it has been 
observed that food aid flows were particularly low during food aid crises, for example 
in 1974 and during the 1990s (Barrett and Maxwell 2005, pp. 27). Looking at the 
relationship between food aid flows and real wheat prices of the largest food aid donor 
— the United States of America90 — we find evidence that the criticism is justified. 
Figure 5.3 shows that wheat food aid shipments decreased when wheat prices peaked. 
During the food crisis in 2007, when food aid would probably have been needed most 
urgently, food shipments were particularly low.  
Barrett and Maxwell (2005, p.32) argue that there is an automatic linkage 
between food aid shipments from a fixed dollar budget and producer prices, as less food 
can be purchased from this budget at high price levels. Especially if food aid is tied, that  
                                                 
89
 Of course, a bad harvest in the donor country does not imply that recipient countries suffer from bad 
harvests or natural disasters at the same time. However, the global food prices are strongly influenced by 
harvests in countries that are major producers of foodstuffs (which are very often also large food aid 
donors) and thereby affect food availability in developing countries, as well. 
90
 We use the United States as an example, because real producer prices can be calculated more accurately 
for a single nation and the United States were most frequently associated with this particular criticism. 
However, data for shipments from NGOs and the European Union (data: INTERFAIS) show the same 
pattern (see Figure A1 and A2 in the appendix). 
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Figure 5.3: U.S. wheat food aid shipments and producer prices 
 
Notes: Data on wheat food shipments are from the World Food Programme (WFP) International Food 
Aid Information System (INTERFAIS). Nominal prices of U.S. wheat are from the U.S. department of 
agriculture: http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=DATA_STATISTICS. Real prices 
were calculated by using the GDP deflator of the World Bank. 
 
is, goods and services (such as shipment) must be bought from suppliers of the donor 
country, the amount of food aid is heavily dependent on prices in the donor country. In 
case of a severe bottleneck in the production, the donor might not even be able to keep 
recent budget levels.
91
  
Time and cost-inefficiency is another topic that has been widely debated. If food 
aid is given as in-kind assistance – which usually means that foodstuffs (mostly grain) 
are shipped from the donor to the recipient country – relatively high transport costs and 
transport times are involved. Particularly in the event of natural disasters, when 
immediate nutritional support is crucial, the time delay might have devastating 
implications. Moreover, the financial resources that are spent on transport could have 
been allocated more efficiently elsewhere. Some donors have tried to respond to these 
problems by purchasing food locally or in other developing countries that are net food 
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 In figure 3, the food aid budget sometimes decreases before wheat prices increase. This probably stems 
from the fact that — in contrast to the data used in the regressions below — commitments instead of 
actual disbursements are reported here. Food aid commitments can be adjusted downwards before an 
actual price increase, for example if a bad harvest is expected. 
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exporters. However, tied aid
92
 still accounts for approximately 80 per cent of total food 
aid (Awokouse 2011, p. 496). In the case of Ethiopia, only 59,000 tonnes of wheat 
intended for nutritional support have been purchased locally in contrast to 1,074,000 
tonnes of imported wheat in the year 2000 (Levinsohn and McMillan 2007, p. 566). 
Poor targeting is another big issue in the food aid debate (OECD 2013; 
Awokouse 2011, p. 494, among others). Do donors really give the largest share of food 
aid to countries with the greatest need or do they link food aid to political interests? And 
does food aid — once distributed to a recipient country — flow to the poorest 
households or do people with higher incomes benefit from it?  Some studies provide 
evidence that overall food aid has generally been allocated to the neediest countries, but 
quantities were not big enough to stabilise consumption (Gupta et al. 2004; Kuhlgatz et 
al. 2010). Neumayer (2005) has examined donors interests in the allocation of food aid 
in more detail and finds a preferential treatment of geographically close countries and 
those countries with the same voting patterns in the UN, while neither military-strategic 
or export interests  nor preferential treatment of former colonies play a major role. On 
the within-country income level, food-for-work programmes were found to rather 
benefit households in the middle and upper tail of the consumption distribution, while 
poor households actually benefit from free distribution (Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007). 
Finally, food aid has been criticised for being poor in quality and not containing enough 
micronutrients to improve the nutritional status of the recipients (Clay et al. 1998). 
In consequence of the above-mentioned inflexibility and inefficiency of 
conventional government-to-government in-kind food aid, many donors have recently 
switched to cash and voucher distribution or local and regional procurement. However, 
this kind of nutritional support – that is supposed to be free from donor interest bias and 
delays in delivery – has been suspected to have certain disadvantages as well. In 
particular, there is concern about potential effects of local procurement on food prices 
and increasing market price volatility in procurement countries. Although previous 
studies were unable to confirm such effects for the recent past (Garg et al. 2013), local 
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 Meaning it is given on the condition that it will be used to buy goods or services from a specific 
country or region (mostly the donor country). Tied food aid is therefore either in-kind aid shipped from 
the donor country (or another country that is chosen by the donor) or monetary aid that has to be spent on 
food or services produced by the donor country. 
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procurement might become a critical issue once food will be bought by an increasing 
number of different food assistance actors in the future, as coordination might become 
more difficult with increasing volumes of purchased food (Lentz et al. 2013). This and 
the arguments discussed above cast severe doubts on food aid’s effectiveness in 
improving recipients’ nutritional status and well-being.    
 
5.2.3 Evidence of food aid’s effectiveness so far  
Empirical evidence on whether food aid actually succeeded or failed to improve 
the nutritional and health status of recipients is limited and mostly examines the 
situation in individual countries. Moreover, several approaches and methodologies have 
been used to measure the effectiveness of nutritional support and the study results are 
therefore hardly comparable. The most frequently used performance indicators include, 
among others, child growth, caloric intake and mortality rates. 
Clay et al. (1996), for example, analyse whether the European Union 
Programme aid was able to improve food security – in terms of overall food availability 
and access to a nutritious diet by all people – for a set of developing countries. They 
show that, on balance, the EU programme aid had marginally positive impacts on food 
security but note that the effects were relatively small, particularly in view of the high 
transaction costs involved. This is in line with a survey evaluating more than 200 past 
food aid programmes: feeding programmes targeted at young children in developing 
countries have been found to be quite expensive compared to their effect on 
anthropometric outcomes (Beaton and Ghassemi 1982). McClelland (1998) evaluates 
the effect of U.S. food aid on the nutritional status of children below the age of five for 
a selection of countries
93
 but does not find any unambiguous effects of the nutritional 
support on child malnutrition. One possible explanation for the unsatisfactory 
performance is, according to the author, that children’s food rations were relatively 
small despite of the food supplement, because the latter was shared among family 
members. A more positive view on food aid is provided by Plümper and          
Neumayer (2007) who find that international food aid has a life-saving effect during 
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 Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia and the Sahel region. 
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famines
94
, especially when the share of affected people in the population is particularly 
high. In addition, the authors show that food aid works better in democracies than in 
autocratic regimes. 
Ethiopia, in particular, has been subject to abundant research, probably because 
it is exceedingly affected by food crises. Yamano et al. (2005) find a large positive 
impact of food aid on early child growth in Ethiopia: children between six and 24 
months in food aid receiving communities grew on average 1.8 cm faster than children 
who did not receive food aid. Moreover, food aid is shown to serve particularly well to 
alleviate temporary income shocks, such as droughts. However, the authors criticise that 
targeting is not efficient enough as food aid seldomly flows to communities that are 
exposed to severe shocks. The positive effects of food aid on child growth (Porter 2010; 
Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007) and household income (Levinsohn and McMillan 2007) 
in Ethiopia are confirmed by several other studies. Equally positive results were found 
for food-for-work programmes in Kenya (Bezuneh and Deaton 1997; Bezuneh et al. 
1988). 
 A more differentiated picture is drawn by Broussard (2012) who evaluates food 
aid’s effect on adult body mass indices and finds that adult male household members 
profit more from aid transfers, while women from poor households are adversely 
affected by aid receipts. The discrimination of females is less clear for Ethiopian 
children: which gender profits from food aid depends on the gender of the adult 
recipient as well as on the form of food aid (i.e. whether it was freely distributed or 
distributed via food-for-work programmes; Quisumbing 2003). 
 
5.3 Data and empirical design 
5.3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
Our intent is to estimate the effect of food aid on child nutrition. As the 
dependent variable, we use the stunting indicator (height for age) of the World Bank 
that estimates the percentage of children under the age of five whose height for age is 
                                                 
94
 The authors use the number of people killed by famines and droughts in a country during a given year 
as dependent variable.  
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more than two standard deviations below the median for the international reference 
population of the same age. To put it in a nutshell, it is the percentage of stunted 
children in a country. The data are based on the World Health Organisation's (WHO) 
new child growth standards released in 2006. In order to make the regression outcomes 
easier to interpret, we do not use the percentage of stunted children, but rearrange the 
variable, such that the dependent variable states the percentage of children that are not 
stunted and therefore presumably in good health (thus, a positive coefficient in the 
regression output indicates a positive effect of food aid on health). Just like the data on 
total official development assistance (ODA) in chapter 4, food aid data is provided by 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. Again, we use 
disbursement data instead of data on commitments, meaning that the stated amount is 
actually disbursed to the recipient country in the given year. We only include countries 
in the regression that have received food aid at least once within the period under study 
(1995 onwards).  
Several external factors that might have an effect on the nutritional and health 
status of children and therefore on their height and weight are also controlled for. For 
instance, we include infant mortality, government health expenditure, the percentage of 
women receiving prenatal care, immunisation rates as well as the HIV rates to account 
for the health environment in a country.
95
 The share of arable land and the share of the 
population living in rural areas could provide information on the availability of food. 
Countries with a high share of arable land, for instance, are more likely to be able to 
provide a sufficient amount of domestic food supply. Moreover, highly rural societies 
might have different access to food despite poverty as they are more likely to grow their 
own food. Countries with poor records in political rights might distribute resources 
differently than fully democratic countries. More specifically, democracies are more 
likely to channel food aid to people in need, whereas autocracies might prefer to 
distribute resources to the elite or important political supporters (Plümper and 
Neumayer 2007). Therefore, we also include the political rights score by Freedom 
                                                 
95
 The number of doctors per 1,000 people was too closely correlated with the infant mortality rate and 
was therefore omitted. 
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House.
96
 Sources and definitions of other explanatory variables can be found in the 
appendix. 
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. 
On average, the amount of food aid accounts for less than 1% of GDP, which is in line 
with the findings of chapter 5.2: food aid flows have become relatively small since the 
1990s.
97
 33.8% of the children below the age of five are stunted (66.2% not stunted) in 
the average country in our regressions.  
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable        Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Food aid/GDP 170 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Food aid in mio.  170 19.42 29.94 -0.37 177.17 
(No) Stunting 170 0.66 0.15 0.37 0.99 
(No) Malnutrition 147 0.80 0.12 0.48 0.99 
Agricult. Land 170 0.47 0.19 0.00 0.88 
GDP p.c. 170 3095.60 3116.29 390.04 15992.82 
Health exp. 170 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.24 
HIV  170 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.27 
Infant mortality per 1,000 births 170 61.26 31.71 5.10 141.90 
Civil war 170 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Political rights 170 4.05 1.77 1.00 7.00 
Prenatal care 170 0.77 0.19 0.23 1.00 
Rural population (%of total) 170 0.59 0.19 0.09 0.92 
Immunisation (dpt) 170 0.76 0.19 0.22 0.99 
Immunisation (measles) 170 0.76 0.19 0.16 0.99 
Notes: Numbers are calculated for the fixed effects regressions of Table 5.3 where included variables are 
non-missing. Food aid/GDP minimum values are not exactly zero, but very small values below 0.005. 
Immunisation (dpt) is the rate of children that were adequately immunised against diphtheria, pertussis 
and tuberculosis. Where variables are defined as percentages, values are divided by 100: a value of 0.5 is 
therefore equal to 50%. 
 
A closer look at the data reveals which countries suffer from particularly severe stunting 
and malnutrition and whether these countries are also the main recipients of food aid. 
Table 5.2 shows the ten countries with the highest average percentage of stunted or 
                                                 
96
 We do not use the Polity IV data in this paper, because the Freedom House data provides a more 
abundant data set for the period under study. 
97
 The high maximum value for “other aid” is due to the high amounts of official development assistance 
given to Liberia after the Second Liberian civil war (1999-2003). 
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malnourished children in the period under study (1995 onwards), as well as the 
countries that received the highest average amount of total food aid and food aid relative 
to GDP. Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Malawi, India and Eritrea are amongst the top ten 
recipients of food aid and also amongst the countries with the highest percentage of 
stunted and malnourished children. Therefore, the critique that donors do not provide 
aid to the neediest countries does not seem justified at a first glance, at least for the post-
1995 period 
 
 Table 5.2: Countries with highest average values of malnutrition, stunting and food aid 
 
Notes: The values are the average numbers for the entire period under study. Sources: Food aid: OECD; 
% stunted and % underweight: World Bank.  
 
5.3.2 Empirical design 
Children’s height and thereby also stunting (defined here as having a height for 
age that is at least two standard deviations below that of the reference population) is 
determined by several factors. We draw on Alderman et al.’s (2006) approach that 
defines height of a pre-school child as a function of child specific effects, household 
characteristics and community characteristics. More specifically, child specific effects 
are time invariant characteristics specific to a certain child, such as sex or genetic 
characteristics. Household characteristics such as parents’ tastes or wealth and their 
investment in the offspring’s health are common for all individuals living in this 
household, and community effects are the restrictions or options posed upon the child 
due to living in the community. As we do not evaluate food aid’s impact on 
Rank
1 Burundi 63.1 Bangladesh 47.2 Liberia 0.03 Ethiopia 124.6
2 Nepal 57.7 Yemen, Rep. 45.4 Eritrea 0.02 Bangladesh 87.3
3 Afghanistan 56.3 India 44 Cape Verde 0.02 India 65.8
4 Angola 56.3 Niger 42.8 Tajikistan 0.01 Mozambique 49.9
5 Yemen, Rep. 55.8 Nepal 40.7 Rwanda 0.01 Haiti 44.1
6 Bangladesh 55.6 Timor-Leste 40.6 Malawi 0.01 Afghanistan 42.5
7 Malawi 55.5 Burundi 38.9 Haiti 0.01 Peru 38.4
8 Timor-Leste 55.3 Ethiopia 38.3 Sierra Leone 0.01 Bolivia 31.5
9 Ethiopia 54.1 Eritrea 36.4 Mozambique 0.01 Malawi 30.2
10 Guatemala 53.2 Madagascar 36.2 Ethiopia 0.01 Indonesia 30.1
% stunted % underweight Food aid/GDP foodaid in Mio U.S.$
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malnutrition on an individual- but on the country level, we are rather interested in the 
effects that are specific to a country and do not account for individual and household 
specific effects. We therefore abstract from Aldeman et al.’s model and write 
No Stuntingit = α + ß Xit + γi + uit 
where α is a constant and  γi  are time-invariant country characteristics, such as 
the genetic potential or food tastes due to cultural preferences. In this case, γi are simply 
country fixed effects, as country-specific characteristics that affect malnutrition are hard 
to measure. Xit is a vector of country-specific characteristics that may vary over time 
(such as GDP, provision of health services, nutritional availability during a particular 
time, civil war), and uit is the error term. Included in the vector of variables is our factor 
of interest: food aid.  
We include food aid flows in period t=0, but also control for past food aid flows. 
The reason for this is that food aid might not have an immediate impact on a child’s 
height, but the body might take a certain time to react to the change of available food 
quantities. We therefore include a control variable for the average amount of food aid 
that was given between t-1 and t-5 and, thus, control for food aid flows since the time of 
birth. We also include deeper lags in some cases that account for food aid’s impact on 
the mother’s nutritional status. We do so because adverse shocks during the fetal period, 
which involves the health status and nutrition of the mother, as well as her smoking or 
drinking habits, may lead to low birth weight, long-term health effects, disability or 
poor cognitive development of her child (Almond and Currie 2011). Moreover, lags 
should account for the fact that the contemporary amount of food aid might very well be 
correlated with past amounts of food aid.
98
 In most of the specifications, we only use 
lagged food aid instead of food aid flows at time t=0, as there might be the problem of 
reverse causality: countries with high levels of malnutrition are more likely to receive 
high amounts of food aid, at least if food aid is given for developmental purposes.  
                                                 
98
 We tested for autocorrelation of error terms and multicollinearity. Both were rejected in the tests. 
Therefore, including several lags of food aid does not pose a statistical problem here. 
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The most elegant way to solve this problem would be to use an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach. We tried this with several potential instruments
99
, which, 
however, did not pass the critical value of 10 in the F-test and were therefore discarded. 
Another solution could be to apply an autoregressive distributed lag model or GMM 
estimation methods. The difficulty in doing so in this case lays in the fact that we have a 
strongly unbalanced panel. Although we have a very good data base for food aid, the 
data on malnutrition is not available for each and every year. Hence, using lags of the 
dependent variable leads to a strong reduction in the number of observations. We are 
thus bound to use the easiest way of dealing with reverse causality and mostly use 
lagged values of food aid. Therefore, the results have to be treated with caution and we 
should rather speak of correlation or association instead of causality when interpreting 
the coefficients.  
Using lagged food aid instead of contemporary food aid flows has one further 
advantage. When we look at food aid disbursements we have to keep in mind that 
disbursements given in a particular year may need some time to, firstly, arrive at the 
final recipient and, secondly, have an effect on the recipient’s health. As we do not 
differentiate between in-kind food aid or cash-based aid here, we have to keep in mind 
that there generally is a substantial time lag between the initial shipment and delivery 
date in the case of in-kind food aid (Barrett and Maxwell 2005) or between the time of 
payment of monetised aid and the delivery of the purchased food. In short, there is a 
time-lag between initiating the intervention and the implementation. The second time-
lag we have to consider is the time between the distribution of food to the recipient and 
the measurable response in growth (or, if we use weight for age, the gain in weight, 
which would have a shorter time-lag than height for age). An additional challenge in our 
estimation, as described above, arises from the fact that the panel is unbalanced. We 
                                                 
99
 For example, we tried to instrument food aid with the number of natural catastrophes in the biggest 
wheat producing countries because wheat is the main commodity given as food aid.  As food aid flows 
are often counter-cyclical with wheat prices, catastrophes in the main producer countries may lead to 
higher prices and less disbursements. Moreover we used changes in policies in the main donor country 
(U.S.A.) as different political parties might have different developmental strategies and changes in 
precipitation. 
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apply weights that account for the probability of being included in the sample, such that 
every country has the same importance in the results.
100
  
Although children’s height reacts relatively promptly to an improvement in 
nutrition and health conditions, it does not react as directly to changes in these factors as 
weight. The indicator “prevalence of undernutrition, weight for age”, that is used as 
dependent variable in some of the specifications, should be able to reflect the short-term 
influences of food aid on nutrition. 
In a next step we pick up an idea by Minoiu and Reddy (2010) who argue that – 
in the case of overall aid flows – the aggregate nature of the total aid variable might lead 
to erroneous conclusions if donors’ intentions for providing aid differ.101 More 
specifically, the authors state that if some donors give aid for developmental purposes 
(in the case of overall aid, Northern European Countries have been found to be most 
likely to give aid without having strategic interests, Gates and Hoeffler 2004; Alesina 
and Dollar 2000, among others) and others out of non-developmental reasons, aid given 
by different donors could also have different effects on the dependent variable in which 
case the standard model used in the aid-literature would be misspecified. While Minoiu 
and Reddy (2010) define single nations as being pro-developmental (or not), this 
classification would not be appropriate when analysing food aid. Since the late 1980s, a 
considerable share of food aid is channelled through multilateral organisations, such as 
the World Food Programme and the European Union, which account for more than half 
of the total food aid distributions nowadays (Broussard 2012). U.S. food aid, on the 
other hand, is provided mostly on a bilateral basis and still represents a large share of 
overall food aid. These two donors – multilateral organisations and the United States- 
are the most important donor groups that might also show different distribution patterns. 
As multilateral food aid is generally believed to be rather developmental and U.S. food 
aid suffers from a historically founded bad reputation, it might be interesting to 
disentangle the different effects of these kinds of food aid. Kuhlgatz (2010), for 
                                                 
100
 Fixed effects regressions without probability weights are provided in the appendix to see whether the 
results are significantly different.  
101
 Minoiu and Reddy (2010) analyse the impact of overall aid on GDP growth. However the 
effectiveness of food aid on nutrition suffers the same challenges, therefore it might be reasonable to 
differentiate between different donors.  
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example, shows that U.S. project aid rather focuses on politically stable and rural 
regions while non-U.S. project aid is targeted towards populations with high nutritional 
requirements. As different donor motivations can also result in varying outcomes, we 
investigate whether there is empirical evidence that the U.S. and multilateral 
organisations perform particularly well or poorly. 
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
The regression results in Table 5.3 show that food aid distributed between t-1 
and   t-5 is positively and significantly related to children’s height: a one standard 
deviation increase in lagged food aid is associated with a 0.12 (model 3) to 0.18 (model 
1) standard deviation increase in the percentage of children that do not suffer from 
stunting.
102
 Food aid therefore seems to be better than its reputation. Despite all the 
criticism, food aid distributions since the mid-1990s have made a significant 
contribution to alleviating hunger and thereby reducing the probability of being stunted 
for children in recipient countries.  
The weight of children in recipient countries is not significantly correlated to food aid 
that was provided between the time of birth and one year prior to the time of 
observation (Table 5.4).
103
 The coefficient for contemporary food disbursements is 
negative and significant (model 1 of Table 5.4). However, it might be misleading to 
assume that food aid has a negative impact on children’s weight. The negative and 
significant outcome might be put down to reverse causality effects as food aid is more 
likely to be given to countries with a high percentage of underweight children.  
                                                 
102
 The deeper lags of food aid serve as control variables but are not of interest for our interpretation, as 
we only want to explain the impact on children’s well-being. Children’s height cannot be directly 
influenced by food aid that is given prior to their birth. However, earlier food aid flows might have a 
significant impact on prior generations and thereby on the offspring’s height and are thus controlled for. 
Trying to interpret these variables would be highly speculative. As mentioned above, autocorrelation of 
error terms and multicollinearity was rejected by statistical tests. Therefore, including several lags of food 
aid does not pose a statistical problem here. However, we also tested specifications where we only 
included one of the lagged food aid variables (not shown here), which did not change the results. 
103
 Deeper lags were not included in the regression, as weight is a measure that acts rather promptly in 
contrast to height that might need longer periods to catch up and might be predetermined by previous 
generations’ well-being. To make the regressions comparable, we also included deeper lags in regressions 
not shown in this table, which did not lead to changes in our variable of interest (Tables available from 
the author). 
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Table 5.3: Food aid’s impact on (no) stunting, fixed effects estimates 
 Notes: P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level. Country and time fixed 
effects and probability weights applied in every specification. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity and 
cluster-robust.
 (1) (2) (3) 
Food aid 0.120                  
 (0.953)                  
Food aid Lag 1-5 3.796** 3.737*** 2.500*   
 (0.035) (0.006) (0.063)    
Food aid Lag 6-10 -1.102 -1.127 -2.299**  
 (0.331) (0.312) (0.035)    
Food aid Lag 11-15 2.130** 2.100**                 
 (0.027) (0.022)                 
Health expenditure of gov. -0.133 -0.134 -0.196    
 (0.402) (0.400) (0.212)    
Political rights 0.002 0.002 0.003    
 (0.744) (0.743) (0.705)    
Intra state war 0.008 0.008 0.007    
 (0.623) (0.616) (0.694)    
HIV  -0.692 -0.689 -0.676    
 (0.355) (0.356) (0.378)    
Infant mortality  0.475 0.468 -0.599    
 (0.709) (0.717) (0.604)    
GDP p.c. (log) -0.014 -0.015 -0.015    
 (0.690) (0.688) (0.656)    
Agricultural Land -0.051 -0.049 -0.148    
 (0.825) (0.828) (0.524)    
Immunisation (measles) 0.059 0.059 0.063   
 (0.379) (0.386) (0.366)    
Prenatal care 0.126** 0.126** 0.101*   
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.088)    
Rural population -0.041 -0.042 -0.282    
 (0.901) (0.900) (0.388)    
Constant 0.657** 0.659* 0.953*** 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.003)    
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? Yes Yes Yes 
N 172 172 172    
Within-R2 0.405 0.405 0.362    
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Table 5.4: Food aid’s impact on (no) underweight, fixed effects estimates 
 (1) (2) 
Food aid -3.055**                 
 (0.013)                 
Food aid Lag 1-5 -0.758 0.559    
 (0.330) (0.257)    
Health expenditure of gov. -0.0111 -0.021    
 (0.912) (0.837)    
Political rights 0.002 0.003    
 (0.516) (0.421)    
Intra state war -0.004 -0.004    
 (0.714) (0.759)    
HIV  -0.137 -0.187    
 (0.578) (0.497)    
Infant mortality  -1.283 -1.566*   
 (0.122) (0.051)    
GDP p.c. (log) 0.009 0.016    
 (0.705) (0.481)    
Agricultural Land -0.088 -0.125    
 (0.513) (0.441)    
Immunisation (measles) -0.068 -0.048 
 (0.147) (0.303)    
Prenatal care 0.131*** 0.119*** 
 (0.003) (0.005)    
Rural population 0.101 0.010    
 (0.645) (0.956)    
Constant 0.706*** 0.717*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)    
Time FE? Yes Yes 
Country FE? Yes Yes 
N 153 153    
Within-R2 0.644 0.605    
Notes: P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively, probability 
weights as well as country and time fixed effects applied in every specification. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity and cluster-robust. 
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Admittedly, the same argument goes for populations with a high share of stunted 
children and yet we do not find significant negative effects of contemporary food aid on 
stunting (Table 5.3, model 1). A tentative explanation for this could be that – as weight 
reacts more quickly to external influences than height – a high proportion of 
underweight children indicates that a country is currently facing a severe food crisis and 
donors react promptly by providing emergency aid. A high share of stunted children, on 
the other hand, tends to point to persistent food insecurity. One could therefore assume 
that donors react differently to short-term food crises, often triggered by external 
shocks, and persistent nutritional shortages in a recipient country. The question whether 
the negative and significant coefficient of contemporary food aid indicates that there is 
reverse causality or whether food aid has indeed a negative impact on nutritional 
outcomes in the short run cannot be answered in this study due to the above-mentioned 
statistical restrictions.  
If all food aid donors have the same (developmental) goals in providing food aid, then 
the effects of food aid on well-being are uniform. If, however, different donors are 
giving aid for different reasons, then the effect of food aid on stunting and malnutrition 
might also vary, depending on who provided it. Table 5.5 shows the results for the 
regression analysis that evaluates the efficiency of U.S. food aid in comparison with 
other donors. U.S. food aid provides neither better nor worse results than other donors’ 
food provisions when it comes to children’s heights (models 1 to 3 of Table 5.5). Only 
contemporary U.S. food aid performs significantly worse. Again, this coefficient should 
be handled with caution, as it might simply reflect that the U.S. is giving more food aid 
to countries that currently have a high percentage of stunted children (and therefore 
react to generally bad nutritional conditions and not only to natural disasters). There is 
no significantly different effect of U.S. food aid on the percentage of underweight 
children (model 4 of Table 5.5). Likewise, no better or worse performance compared to 
other donors can be found for multilateral donors: Table 5.6 shows that multilateral aid 
has neither a significantly different impact on stunting (models 1 to 3) nor on 
underweight (model 4).  
A factor that also seems to be crucial for the well-being of children is prenatal care. 
Throughout every regression and specification in Tables 5.3 to 5.6, prenatal care has a 
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positive and significant impact on the outcome variable. As already mentioned above, 
maternal health and nutrition can affect the offspring’s health to a great extent. The 
results confirm that prenatal care – by improving maternal health during pregnancy – 
has a positive effect on the child’s physical development. Apparently, the availability of 
good medical care during pregnancy is a crucial determinant for the offspring’s health.  
To sum up, there seems to be some positive impact of food aid on children’s height for 
the post-1995 period (or at least a positive relation). However, a positive correlation 
between food aid and the weight of children, which reacts more quickly to external 
influences than height, could not be found. Moreover, the frequently discussed 
statement that U.S. aid is less effective than food aid provided by other donors, 
particularly multilateral organisations, could not be confirmed here. 
 
5.5 Conclusion and Policy recommendations 
This paper addressed food aid’s role in affecting recipients’ health. As food aid has 
often been criticised for not being efficient in improving peoples’ lives, we first 
explained how food aid has developed over time and discussed the main criticisms 
regarding this development tool. In a second step, we empirically analysed whether the 
criticism that food aid is ineffective in improving the recipients’ health is justified and 
also tested whether U.S. food aid still deserves its historically grounded poor reputation. 
The paper shows that food aid has changed considerably during the last decades. The 
amount of food aid has decreased over time, but donors also seem to have tried to learn 
from previous mistakes. While programme food aid on a government-to-government 
basis was the predominant form of food assistance until the 1980s, donors have shifted 
towards more flexible and need-oriented ways of providing nutritional support. The 
results show that for the post-1995 period, (lagged) food aid is positively and 
significantly correlated with the percentage of children that are not stunted. In some 
cases, food aid that was provided before the time of birth was also positively and 
significantly correlated with the outcome variable. This might be explained by the fact 
that a good nutrition of the mother also results in favourable health conditions of her 
child and therefore food aid can be considered to have a long-lasting effect.  
Chapter 5. Does food aid improve child nutrition? An anthropometric assessment of 
children’s nutritional status in recipient economies. 
 
141 
 
Table 5.5: U.S. food aid’s impact in comparison to other donors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep.var. no stunting no malnutrition 
Food aid U.S. -4.051**   -3.115 
 (0.036)   (0.183) 
avus1to5 4.086 2.662 0.291 -0.124 
 (0.159) (0.246) (0.833) (0.924) 
FA U.S. Lag 6-10 -3.379 -2.681   
 (0.214) (0.174)   
FA U.S. 11-15 2.225    
 (0.318)    
Health expenditure gov. -0.346 -0.289 -0.213 0.058 
 (0.144) (0.178) (0.293) (0.640) 
Political rights -0.000 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 (0.960) (0.644) (0.548) (0.496) 
Intra state war 0.009 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 
 (0.610) (0.736) (0.995) (0.628) 
HIV  -0.339 -0.409 -0.542 -0.173 
 (0.632) (0.531) (0.401) (0.473) 
Infant mortality  0.076 -0.077 0.096 -1.823** 
 (0.949) (0.950) (0.939) (0.020) 
GDP p.c. (log) -0.031 -0.018 -0.030 0.012 
 (0.541) (0.701) (0.510) (0.588) 
Agricultural Land 0.129 -0.116 -0.147 -0.132 
 (0.552) (0.626) (0.524) (0.355) 
Immunisation (measles) 0.001 -0.011 -0.022 -0.059 
 (0.988) (0.894) (0.779) (0.189) 
Prenatal care 0.138** 0.105* 0.114* 0.125*** 
 (0.023) (0.065) (0.054) (0.004) 
Rural population -0.423 -0.250 -0.191 0.047 
 (0.310) (0.450) (0.566) (0.825) 
Constant 0.969** 0.932** 1.027** 0.749*** 
 (0.044) (0.038) (0.018) (0.003) 
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 157 166 168 153 
Within-R2 0.433 0.351 0.347 0.633 
Notes: P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively, probability 
weights included in every specification. Heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors applied in 
every model.
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Table 5.6: Multilateral food aid’s impact in comparison to other donors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep.var. (No) stunting   (No) underweight 
Food aid mult. 6.674                   -1.065 
 (0.321)                   (0.822) 
FA mult Lag 1-5 5.617 6.253 6.437    4.871 
 (0.471) (0.332) (0.315)    (0.131) 
FA mult. Lag 6-10 2.265 -1.591                   
 (0.656) (0.603)                   
FA mult. Lag 11-15 6.272                    
 (0.165)                    
Health expenditure gov. -0.200 -0.177 -0.152    -0.0160 
 (0.573) (0.472) (0.463)    (0.882) 
Political rights 0.003 0.004 0.004    0.003 
 (0.628) (0.599) (0.610)    (0.385) 
Intra state war 0.00620 0.001 0.001  -0.003 
 (0.737) (0.963) (0.976)    (0.801) 
HIV  -0.802 -0.571 -0.495    -0.184 
 (0.294) (0.426) (0.450)    (0.515) 
Infant mortality  -0.054 -0.600 -0.456    -1.700** 
 (0.975) (0.631) (0.720)    (0.047) 
GDP p.c. (log) -0.054 -0.028 -0.027   0.021 
 (0.331) (0.517) (0.520)    (0.381) 
Agricultural Land -0.105 -0.171 -0.158    -0.123 
 (0.664) (0.448) (0.470)    (0.474) 
Immunisation (measles) -0.026 -0.022 -0.018    -0.049 
 (0.752) (0.780) (0.812)    (0.299) 
Prenatal care 0.107* 0.108* 0.112*   0.112*** 
 (0.080) (0.065) (0.058)    (0.009) 
Rural population -0.240 -0.270 -0.287    -0.031 
 (0.642) (0.487) (0.433)    (0.883) 
Constant 1.166* 1.073** 1.095*** 0.711** 
 (0.069) (0.012) (0.007)    (0.011) 
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 157 166 168    153 
Within-R2 0.385 0.340 0.353    0.609 
Notes: P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively, probability 
weights included in every specification. Heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors applied in 
every model.
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A significant and positive impact of food aid on children’s weight could not be 
found, which indicates that food aid does not have a direct impact on health in the short-
run, but might have a positive impact if we observe longer periods. The criticism that 
U.S. food aid is particularly ineffective in improving health outcomes even has negative 
effects for well-being could not be confirmed here. The paper shows that much of the 
criticism discussed in this paper no longer applies for food aid that was provided during 
the last two decades. However, the effects on the nutritional outcomes are relatively 
small in size.  
Throughout every specification, prenatal care had a significantly positive effect on 
children’s nutritional outcomes. The mother’s health therefore seems to be a crucial 
determinant of her offspring’s health. Policy makers and organisations involved in 
foreign aid should therefore enforce programmes that benefit the mother’s health and 
thereby increase the biological well-being of future generations. A future research 
desideratum would be to improve the data basis on nutritional outcomes and to find 
appropriate instruments for food aid, as the lack thereof did not allow the solving of the 
potential reverse causality problem that arises if food aid is given to countries with high 
shares of stunted and malnourished people. 
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Appendix D 
 
Definitions and sources of variables 
 
Food Aid is defined as the share of net official development food aid disbursements and 
GDP. We only include countries that received food aid at least once during the 
entire period. Source: OECD DAC 2a data set (aid (ODA) disbursements to 
countries and regions). Data available at http://stats.oecd.org.  
 
Food Aid L1-5 is the average amount of Food aid/GDP during the period t-1 to t-5. 
 
Food Aid L6-10 is the average amount of Food aid/GDP during the period t-6 to t-10. 
 
Food Aid L11-15 is the average amount of Food aid/GDP during the period t-10 to t-15. 
 
Agricultural Land is the share of land area that is arable. Data: World Bank. 
 
(No) Stunting is the dependent variable and measures the percentage of children under 
age 5 whose height for age (stunting) is NOT more than two standard deviations 
below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 months. 
Therefore, it shows the percentage of children who are not stunted. The data are 
based on the WHO's new child growth standards released in 2006. The variable 
ranges between 0 and 1, 1 meaning that there is no stunting in the population. 
Source: World Bank 
 
GDP p.c. is the average GDP per capita in period t. The data was extracted from the 
World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
 
Health expenditure is the percentage of total government expenditure that is spent on 
public health measures. Data: World Bank 
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HIV measures the percentage of the population (ages 15-49) infected with HIV. The 
variable ranges between 0 and 1, 1 being 100%. 
 
Immunisation (measles) is defined as the percentage of children (12-23 months) who 
received vaccinations before 12 months and is adequately immunised against 
measles. The variable ranges between 0 and 1, 1 meaning that all children in the 
country are immunised against measles. Data: World Bank. 
 
Immunisation (dpt) measures the percentage of children (12-23 months) who are 
adequately immunised against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. The variable 
ranges between 0 and 1, 1 being 100%.Data: World Bank. 
 
Infant mortality is defined as the percentage of infants dying before reaching one year of 
age in a given year. The variable ranges between 0 and 1, 1 being 100%. Data: 
World Bank. 
 
Intra-state war is coded as a dichotomous variable adopting the value 1 if an intra-state 
war took place in given country and period. Intra-state wars are wars that are 
fought within state borders and include wars between non-government forces 
and a government (civil war) as well as wars between two non-government 
forces. Sources: Correlates of War Project: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
 
Political rights defines he extent of political rights in a country as calculated by Freedom 
House. The Variable is coded from 1-7,  7 being the worst. Data: Freedom 
House 
 
Rural population is the percentage of people living in rural areas as defined by national 
statistical offices. The variable ranges between 0 and 1, 1 meaning that 100% are 
living in rural areas. Data: World Bank. 
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Table D1: Coverage of data set for Table 5.3 (meaning cases where none of the 
included variables has missing values) 
Country Frequency Per cent Cumulative 
Angola 1 0.58 0.58 
Argentina 1 0.58 1.16 
Armenia 1 0.58 1.74 
Azerbaijan 3 1.74 3.49 
Bangladesh 7 4.07 7.56 
Belarus 1 0.58 8.14 
Belize 1 0.58 8.72 
Benin 3 1.74 10.47 
Bolivia 2 1.16 11.63 
Botswana 1 0.58 12.21 
Brazil 2 1.16 13.37 
Burkina Faso 3 1.74 15.12 
Burundi 1 0.58 15.70 
Cambodia 1 0.58 16.28 
Cameroon 3 1.74 18.02 
Central African Republic 2 1.16 19.19 
Chad 3 1.74 20.93 
Colombia 3 1.74 22.67 
Comoros 2 1.16 23.84 
Croatia 2 1.16 25.00 
Cuba 1 0.58 25.58 
Djibouti 1 0.58 26.16 
Dominican Republic 4 2.33 28.49 
Ecuador 2 1.16 29.65 
El Salvador 2 1.16 30.81 
Equatorial Guinea 1 0.58 31.40 
Eritrea 1 0.58 31.98 
Ethiopia 2 1.16 33.14 
Gambia, The 2 1.16 34.30 
Georgia 2 1.16 35.47 
Ghana 3 1.74 37.21 
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Table D1. (cont.) 
Country Frequency Per cent Cumulative 
Guatemala 3 1.74 38.95 
Guinea 2 1.16 40.12 
Guinea-Bissau 2 1.16 41.28 
Guyana 2 1.16 42.44 
Haiti 3 1.74 44.19 
Indonesia 2 1.16 45.35 
Jamaica 6 3.49 48.84 
Kazakhstan 3 1.74 50.58 
Kenya 3 1.74 52.33 
Lebanon 1 0.58 52.91 
Lesotho 1 0.58 53.49 
Liberia 2 1.16 54.65 
Madagascar 2 1.16 55.81 
Malawi 2 1.16 56.98 
Maldives 1 0.58 57.56 
Mali 3 1.74 59.30 
Mauritania 2 1.16 60.47 
Mexico 1 0.58 61.05 
Moldova 1 0.58 61.63 
Mongolia 2 1.16 62.79 
Morocco 2 1.16 63.95 
Mozambique 2 1.16 65.12 
Namibia 2 1.16 66.28 
Nepal 3 1.74 68.02 
Nicaragua 2 1.16 69.19 
Niger 3 1.74 70.93 
Nigeria 3 1.74 72.67 
Pakistan 1 0.58 73.26 
Peru 2 1.16 74.42 
Philippines 2 1.16 75.58 
Rwanda 2 1.16 76.74 
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Table D1. (cont.) 
Country Frequency Per cent Cumulative 
Senegal 2 1.16 77.91 
Serbia 1 0.58 78.49 
Sierra Leone 3 1.74 80.23 
South Africa 1 0.58 80.81 
Sri Lanka 2 1.16 81.98 
Sudan 2 1.16 83.14 
Suriname 2 1.16 84.30 
Swaziland 2 1.16 85.47 
Tajikistan 5 2.91 88.37 
Tanzania 3 1.74 90.12 
Thailand 1 0.58 90.70 
Togo 2 1.16 91.86 
Tunisia 3 1.74 93.60 
Turkey 1 0.58 94.19 
Uganda 3 1.74 95.93 
Vietnam 3 1.74 97.67 
Zambia 3 1.74 99.42 
Zimbabwe 1 0.58 100.00 
Total 172 100  
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Table D2: Variance inflation factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Food aid 2.16 0.46 
Food aid Lag 1-5 5.06 0.20 
Food aid Lag 6-10 3.70 0.27 
Food aid Lag 11-15 1.77 0.57 
Agricultural land 1.08 0.92 
GDP p.c. (log) 4.83 0.21 
Health exp. 1.10 0.91 
HIV  1.47 0.68 
Immunisation (measles) 2.48 0.40 
Infant mortality  4.93 0.20 
Intra state war 1.15 0.87 
Political rights 1.29 0.78 
Prenatal care 1.88 0.53 
Rural pop. 2.51 0.40 
Mean VIF 2.53  
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Table D.3: Fixed effects estimation without probability weights 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep.var. (no) stunting (no) malnutrition 
Food aid -0.690 
  
-2.895** 
 
 
(0.705) 
  
(0.010) 
 Food aid Lag 1-5 3.126* 3.452** 2.291* -0.375 0.798
 
(0.087) (0.022) (0.093) (0.626) (0.123) 
Food aid Lag 6-10 -1.026 -0.882 -1.714 0.028 0.006 
 
(0.358) (0.419) (0.100) 
  Food aid Lag 11-15 1.544 1.708 
   
 
(0.147) (0.104) 
   Health exp. -0.087 -0.088 -0.139 0.028 0.006
 
(0.625) (0.613) (0.417) (0.781) (0.949) 
Political rights 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.466) (0.431) (0.453) (0.310) (0.264) 
Intra state war 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.862) (0.924) (0.961) (0.438) (0.485) 
HIV  -0.631 -0.639 -0.594 -0.105 -0.107 
 
(0.367) (0.346) (0.382) (0.668) (0.704) 
Infant mortality  -0.484 -0.453 -1.187 -1.814** -2.042*** 
 
(0.730) (0.747) (0.324) (0.030) (0.009) 
GDP p.c. (log) -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 0.014 0.018 
 
(0.834) (0.847) (0.810) (0.546) (0.429) 
Agricult. Land -0.195 -0.202 -0.269 -0.107 -0.128 
 
(0.443) (0.428) (0.279) (0.470) (0.454) 
Immunisation 
(measles) 
0.046 0.048 0.048 -0.062 -0.047 
 
(0.499) (0.488) (0.501) (0.163) (0.289) 
Prenatal care 0.098 0.096 0.082 0.117*** 0.110*** 
 
(0.107) (0.110) (0.154) (0.007) (0.007) 
Rural pop. -0.136 -0.133 -0.304 0.059 -0.016 
 
(0.688) (0.689) (0.331) (0.781) (0.932) 
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.800** 0.789** 1.002*** 0.767*** 0.788*** 
 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
N 172 172 172 153 153 
Within-R2 0.396 0.395 0.370 0.650 0.622 
Notes: P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively, 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors applied in every model. Fixed effects estimations 
with equal models as in Table 5.3 and 5.4, but without probability weights. 
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Figure D1: Wheat prices and food aid given by NGOs  
 
Notes: Data on wheat food shipments are from the World Food Programme (WFP) International Food 
Aid Information System (INTERFAIS). Nominal prices of U.S. wheat are from the U.S. department of 
agriculture: http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=DATA_STATISTICS. Real prices 
were calculated by using the GDP deflator of the World Bank. 
 
Figure D2: Wheat prices and EU food aid flows 
 
Notes: Data on wheat food shipments are from the World Food Programme (WFP) International Food 
Aid Information System (INTERFAIS). Nominal prices of U.S. wheat are from the U.S. department of 
agriculture: http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=DATA_STATISTICS. Real prices 
were calculated by using the GDP deflator of the World Bank. 
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6. Does food aid really have disincentive effects on local 
food production? An empirical investigation 
 
 
 
Abstract 
There has been a persistent belief since Schultz's (1960) seminal paper on U.S. food 
aid's impact on developing countries that nutritional support leads to disincentive effects 
for farmers in recipient countries. Moreover, critics argue that repeated food aid flows 
decrease the recipient government’s incentive to invest in agriculture. Both aspects 
would ultimately lead to a decrease in local agricultural production. The paper 
investigates, using a global sample, whether there is empirical evidence that food aid 
does indeed cause a drop in the agricultural output of recipient economies. The results 
show that the “disincentive hypothesis” cannot be confirmed. On the contrary, 
nutritional support is significantly related to future wheat production. The total 
agricultural production, however, is not significantly affected by food aid.  
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 6.1 Introduction 
Food aid has aroused heated discussions for more than half a century. As stated 
in the previous chapter, there are doubts concerning, inter alia, the effectiveness of 
nutritional support, the right targeting of food aid, and non-developmental donor 
motivations. A second strand of criticism is related to food aid’s unintended 
consequences for the recipient country’s agriculture. More specifically, critics put 
forward that – by increasing local food supply – nutritional support leads to a drop in 
local food prices and thereby creates producer disincentives. Moreover, food aid has 
frequently been accused of shifting the recipient government’s investments away from 
the agricultural sector and displacing commercial imports (Lavy 1990; Lowder 2004, 
among others). In contrast, some economists argue that food aid can act as a budget 
relief and could therefore increase spending on locally produced food (Fitzpatrick and 
Storey 1989) and intermediate goods (Mohapatra et al. 1996), thereby increasing local 
food production. 
This study contributes to a growing body of literature examining the potential 
disincentive effects of food aid (Abdulai et al. 2003; Barrett 2006; Bezuneh et al. 2003; 
Lavy 1990; Lowder 2004, among others). Most of the scientific research regarding food 
aid’s impact on recipients’ local agriculture is predominantly theoretical in nature and 
does not provide empirical evidence in favour or against the critical hypotheses. The 
scant empirical studies on the subject mostly focus on certain countries or on the 
impacts of food aid on imports and exports. The main objective of this chapter is, in 
contrast to existing studies, to empirically assess whether food aid really creates 
unintended effects for the local agriculture. We reach beyond the current state of the art 
by taking a global perspective, namely by analysing food aid flows to all reported 
recipient countries since the mid-1970s. Furthermore, we also take into consideration 
that effects might vary between world regions. 
Wheat plays an integral role in the distribution of in-kind food aid and also 
constitutes a major part of monetised food aid. Thus, wheat production will be affected 
most severely if the disincentive hypothesis holds. The impact of food aid on wheat 
production in recipient countries will therefore be analysed in detail. However, 
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nutritional support might also affect the production of other foodstuffs. This is 
particularly true for countries where wheat is not one of the typical food products. In 
these countries, local purchases of food or a change of the government’s agricultural 
policy in consequence of repeated nutritional support during times of food shortage 
would rather affect the production of the main local agri-food products. We therefore 
also take a closer look at food aid’s impact on the total net value of agricultural 
production. 
 
As the production disincentive effect is one of the most prominent arguments 
against food aid, the empirical part of the paper will focus on this comprehensive issue. 
However, the production disincentive argument is inextricably linked with a number of 
other factors and unwanted effects. Therefore, the points of critique will be discussed in 
a broader perspective in the following section 6.2. Section 6.3 proceeds with the 
description of the data and the methodology used, the main results of the empirical 
analysis are presented in section 6.4. The last section concludes.  
 
6.2 Hypotheses about food aid’s impact on agriculture 
The first fundamental critique regarding food aid’s impact on recipients’ 
agriculture was provided by Schultz (1960). In his study on the U.S. Public Law 480 he 
discusses his speculative assumption that food aid leads to a drop in food prices and, 
therefore, results in disincentives for agricultural producers in recipient countries. More 
recent literature also discusses other potential effects of food aid, such as the 
displacement of imports, a shift in consumer preferences or disincentives for 
investment. 
 
6.2.1 Disincentives for farmers 
According to Schultz’s (1960) influential paper, food aid creates disincentives 
for recipient countries’ farmers because it decreases local food prices, thereby making 
food production less profitable. In theory, food aid should not serve as a substitution to 
imports, but must be additional according to the usual marketing requirements (UMR). 
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This concept, introduced by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in the 
1950s, requires that recipient countries have to purchase certain amounts of food at non-
concessional prices before they can import food aid at concessional prices. Advocates of 
the disincentive-hypothesis argue that – if the UMR are enforced – food aid will lead to 
more food supply, resulting in a downward pressure of domestic prices and 
disincentives for local farmers (Lowder 2004; Lavy 1990). Effects of food aid in cases 
where UMR are not applied will be discussed in section 6.2.3. Fitzpatrick and Storey 
(1989) argue that prices do not necessarily fall as a result of food aid. Apart from the 
case where food aid replaces imports, prices could also remain stable if additional 
demand is created. This can be achieved by targeting food aid directly to needy people 
via institutional feeding or other development programs.
104
 Moreover, food aid might 
act as a budget relief for the poor, who tend to spend a high share of their income on 
food and are likely to consume additional food directly instead of using it as a substitute 
for locally produced food. As a result, overall demand will increase (Fitzpatrick and 
Storey 1989). According to Engel’s law, however, demand for food does not increase as 
fast as income (in this case provided in the form of commodities) and therefore the 
assumption that food aid fosters demand should be regarded with caution (Barrett 
2006). 
Despite the extensive and adjacent discussion of the topic in literature, empirical 
evidence on food aid’s impact on prices and production disincentives remains scarce. 
The literature so far does not confirm disincentive effects of food aid (Bezuneh et al. 
2003; Lowder 2004; Mabuza et al. 2009; Abdulai and Barrett 2005; Bezuneh et al. 
1988) or only displacement of domestic production in the short-run (Barrett et al. 1999, 
only for U.S. food aid) or at high levels of food aid with more than 10% of domestic 
production (Tadesse and Schively 2009, for Ethiopia). Moreover, especially small 
farmers might not even be affected by lower cereal prices as a result of increased cereal 
availability, as they produce primarily for their own consumption and do not sell their 
products on domestic markets (McMillan et al. 2007 observe this for Mexican farmers). 
                                                 
104
 Very poor people are assumed not to have access to sufficient levels of food and therefore do not need 
price incentives to consume more at any given price level if food is available. 
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Barrett (2006, p.13) and Lavy (1990) argue that potential disincentive effects are 
offset by positive effects of food aid such as the benefits of reduced liquidity 
constraints. This finding is an important contribution to the discussion, as it obliterates 
the argument that food aid’s negative impacts are disproportionally felt by the poor who 
often earn their income in the agricultural sector.  
This paper does not intend to judge whether food aid had on average positive or 
negative effects for different population groups and merely focuses on the general 
impact on the local agricultural sector. However, it should be kept in mind that while 
food aid might have negative effects for farmers, other groups of the population could at 
the same time profit from it. As many poor countries are net importers of cereals, the 
average household profits from lower food prices even if agricultural products are 
important export commodities (McMillan et al. 2007). In countries where poor people 
are more often net buyers than net sellers of wheat, such as Ethiopia, the poor 
population even profits disproportionally from food aid (Levinsohn and Mc Millan 
2007).
105
  
 
6.2.2 Disincentives for the recipient country’s government 
Food aid is not only criticised for harming net incomes of farmers but also for 
being fungible and for discouraging government spending on the agricultural sector, as 
well as dissuading policymakers from necessary policy reforms (Colding and Pinstrup-
Andersen 2000, p.194; Maxwell 1991; Maxwell and Singer 1979). According to Kirwan 
and McMillan (2007), this might be one possible explanation for the fact that many 
former net food exporters in the developing world have become net food importers. On 
the other hand, poor countries’ food producers might just as well have been the losers of 
a continuing process of market liberalisation. 
Many scholars agree that food aid does have adverse effects on policy and 
institutions (Mosley and Eeckhout 2000, p.135). As far as overall development 
assistance is concerned, Djankov et al. (2008) even find that it leads to the same rent 
                                                 
105
 There is not much evidence on food aid’s direct effects on farmers’ households. For the Mexican case, 
Levinsohn and McMillan (2007) do not find income losses of poor farmers, probably because they very 
rarely participate in the markets.  
Chapter 6. Does food aid really have disincentive effects on local food production?  
An empirical investigation. 
 
157 
 
seeking behaviour as known in the “curse of natural resources” literature and show that 
aid is a bigger curse than oil as governments will reduce democracy levels in order to 
extract more aid flows for own purposes. A similar effect might be assumed for 
(monetised) food aid.  
 
6.2.3 Food aid as a substitute for commercial imports 
Although food aid is intended to be additional to commercial imports, it is 
possible that the UMR cannot always be enforced. If this is the case and food aid 
therefore works as a substitute for commercial imports, there will be no disincentives 
for local production as supply does not increase. However, this would just as well be an 
unwanted effect of food aid. Firstly, because the food supply in the recipient country 
would stay the same and thus food aid would not help to ease malnutrition. Secondly, 
because exporting countries (others than the recipient country) would see their export 
markets eroded if food aid displaced imports (Fitzpatrick and Storey 1989). Recent 
studies show that an enforcement of the additionality principle is unsuccessful. Food aid 
displaces commercial imports up to an almost equivalent amount as food aid given 
(Lavy 1990). Moreover, the displacement was found to be more severe for programme 
food aid than for targeted aid (Lowder 2004).
106
 Barrett et al. (1999) find a J-curve 
effect on recipient countries’ imports, with U.S. food aid resulting in lower imports in 
the short run but higher imports in the long term. In the Tunisian case, similar import 
displacement effects have not been found (Bezuneh et al. 2003). 
 
6.2.4 Shift in consumption preferences 
Another unintended effect of food aid that is sometimes mentioned in the 
literature is the possibility of a shift in preferences from locally produced food towards 
imported food (Coding and Pinstrup Andersen 2000, p.194; Barrett 2006). This can lead 
to a certain dependence on imports, if foreign food is preferred over local food. 
Moreover, food-for-work programs that yield direct outcomes for participants – in 
                                                 
106
 Program food aid is usually food that is given to the recipient government which monetizes it and uses 
it for development project. Targeted food aid is usually directly targeted and freely distributed to poor 
people. 
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contrast to own cultivation that is subject to weather conditions – can draw farmers 
away from their own cultivation (Fitzpatrick and Storey 1989). To sum up, most of the 
above-mentioned points of critique would – if they were justified – lead to a change in 
the production pattern. In the following, we will empirically test whether such an effect 
can be found.  
 
6.3 Data and empirical design 
How can food aid influence agricultural output in recipient economies? A 
theoretical approach on this issue is offered by Mohapatra et al. (1996). The authors 
assume that an increase in food aid (A) does not only have an effect on food prices (Pf), 
but also affects budget constraints and the shadow wage of the local producers (Pl).
107
 
Therefore, the change in output depends on three effects. 
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The first term on the right-hand side is the effect of an increase in food aid on 
local food prices and therefore describes the Schultzian negative partial-equilibrium 
supply-response (see Schultz 1960): an increase in aid is expected to decrease food 
prices in the recipient country due to increased food supply, resulting in lower output. 
However, as mentioned above, food aid can also reduce budget constraints that usually 
impede imports of intermediate goods (e.g. fertilisers, machinery). Relaxed balance of 
payments constraints which go along with increased hard currency availability could 
increase the local supply of commercial inputs and thus reduce the local prices of these 
goods (Px). This, in turn, could result in increased agricultural output. The effect of 
increased food aid on the shadow wage is ambiguous as market disincentives and factor 
market incentives influence the shadow wage in opposing directions. More specifically, 
the shadow wage is influenced by the induced fall of food prices on the one hand and an 
                                                 
107
 The authors assume that agricultural workers in recipient countries are mostly employed on their own 
farm and therefore labour is non-tradable. Thus, they receive a shadow wage that differs from the market 
wage. 
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increase in leisure demand stimulated by income transfers as well as a fall in 
intermediate good prices on the other hand.  
In summary, the change in agricultural output resulting from an increase in food 
aid can go either way, depending on whether lower input-factor prices incentivise 
production to a greater extent than lower food prices disincentivise market output. We 
empirically test whether food aid significantly affects food production by applying fixed 
effects models and Arellano Bond dynamic panel GMM estimators, using a large set of 
explanatory variables that might influence agricultural production. Our data set covers 
up to 140 countries and 32 years (1976-2008). 
The Food and Agricultural Organisation offers a comprehensive data base on 
agricultural production that provides information both on individual food items and 
aggregate food production. For the investigation of food aid’s impact on wheat 
production, we use the data on wheat production in tonnes.
108
 When food aid’s effects 
for total agricultural production are analysed, we use the net production value of the 
total agricultural production in constant 2004-2006 international 1,000 $. We use food 
aid data from the OECD as in the previous chapters and control both for contemporary 
food aid and previous food aid flows, as it might take a while for farmers to react to 
changes on the market.  
A number of other factors that could influence food production are also 
controlled for (Table 6.1). We include the share of agricultural land, as countries with 
high shares of arable land are more likely to produce large amounts of agricultural 
products. We also control for population size and the share of the rural population 
because large countries produce larger amounts of food and highly rural societies are 
often heavily dependent on the primary sector.
109
 Civil wars might destroy harvests or 
keep farmers from cultivating their fields and are therefore included as an explanatory 
variable as well. As natural disasters are the primary cause for destroyed harvests, they 
enter the regression as a right-hand side variable, too.  
 
                                                 
108
 We also ran the regressions with the net production value of wheat in 1,000 international $, which did 
not change the results. Tables are available from the authors.  
109
 The correlation coefficient between total population (log) and rural population is -0.069. 
Multicollinearity was tested and rejected, therefore we include both variables. 
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Moreover, we include the explanatory variable “agricultural machinery” in order 
to account for the technological standard of agricultural production.  
The scatter plots showing the relationship between food aid and wheat 
production or the net value of total agricultural production already provide a first 
indication of how food aid influences the agricultural sector of recipient economies 
(Figures 6.1 and 6.2).  
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics for regressions on wheat production  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Food aid (in mio.) 987 27.38 53.39 0.01 408.52 
Wheat tonnes (in mio.) 987 4.24 15.20 0.00 123.00 
Net total food prod. value (in mio).  987 12.30 37.30 0.05 347.00 
Agricultural land (% of land area) 987 0.44 0.21 0.02 0.86 
Agricultural machinery 987 97.47 141.13 0.08 1083.30 
Civil war 987 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Natural disasters 987 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Population (in mio.) 987 64.50 199.00 0.31 1300.00 
Rural pop. as % of total pop. 987 0.60 0.22 0.09 0.97 
Descriptive statistics for regressions on total food production 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Food aid (in mio.) 1432 22.92 46.66 0.01 408.52 
Net total food prod. value (in mio.)  1432 9.67 31.40 0.02 347.00 
Agricultural land (% of land area) 1432 0.43 0.20 0.01 0.86 
Agricultural machinery 1432 83.89 137.09 0.08 1083.30 
Civil war 1432 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Natural disasters 1432 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Population (in mio.) 1432 51.20 168.00 0.09 1300.00 
Rural pop. as % of total pop. 1432 0.61 0.20 0.09 0.97 
Notes: Numbers calculated for regressions of Table 6.2, column 1 (for wheat production) and 6.4 column 
1 (for total food production), only including cases for which none of the included variables has missing 
values. Variables that are defined as percentages are divided by 100: a value of 0.5 is therefore equal to 
50%. 
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Figure 6.1: The relationship between food aid and log wheat production (tonnes)  
 
 
Figure 6.2: The relationship between food aid and the net value of total agricultural 
production (log) 
 
At first glance, the disincentive hypothesis cannot be confirmed: Figure 6.1 does 
not indicate a systematic relationship between food aid and wheat production at all. 
Looking at the net value of total food production, there seems to be a slightly positive 
correlation with food aid (Figure 6.2). As can be seen in Figure 6.2, large amounts of 
food aid are mostly given to countries with a high value of total food production, which 
is not surprising, as countries with a strong focus of agricultural production are also 
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more likely to face nutritional shortages in the case of a bad harvest. However, the 
figure also indicates that there is heteroskedasticity, which is why heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors will be applied in each of the regressions.  
We use data from the mid-1970s to 2008 for countries that have received food 
aid at least once. In a first step, we run fixed-effects
110
 regressions to measure the 
impact of food aid on agricultural output: 
(Log) food productionit = α + β1 (log) food aidit + B Xi,t + ηt +uit 
Food production is either wheat production or the total agricultural production 
value. We analyse the effects of contemporary food aid as well as food aid given in 
previous periods (which are included in the vector of explanatory variables X) because 
it might take a while until food aid flows lead to a change in the production behaviour. 
Country and time fixed effects are included in every fixed effects model. Food aid 
might have stronger impacts on wheat production in countries where the main 
agricultural production commodity is wheat. We take this into account by using 
weighted least squares estimations in some of the specifications, giving more weight to 
countries with a high share of wheat production relative to total agricultural output.  
The panel structure and particularly the fact that we use several lags of food aid 
as independent variables give rise to the problem auf autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic 
errors. Serial correlation in linear panel-data models leads to biased standard errors and 
therefore renders the results less efficient.
111
 There are several ways how to deal with 
this problem. A key concept to be considered is that of the cluster-robust covariance 
matrix, that is, using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for 
arbitrary correlation between errors within clusters of observations (e.g. countries or 
firms).
112
 Peterson (2009) compares the outcomes of different approaches to deal with 
                                                 
110
 We conducted the Hausman test, which rejected the hypothesis that random effects provide consistent 
estimates. The p-value was 0.000. 
111
 We tested for autocorrelation using the approach proposed by Drucker (2003) and found that the 
assumption that the errors are not serially correlated is violated. 
112
 For more detail, see, for example, Wooldridge (2002) or Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
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serial autocorrelation and finds the most exact and unbiased results for approaches with 
clustered standard errors.
113
   
Newey and West (1987) developed another approach to obtain autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. While the Newey-West standard errors 
were initially designed for serial correlation of unknown form in time-series data, panel 
versions are available in most of the established statistical software packages. We 
therefore use fixed effects models with clustered standard errors that are also robust to 
heteroskedasticity in a first step (Table 6.2), but also compare the results to fixed effects 
models with Newey-West standard errors for panel data (Table E.2).  
Another straight-forward approach to deal with the challenges of dynamic panel 
data models is to use the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator after Arellano 
and Bond (1991). We do so in a second step and test whether our results hold. The 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator has several advantages. Firstly, time-invariant country-
specific characteristics that may be correlated with the explanatory variables are 
removed by first-differencing. Secondly, a lagged dependent variable is introduced 
without giving rise to the problem of autocorrelation. Last but not least, we are also able 
to account for possible endogeneity of food aid. As more aid might be given as a result 
of strongly reduced food output (for example due to bad harvests or natural 
catastrophes), a potential endogeneity of contemporary food aid should be taken into 
consideration. The model can be written as follows: 
Δ(Log) food prod.it = β1Δ(log) food productioni,t-1 + β2Δ(log) food aidit + β3 Δ Xit + Δ uit 
While we assume contemporary food aid to be exogenous in some of the specification, 
we explicitly declare it to be endogenous in other specifications to see whether our 
results stay robust. Xit also encompasses lagged values of food aid.
114
 Again, time fixed 
effects are controlled for in every specification. 
 
                                                 
113
 However, he analyses standard errors in panel data sets and clusters at the firm level.  
114
 Particularly high levels of food aid are likely to be given in times when food output is low, for 
example due to bad harvests or natural catastrophes. 
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6.4 Empirical results 
Table 6.2 presents a series of regressions with wheat production (in logs) as the 
dependent variable. Column (1) to (4) are fixed effects estimations with between one 
and three lags of food aid or average food aid in the last five years (column 4) in order 
to account for the possibility that it takes a while for wheat producers to react to food 
aid provisions. In columns (5) and (6), weights that put greater emphasis on countries 
with a high share of wheat production relative to total agricultural production are 
applied. In every specification, contemporary food aid has a negative sign but is only 
significantly related to a lower production output in one of the specifications (model 3 
of Table 6.2). Food aid provided in the previous year has mostly a positive sign, and 
sometimes significantly so. The negative sign of contemporary food aid might indicate 
reverse causality. The positive and sometimes significant coefficient of lagged food aid 
could be interpreted as a sign that production values go back to their growth path after 
an external shock. According to the within-R
2
, the included right hand side variables 
explain between 25 and 29 per cent of the variation in wheat production, with values 
increasing once we include more lags of food aid or put more weight on large wheat 
producers.  
In Table 6.3, Arellano Bond dynamic panel GMM estimators are used to test the 
influence of food aid on wheat production.
115
 We include the lagged dependent variable 
to account for country-specific characteristics with regard to wheat production and also 
take into account the potential endogeneity of contemporary food aid flows (model 4 of 
Table 6.3). Not surprisingly, the lagged dependent variable is highly significant and 
positively related to contemporary wheat production: countries with high agricultural 
output in the past will also have a higher agricultural output today. The sign of 
contemporary food aid is negative but insignificant in all specifications. Therefore, the 
disincentive hypotheses can be rejected, at least for contemporary food aid flows.  
                                                 
115
 For consistent estimation, Arellano-Bond estimators require that the first-differenced disturbances are 
not serially correlated. We tested this assumption in each of the models, using the Arellano-Bond test for 
zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors in Stata. The null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation 
was never rejected at orders higher than order 1. 
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Table 6.2: The impact of food aid on wheat production: fixed effects and weighted least 
squares estimations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
FE FE FE FE WLS WLS 
Food aid (logs) -0.017 -0.023 -0.038* -0.020 -0.009 -0.014 
 
(0.401) (0.254) (0.091) (0.277) (0.729) (0.581) 
L1. food aid (logs) 0.019 0.035** 0.050*** 
 
-0.002 0.030** 
 
(0.349) (0.040) (0.006) 
 
(0.897) (0.015) 
L2. food aid (logs) 
 
0.008 0.011 
  
0.015 
  
(0.630) (0.369) 
  
(0.342) 
L3. food aid (logs) 
  
0.008 
   
   
(0.690) 
   Av. Food aid (L.1-5) 
   
0.022 
  
    
(0.614) 
  Agricultural land 6.310** 6.482** 6.134** 6.565** 6.076*** 5.463** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.021) (0.003) (0.014) 
GDP p.c. (logs) 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.019 0.009 0.002 
 
(0.142) (0.216) (0.196) (0.163) (0.525) (0.922) 
Nat. disasters -0.061 -0.041 -0.023 -0.063 0.024 0.052 
 
(0.262) (0.454) (0.667) (0.201) (0.633) (0.300) 
Civil war -0.082 -0.111 -0.102 -0.060 -0.016 -0.055 
 
(0.394) (0.250) (0.279) (0.537) (0.809) (0.406) 
Rural population 1.950 2.673 3.109 2.215 0.905 1.993 
 
(0.316) (0.176) (0.112) (0.222) (0.673) (0.399) 
Agric. machinery 
(logs) -0.139 -0.159 -0.216 -0.165 0.274* 0.248 
 
(0.483) (0.429) (0.298) (0.336) (0.089) (0.124) 
Population (logs) 0.338 0.106 -0.143 0.628 0.217 0.327 
 
(0.698) (0.910) (0.880) (0.416) (0.763) (0.695) 
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.883 6.590 10.85 -1.840 6.315 4.317 
 
(0.837) (0.661) (0.477) (0.882) (0.599) (0.760) 
N 987 905 837 1035 987 905 
Within-R
2
 0.252 0.271 0.294 0.246 0.278 0.276 
Notes: P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively, 
heteroskedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in every specification. Model (5) and (6) are 
weighted least squares models, with stronger emphasis on countries with a high share of wheat production 
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Table 6.3: The impact of food aid on wheat production: GMM estimations  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
GMM GMM GMM GMM 
L1.wheat prod. (log) 0.423*** 0.408*** 0.411*** 0.428*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Food aid (logs) -0.012 -0.023 -0.011 -0.014  
 
(0.463) (0.120) (0.502) (0.455)    
L1. food aid (logs) 0.025* 0.044*** 
 
0.024*   
 
(0.058) (0.001) 
 
(0.100)    
L2. food aid (logs) 
 
-0.011 
 
                
  
(0.301) 
 
                
Av. Food aid L1-5 
  
0.001                 
   
(0.975)                 
Agricultural land 1.986 2.580* 1.939 2.063    
 
(0.148) (0.074) (0.152) (0.122)    
GDP p.c. (logs) 0.027** 0.024** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
 
(0.012) (0.037) (0.009) (0.006)    
Nat. disasters 0.002 0.020 0.001 0.000  
 
(0.957) (0.493) (0.984) (0.986)    
Civil war -0.051 -0.063 -0.034 -0.052 
 
(0.321) (0.250) (0.531) (0.312)    
Rural population 0.972 0.908 0.705 1.042    
 
(0.316) (0.385) (0.498) (0.291)    
Agricultural machinery (logs) -0.176 -0.176 -0.176 -0.165    
 
(0.184) (0.221) (0.194) (0.200)    
Population (logs) 0.695 0.441 0.696 0.681*   
 
(0.130) (0.395) (0.138) (0.095)    
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? First diff. First diff. First diff. First diff. 
Constant -5.619 -1.349 -5.201 -5.536    
 
(0.460) (0.875) (0.500) (0.412)    
N 895 829 922 895    
Chi-squared 1349.9 1616.5 898.2 1453.8    
Notes: P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively, 
heteroskedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in every specification. Model (1) to (3) use food aid 
as exogenous variable, while in model (4) it is assumed that food aid is endogenous. 
 
Food aid provided in the previous year is significantly and positively related to 
wheat production (columns 1, 2 and 4 of Table 6.4), while average wheat flows during 
the previous five years do not have a significant effect on wheat output (column 3 of 
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Table 6.3). We can therefore conclude that the often stated criticism that food aid 
discourages agricultural production cannot be proven empirically. But do the positive 
and significant results for lagged food aid indicate that nutritional support significantly 
increases wheat production in recipient economies (with a slight delay)? A cautious 
interpretation appears warranted: as food aid is often provided in times of severe food 
shortage – for example due to an exceptionally bad harvest – a significantly positive 
relationship between lagged food aid and contemporary wheat production might simply 
be a sign that production is back on track.  
How does food aid influence total food production? Table 6.4 shows the results 
for fixed effects (column 1) and Arellano Bond GMM estimations (column 2, 3 and 
4).
116
 The coefficient for contemporary food aid has also a negative sign here, but is 
only significant in the fixed effects regressions. This is not surprising, as food aid is 
mostly given in times of severe food shortages which often go along with bad harvests. 
Moreover, previous years might have been equally marked by low production output 
and therefore by higher nutritional support. As GMM specifications allow us to include 
lagged dependent (and independent) variables without running the risk of 
autocorrelation and can cope with potential endogeneity, they are actually the better 
option to approach the research question in this paper and should therefore be regarded 
as the preferred estimation method. Once first differences are applied, the coefficients 
for contemporary food aid flows are insignificant. The same is true for food aid that is 
lagged by one year. Moreover, the coefficients for contemporary and lagged values of 
food aid are very small in size or even zero. It can therefore be said that there is no clear 
indication for food production disincentives resulting from nutritional support.
117
  
                                                 
116
 We also tested for other specifications with more lags of food aid just as in table 4.2 and 4.3. As the 
results stayed the same, we only display a selection of these results. However, the tables are available 
from the authors. 
117
 We also conducted regressions controlling for food imports for all specifications testing food aid’s 
effect on wheat production and general food production. Including food imports did not change the 
results, except for the fixed effects regressions in Table 6.4, where the coefficient for lagged food aid 
turned insignificant. However, as the sample size is reduced to a great extent if this control variable is 
included, we decided to use the regressions excluding it as we would otherwise face a bigger risk of 
sample selection bias. The tables are available from the authors, though. 
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Table 6.4: The impact of food aid on total agricultural production: fixed effects and 
GMM estimations  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
FE1 GMM GMM4 GMM5    
L1.net total agric. value  0.431*** 0.405*** 0.431*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Food aid (logs) -0.010** -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.018) (0.421) (0.342) (0.806)    
L1. food aid (logs) -0.009** 0.002 
 
0.000  
 
(0.022) (0.604) 
 
(0.941)    
Av. Food aid L1-5 
  
-0.004 
 
   
(0.468) 
 Agricultural land 2.139*** 1.177*** 1.244*** 1.175*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)    
GDP p.c. (logs) 0.009 0.008*** 0.007** 0.008*** 
 
(0.133) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009)    
Nat. disasters 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.838) (0.656) (0.835) (0.740)    
Civil war 0.037 0.006 0.007 0.005 
 
(0.104) (0.646) (0.565) (0.674)    
Rural population -1.088 -0.811** -0.919** -0.831**  
 
(0.106) (0.042) (0.031) (0.039)    
Agricultural machinery (logs) 0.091*** 0.035** 0.040** 0.034**  
 
(0.000) (0.037) (0.018) (0.038)    
Population (logs) 0.425** 0.232* 0.224* 0.236*   
 
(0.024) (0.059) (0.098) (0.057)    
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? Yes First diff. First diff. First diff. 
Constant 7.204** 4.386** 4.998** 4.324**  
 
(0.018) (0.028) (0.020) (0.034)    
N 1432 1301 1340 1301    
Within-R
2
 0.777 
   Chi-squared 
 
3886.2 3753.9 3869.1    
Notes: P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively, 
heteroskedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in every specification. Model (1) to (3) use food aid 
as exogenous variable, while in model (4) it is assumed that food aid is endogenous 
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6.5 Conclusions  
In this study, we contributed to a growing body of literature on food aid’s 
impacts on recipient countries’ agricultural output by empirically testing the 
“disincentive hypothesis”. That is, we assessed whether there is empirical proof for the 
frequent statement in – mostly theoretical – literature that food aid leads to disincentive 
effects for recipient countries’ agricultural output. 
As wheat plays a crucial role in nutritional support, the effects of food aid on wheat 
output were tested in a first step, also taking into account that large wheat producers 
might be more heavily affected by large amounts of food aid given. In a second step, 
food aid’s impact on total food production was tested, as food aid provisions could also 
affect the production of food commodities other than wheat. Moreover, frequent 
nutritional support could lead to disincentives for recipient governments to invest in the 
local agriculture and therefore negatively affect total agricultural output. 
The results show that disincentive effects of food aid cannot be found for 
recipients of food aid since the mid-1970s. On the contrary, the regression analysis that 
assesses how food aid affects wheat output shows that there is a positive and mostly 
significant relationship between food aid and wheat output one year after the aid was 
provided. As food aid is generally given in times of severe food shortage and, moreover, 
the coefficients are significant but relatively small in size, we abstain from saying that 
food aid actually leads to a higher wheat output in the future. It might be more 
reasonable to conclude that food aid does not lead to less output in the future but helps 
local wheat producers to get back to a normal growth path. The value of total food 
production was not significantly affected by nutritional assistance. 
In summary, we conclude that no empirical evidence can be found for the 
frequent criticism of economists, accusing food aid of leading to agricultural 
disincentives in recipient countries. As many doubts relating to food aid’s impacts on 
the agricultural sector remain, it would be interesting to analyse these points of critique 
empirically in the future. This is particularly true for the impact on agricultural spending 
of recipient governments.
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Appendix E 
 
Definition and sources of variables 
Agricultural land refers to the share of land area that is arable, under permanent crops, 
and under permanent pastures. Arable land includes land defined by the FAO as 
land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary 
meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and 
land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is 
excluded. Land under permanent crops is land cultivated with crops that occupy 
the land for long periods and need not be replanted after each harvest, such as 
cocoa, coffee, and rubber. This category includes land under flowering shrubs, 
fruit trees, nut trees, and vines, but excludes land under trees grown for wood or 
timber. Permanent pasture is land used for five or more years for forage, 
including natural and cultivated crops. Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
 
Agricultural machinery refers to the number of wheel and crawler tractors (excluding 
garden tractors) in use in agriculture at the end of the calendar year specified or 
during the first quarter of the following year. Arable land includes land defined 
by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted 
once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or 
kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of 
shifting cultivation is excluded. Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
 
Civil War is coded as a dichotomous variable adopting the value 1 if an intra-state war 
took place in given country and period. Intra-state wars are wars that are fought 
within state borders and include wars between non-government forces and a 
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government (civil war) as well as wars between two non-government forces. 
Sources: Correlates of War Project: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
 
Food aid is development food aid in millions of constant 2010 US $. We only include 
countries that received food aid at least once during the entire period. Source: 
OECD DAC 2a data set (aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions). 
Data available at http://stats.oecd.org. 
 
GDP p.c is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant U.S. dollars 
(original data in constant 2005 U.S. $. For this paper the data was rescaled into 
2010 U.S. $.). Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Natural disasters is a dummy variable with dis=1 if a natural disaster took place in 
country i and period t. Source: EM-DAT, the international disaster database. 
Data available at http://www.emdat.be/. 
 
Population refers to the total population. Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
 
Rural population (% of total population) refers to people living in rural areas as defined 
by national statistical offices. It is calculated as the difference between total 
population and urban population. Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators.. 
 
Total agricultural food production refers to the Net Production Value of the total 
agricultural production in constant 1000 I$. Source: FAOSTAT (Food and 
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agriculture organisation of the United Nations, Statistics division). Data 
available at http://faostat.fao.org/ 
 
Wheat production refers to the production of wheat in tonnes. Source: FAOSTAT (Food 
and agriculture organisation of the United Nations, Statistics division). Data 
available at http://faostat.fao.org/
Chapter 6. Does food aid really have disincentive effects on local food production?  
An empirical investigation. 
 
173 
 
Table E.1: Variance inflation factors 
Variance inflation factors in cases where the dependent 
variable is (log) wheat production 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Food aid 3.29 0.30 
L1. food aid (logs) 4.07 0.25 
L2. food aid (logs) 4.09 0.24 
L3. food aid (logs) 3.30 0.30 
Agricultural land 1.16 0.87 
Nat. disasters 1.23 0.81 
Civil war 1.07 0.94 
Agricultural machinery (logs) 1.67 0.60 
GDP p.c. (logs) 1.26 0.79 
Population (logs) 1.37 0.73 
Rural population 2.04 0.49 
Mean VIF 2.23 
 Variance inflation factors in cases where the dependent 
variable is (log) total agricultural production 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Food aid 3.20 0.31 
L1. food aid (logs) 4.03 0.25 
L2. food aid (logs) 4.15 0.24 
L3. food aid (logs) 3.31 0.30 
Agricultural land 1.10 0.91 
Nat. disasters 1.21 0.83 
Civil war 1.10 0.91 
Agricultural machinery (logs) 1.51 0.66 
GDP p.c. (logs) 1.21 0.83 
Population (logs) 1.36 0.74 
Rural population 1.71 0.58 
Mean VIF 2.17 
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Table E.2: Fixed effects regressions using Newey-West standard errors 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
 
FE FE FE WLS WLS 
Food aid (logs) -0.017 -0.023 -0.038* -0.009 -0.014 
 
(0.345) (0.232) (0.060) (0.695) (0.531)    
L1. food aid (logs) 0.019 0.035** 0.050*** -0.002 0.030** 
 
(0.301) (0.029) (0.003) (0.902) (0.060)    
L2. food aid (logs) 0.008 0.011 
 
0.015 
  
(0.627) (0.422) 
 
(0.405)    
L3. food aid (logs) 
 
0.00798 
 
                
   
(0.679) 
 
                
Agricultural land 6.310*** 6.482*** 6.134*** 6.076*** 5.463*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.006)    
GDP p.c. (logs) 0.022* 0.020 0.022* 0.009 0.002    
 
(0.053) (0.115) (0.099) (0.439) (0.911)    
Nat. disasters -0.061 -0.041 -0.023 0.024 0.052 
 
(0.194) (0.381) (0.634) (0.621) (0.268)    
Civil war -0.082 -0.111 -0.102 -0.016 -0.055 
 
(0.227) (0.122) (0.154) (0.817) (0.465)    
Rural population 1.950 2.673* 3.109** 0.905 1.993    
 
(0.149) (0.061) (0.038) (0.548) (0.239)    
Agric. machinery (logs) -0.139 -0.159 -0.216 0.274** 0.248**  
 
(0.270) (0.223) (0.114) (0.018) (0.037)    
Population (logs) 0.338 0.106 -0.143 0.217 0.327    
 
(0.589) (0.876) (0.843) (0.704) (0.631)    
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.182 11.84 8.937 1.377 -0.845    
N 987 905 837 987 905    
Notes: P-values in parentheses, ***, **, * significant on the 1, 5, and 10%-level respectively, Newey-
West standard errors for panel data applied in every specification. 
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7. Summary and policy recommendations 
The aim of this thesis was to assess different developmental aspects in a global 
and historical perspective by using an alternative, non-monetary approach to well-being. 
Moreover, the impacts and the effectiveness of foreign aid as a tool to reduce absolute 
and relative deprivation were analysed in this context. After introducing fundamental 
concepts, ideas, and research questions in the first chapter, chapter two was dedicated to 
the historical development of educational inequality during the 18
th
 to 20
th
 centuries, 
with a particular focus on the role of globalisation in increasing or reducing the 
educational gap between the rich and the poor. While the analysis focused on Latin 
American educational inequality during the First Era of Globalisation (1850-1913), a 
broader set of developing countries was looked at for the mid- to late-20
th
 century. The 
empirical results show that the First Era of Globalisation was characterised by 
increasing educational inequality, while 20
th
 century globalisation led to a reduction in 
educational inequality. Moreover, there is strong evidence for a modified Kuznets’ 
inverted U hypothesis: educational inequality was rising with GDP per capita until 1913 
and fell with GDP per capita after 1945. 
Inequality also played a significant role in the subsequent chapter: the 
determinants of civil war onset were assessed empirically for a global sample since 
1816. In particular, we evaluated whether countries with unequal living conditions were 
more likely to be hit by a civil war. Previous studies on civil war risk had difficulties in 
empirically examining the effect of inequality on civil unrest as data on traditional 
indicators of inequality, such as Gini coefficients, are often scarce, particularly for the 
poor and conflict-struck regions in the world. In this thesis, an innovative approach for 
measuring inequality was introduced by using the inequality of human height, which is 
closely related to inequality in monetary welfare. Inequality was identified as a main 
force driving the onset of civil conflicts, being even more decisive than absolute poverty 
levels.  
We can draw several conclusions from the results of chapters two and three. 
First, educational inequality has evolved due to external factors and is not an established 
fact that cannot be tackled. Second, globalisation in the 20
th
 century has not harmed 
educational outcomes in developing countries but has probably even been development 
enhancing. Last but not least, if inequality (in well-being) is not reduced, it might 
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trigger new violent conflicts, leading to a (further) destabilisation of the respective 
country and probably even to a vicious circle of inequality, poverty and violence.  
One possibility to fight inequality and poverty in general is to provide foreign 
aid to developing countries. Whether foreign aid has turned out to be an efficient 
development tool or rather produced unwanted effects was examined in chapters four, 
five, and six. While the first of these three chapters explored the impact of overall 
development assistance on well-being, the subsequent chapters offered a detailed insight 
into the effects of nutritional support, i.e., food aid.  
In chapter four, the impacts of overall foreign development assistance provided 
between the 1960s and late-2000s on the biological standard of living were assessed for 
a global sample. While a large strand of literature has already provided empirical 
evidence that aid has weak or even negative impacts on economic growth (Boone 1996; 
Hansen and Tarp 2001; Easterly et al. 2004, among others), this thesis contributes to the 
discussion by showing that similar effects can be found for anthropometric outcomes for 
certain time periods: the results indicate that aid had significantly negative effects on 
well-being in the short-run during the 1960s to late-1970s. However, an equally 
negative impact of overall aid on anthropometric indicators was not found for later 
periods. In the long run, increases in aid flows were even positively related to well-
being outcomes, but not significantly so. The change from significantly negative 
impacts of overall aid until the late-1970s to neutral effects in later periods can partly be 
attributed to the change in policy designs that increased the efficiency of foreign aid. 
However, positive impacts resulting from an improved policy design of development 
assistance seem to be offset by adverse effects evoked, for instance, by rent-seeking 
behaviour. 
The subsequent two chapters took a closer look at sector-specific aid that was 
aimed directly at guaranteeing food security in developing countries. In a first step, we 
assessed whether food aid was able to create the desired effect of improving nutritional 
outcomes (chapter 5). Food aid flows provided between 1995 and 2010 were therefore 
analysed for a global sample with regard to their impact on children’s height and 
weight, key measures of the impact of food aid on human well-being. The results 
provided evidence that food aid was significantly and negatively related to stunting for 
the period under observation. However, a clear causal direction could not be identified 
Chapter 7. Summary and policy recommendations  
 
177 
 
due to a lack of suitable instruments for food aid and the missing possibility of using 
GMM models as a result of the data structure. 
Finally, chapter six analysed whether there is empirical evidence for the 
persistent belief that food aid causes disincentives for recipient countries’ agricultural 
production. More precisely, it has often been claimed that food aid increases food 
supply, thereby leading to a decrease in food prices which makes food production 
unprofitable for farmers. Moreover, repeated nutritional support is believed to create 
disincentives for the government to invest in the agricultural sector. The results did not 
confirm the “disincentive hypothesis”. On the contrary, nutritional support was found to 
be significantly related to future wheat production, while no significant food aid effects 
were found for the total agricultural production. In summary, chapter five and six 
contribute to the aid effectiveness literature by showing that the mostly negative 
presumptions concerning food aid cannot be underpinned by empirical evidence.  
What conclusions can be drawn from this thesis and which policy 
recommendations should be derived on the basis of the results provided here? First of 
all, it has been shown that inequality is not an inevitable fate but has grown historically 
and can therefore be combatted. Second, if inequality is not reduced, it could 
significantly trigger political destabilisation. One tool to fight inequality is foreign 
development assistance: chapter four to six have shown that foreign aid and, in 
particular, food aid is better than its reputation. Moreover, the results suggest that 
foreign aid has become more effective in tackling underdevelopment due to more 
intelligently-designed aid policies. A key conclusion that can be drawn from this thesis 
is therefore that it is not enough to simply increase the amount of foreign aid, as Jeffrey 
Sachs (2005) requested in his bestselling book “The End of Poverty: Economic 
Possibilities of our time”. Rather, it seems to be essential to improve the efficiency of 
foreign aid by reducing the risk of fungibility, rent-seeking-behaviour, corruption, and 
wrong targeting.  
Future research should aim at finding suitable instruments for food aid and 
improve the data base for anthropometric indicators to be able to address the question of 
causality. 
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